{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/34512"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/34512","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Three essays on retailer brand introduction, quality information disclosure and distribution channel","abstract":"Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Seth Robbins (srobbins@illinois.edu) on 2012-09-18T21:21:22Z Item is restricted until 2014-09-18T21:21:01Z","abstract_html":"Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Seth Robbins (srobbins@illinois.edu) on 2012-09-18T21:21:22Z Item is restricted until 2014-09-18T21:21:01Z","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Xiao, Ying"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Business Administration","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Liu, Yunchuan","Balachander, Subramanian","Chhajed, Dilip","Qualls, William J.","Petruzzi, Nicholas C."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-09-18T21:20:50Z","date_published":"2012-09-18T21:20:50Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:31Z","subjects":["Distribution channel","Quality disclosure","Retailer brand","Game theory"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2012 Ying Xiao"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/34512","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Liu, Yunchuan","Balachander, Subramanian","Chhajed, Dilip","Qualls, William J.","Petruzzi, Nicholas C."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Xiao, Ying"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2012-09-18T21:20:50Z","2014-09-18T10:00:36Z","2012-08"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Business Administration"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Distribution channel","Quality disclosure","Retailer brand","Game theory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2012 Ying Xiao"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/34512"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Seth Robbins (srobbins@illinois.edu) on 2012-09-18T21:21:22Z Item is restricted until 2014-09-18T21:21:01Z","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:35:14-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: 2014-09-18 16:21:01 UTC Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 34786 on 2014-09-18T10:00:36Z.","This dissertation consists of three essays studying the impact of retailer store brand introduction to the upstream manufacturer, channel quality disclosure and the overall distribution channel efficiency. Chapter 2 studies the retailer brand introduction strategy with consumer evaluation cost. In the market place, there is a growing trend for retailers to introduce premium store brands to complement manufacturer brands. In this chapter, I study the effects of a retailer premium brand on the profitability of a manufacturer and a retailer when consumers do not have full information about the brands and have to incur a cost to evaluate the products. I show that a manufacturer can benefit when the retailer introduces a retailer brand, and the benefit may increase with the rising popularity of the retailer brand. This happens when the introduction of a retailer brand motivates the retailer to induce consumer evaluation and the manufacturer can take advantage of that to charge a high wholesale price for the manufacturer brand. Depending on the level of consumer evaluation cost, a retailer brand is more likely to be introduced in either a decentralized or a centralized channel. Furthermore, consumer welfare can be higher in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel. Chapter 3 studies the benefits of a decentralized channel with voluntary quality disclosure. Traditional distribution channel literature suggests that a centralized channel structure is more efficient than a decentralized channel structure. In this chapter, I find that a decentralized channel can some- times outperform a centralized channel structure, and the aggregated chan- nel profit in a decentralized channel can be higher disregarding the negative impact from channel double marginalization. This occurs when the product quality information is private and the manufacturer incurs a substantial cost to disclose product quality information. I also show that the distribution of product quality plays a role in shaping consumer beliefs about product quality, leading to a more efficient decentralized channel performance. Chapter 4 combines chapter 2 and chapter 3 to study the quality disclosure strategy with a store brand introduction. In chapter 3, I study a manufac- turer’s strategy to disclose product quality with a passive retailer. In this essay, I extend the model to investigate the strategic quality disclosure from both a manufacturer and a retailer when the retailer introduces a retailer brand. I find that a manufacturer has reduced incentive to conduct quality disclosure with a store brand introduction. This incentive is also affected by asymmetric disclosure costs as well as the average retailer brand quality. Unlike in the competition case, the retailer chooses a disclosure strategy to leverage the sales for both manufacturer brand and the retailer, leading to a higher incentive to disclose when the disclosure costs are the same. The profit and channel efficiency implications are also discussed.","Item withdrawn by Mark Zulauf (zulauf@illinois.edu) on 2012-06-19T19:47:36Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Xiao_Ying.pdf: 1123284 bytes, checksum: 9de0a7eccf03a5957428b3b946fac6be (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2012-09-18T21:20:50Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Xiao_Ying.pdf: 1123284 bytes, checksum: c3fa65c34df68b36281e6ee702d8c5c1 (MD5) license.txt: 4057 bytes, checksum: 92bf8f65db8c487872d9056ffde79dfb (MD5)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Three essays on retailer brand introduction, quality information disclosure and distribution channel"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Liu, Yunchuan","Balachander, Subramanian","Chhajed, Dilip","Qualls, William J.","Petruzzi, Nicholas C."],"dc:creator":["Xiao, Ying"],"dc:date":["2012-09-18T21:20:50Z","2014-09-18T10:00:36Z","2012-08"],"dc:description":["Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Seth Robbins (srobbins@illinois.edu) on 2012-09-18T21:21:22Z Item is restricted until 2014-09-18T21:21:01Z","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:35:14-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: 2014-09-18 16:21:01 UTC Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 34786 on 2014-09-18T10:00:36Z.","This dissertation consists of three essays studying the impact of retailer store brand introduction to the upstream manufacturer, channel quality disclosure and the overall distribution channel efficiency. Chapter 2 studies the retailer brand introduction strategy with consumer evaluation cost. In the market place, there is a growing trend for retailers to introduce premium store brands to complement manufacturer brands. In this chapter, I study the effects of a retailer premium brand on the profitability of a manufacturer and a retailer when consumers do not have full information about the brands and have to incur a cost to evaluate the products. I show that a manufacturer can benefit when the retailer introduces a retailer brand, and the benefit may increase with the rising popularity of the retailer brand. This happens when the introduction of a retailer brand motivates the retailer to induce consumer evaluation and the manufacturer can take advantage of that to charge a high wholesale price for the manufacturer brand. Depending on the level of consumer evaluation cost, a retailer brand is more likely to be introduced in either a decentralized or a centralized channel. Furthermore, consumer welfare can be higher in a decentralized channel than in a centralized channel. Chapter 3 studies the benefits of a decentralized channel with voluntary quality disclosure. Traditional distribution channel literature suggests that a centralized channel structure is more efficient than a decentralized channel structure. In this chapter, I find that a decentralized channel can some- times outperform a centralized channel structure, and the aggregated chan- nel profit in a decentralized channel can be higher disregarding the negative impact from channel double marginalization. This occurs when the product quality information is private and the manufacturer incurs a substantial cost to disclose product quality information. I also show that the distribution of product quality plays a role in shaping consumer beliefs about product quality, leading to a more efficient decentralized channel performance. Chapter 4 combines chapter 2 and chapter 3 to study the quality disclosure strategy with a store brand introduction. In chapter 3, I study a manufac- turer’s strategy to disclose product quality with a passive retailer. In this essay, I extend the model to investigate the strategic quality disclosure from both a manufacturer and a retailer when the retailer introduces a retailer brand. I find that a manufacturer has reduced incentive to conduct quality disclosure with a store brand introduction. This incentive is also affected by asymmetric disclosure costs as well as the average retailer brand quality. Unlike in the competition case, the retailer chooses a disclosure strategy to leverage the sales for both manufacturer brand and the retailer, leading to a higher incentive to disclose when the disclosure costs are the same. The profit and channel efficiency implications are also discussed.","Item withdrawn by Mark Zulauf (zulauf@illinois.edu) on 2012-06-19T19:47:36Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Xiao_Ying.pdf: 1123284 bytes, checksum: 9de0a7eccf03a5957428b3b946fac6be (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2012-09-18T21:20:50Z (GMT). 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