{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/34510"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/34510","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Three to tango: explaining expansion of militarized interstate disputes","abstract":"Why do some international conflicts diffuse and expand beyond its initiators? This dissertation answers this question by identifying the potential third party states to a conflict and focusing on their decisions to join (or not) in an ongoing conflict. Why do some third parties intervene in militarized conflicts, while others do not? The potential joiner’s decision to join an ongoing dispute is influenced by two factors – (1) the degree of affinity i.e. the level of shared strategic, economic and political interests it shares with both sides of the dispute, and (2) the level and nature of its interactions with other potential joiners to the dispute, and other states in international politics, which provide opportunities or places constraints on its decision to join. This paper uses social network analysis to test its logic. Affinity is measured by the ‘structural equivalence’ between a potential joiner and the dispute initiators on both sides of the dispute. It is the extent to which they have the same allies, trade partners and are members of the same international government organizations (IGOs). This project posits that a potential joiner is constrained in its decision to join an ongoing dispute by its position in network spaces of rivalries, international trade, and IGO affiliations. The hypotheses are tested using data on potential joiners to Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between 1816 and 2001. Empirical tests support many of the theoretical propositions. A potential joiner is highly likely to intervene in disputes when it has asymmetric levels of affinities induced by having common allies and shared international organizations with the dispute initiators. A potential joiner’s decision to enter an ongoing dispute is constrained by their centrality in rivalry and international government organization networks.","abstract_html":"Why do some international conflicts diffuse and expand beyond its initiators? This dissertation answers this question by identifying the potential third party states to a conflict and focusing on their decisions to join (or not) in an ongoing conflict. Why do some third parties intervene in militarized conflicts, while others do not? The potential joiner’s decision to join an ongoing dispute is influenced by two factors – (1) the degree of affinity i.e. the level of shared strategic, economic and political interests it shares with both sides of the dispute, and (2) the level and nature of its interactions with other potential joiners to the dispute, and other states in international politics, which provide opportunities or places constraints on its decision to join. This paper uses social network analysis to test its logic. Affinity is measured by the ‘structural equivalence’ between a potential joiner and the dispute initiators on both sides of the dispute. It is the extent to which they have the same allies, trade partners and are members of the same international government organizations (IGOs). This project posits that a potential joiner is constrained in its decision to join an ongoing dispute by its position in network spaces of rivalries, international trade, and IGO affiliations. The hypotheses are tested using data on potential joiners to Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between 1816 and 2001. Empirical tests support many of the theoretical propositions. A potential joiner is highly likely to intervene in disputes when it has asymmetric levels of affinities induced by having common allies and shared international organizations with the dispute initiators. A potential joiner’s decision to enter an ongoing dispute is constrained by their centrality in rivalry and international government organization networks.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Moorthy, Shweta"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Diehl, Paul F.","Flint, Colin","Vasquez, John A.","Shumate, Michelle D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-09-18T21:20:45Z","date_published":"2012-09-18T21:20:45Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:31Z","subjects":["interstate disputes","intervention","joining"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2012 Shweta Moorthy."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/34510","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Diehl, Paul F.","Flint, Colin","Vasquez, John A.","Shumate, Michelle D."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Moorthy, Shweta"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2012-09-18T21:20:45Z","2014-10-15T10:00:43Z","2012-08"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["interstate disputes","intervention","joining"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2012 Shweta Moorthy."]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/34510"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Why do some international conflicts diffuse and expand beyond its initiators? This dissertation answers this question by identifying the potential third party states to a conflict and focusing on their decisions to join (or not) in an ongoing conflict. Why do some third parties intervene in militarized conflicts, while others do not? The potential joiner’s decision to join an ongoing dispute is influenced by two factors – (1) the degree of affinity i.e. the level of shared strategic, economic and political interests it shares with both sides of the dispute, and (2) the level and nature of its interactions with other potential joiners to the dispute, and other states in international politics, which provide opportunities or places constraints on its decision to join. This paper uses social network analysis to test its logic. Affinity is measured by the ‘structural equivalence’ between a potential joiner and the dispute initiators on both sides of the dispute. It is the extent to which they have the same allies, trade partners and are members of the same international government organizations (IGOs). This project posits that a potential joiner is constrained in its decision to join an ongoing dispute by its position in network spaces of rivalries, international trade, and IGO affiliations. The hypotheses are tested using data on potential joiners to Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between 1816 and 2001. Empirical tests support many of the theoretical propositions. A potential joiner is highly likely to intervene in disputes when it has asymmetric levels of affinities induced by having common allies and shared international organizations with the dispute initiators. A potential joiner’s decision to enter an ongoing dispute is constrained by their centrality in rivalry and international government organization networks.","Item withdrawn by Mark Zulauf (zulauf@illinois.edu) on 2012-07-09T18:31:07Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Moorthy_Shweta.pdf: 751084 bytes, checksum: 5b9cc9d51471bcc081cd97c703a69153 (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2012-09-18T21:20:45Z (GMT). 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This dissertation answers this question by identifying the potential third party states to a conflict and focusing on their decisions to join (or not) in an ongoing conflict. Why do some third parties intervene in militarized conflicts, while others do not? The potential joiner’s decision to join an ongoing dispute is influenced by two factors – (1) the degree of affinity i.e. the level of shared strategic, economic and political interests it shares with both sides of the dispute, and (2) the level and nature of its interactions with other potential joiners to the dispute, and other states in international politics, which provide opportunities or places constraints on its decision to join. This paper uses social network analysis to test its logic. Affinity is measured by the ‘structural equivalence’ between a potential joiner and the dispute initiators on both sides of the dispute. It is the extent to which they have the same allies, trade partners and are members of the same international government organizations (IGOs). This project posits that a potential joiner is constrained in its decision to join an ongoing dispute by its position in network spaces of rivalries, international trade, and IGO affiliations. The hypotheses are tested using data on potential joiners to Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) between 1816 and 2001. Empirical tests support many of the theoretical propositions. A potential joiner is highly likely to intervene in disputes when it has asymmetric levels of affinities induced by having common allies and shared international organizations with the dispute initiators. A potential joiner’s decision to enter an ongoing dispute is constrained by their centrality in rivalry and international government organization networks.","Item withdrawn by Mark Zulauf (zulauf@illinois.edu) on 2012-07-09T18:31:07Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Moorthy_Shweta.pdf: 751084 bytes, checksum: 5b9cc9d51471bcc081cd97c703a69153 (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2012-09-18T21:20:45Z (GMT). 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