{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/31122"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/31122","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Spoofing GPS receiver clock offset of phasor measurement units","abstract":"We demonstrate the feasibility of a spoofing attack on the GPS receiver of a phasor measurement unit (PMU). We formulate the attack as an optimization problem where the objective is to maximize the difference between the time offset of the PMU's receiver clock before and after the attack. Since the PMU uses this clock offset to compute a time-stamp for its measurements, an error in the receiver clock offset introduces a proportional phase error in the voltage or current phase measurements provided by the PMU with a phase-wrap of $2\\pi$ (in practice, the computed maximum receiver clock offset error is never large enough to induce a phase error that requires a phase-wrap of $2\\pi$) . The decision variables in the optimization problem are the satellites' ephemerides, pseudoranges, and the receiver coordinates. The constraints are cast such that the receiver and satellite positions computed from the solution of the optimization problem will be close to their pre-attack values to avoid detection. We show that the spoofing attack is feasible for any number of visible satellites. Simulation results, in which four and seven satellites are spoofed, are presented to illustrate the effect of the attack on the phase measurements provided by a PMU.","abstract_html":"We demonstrate the feasibility of a spoofing attack on the GPS receiver of a phasor measurement unit (PMU). We formulate the attack as an optimization problem where the objective is to maximize the difference between the time offset of the PMU&#x27;s receiver clock before and after the attack. Since the PMU uses this clock offset to compute a time-stamp for its measurements, an error in the receiver clock offset introduces a proportional phase error in the voltage or current phase measurements provided by the PMU with a phase-wrap of <span class=\"etd-inline-math\">2&pi;</span> (in practice, the computed maximum receiver clock offset error is never large enough to induce a phase error that requires a phase-wrap of <span class=\"etd-inline-math\">2&pi;</span>) . The decision variables in the optimization problem are the satellites&#x27; ephemerides, pseudoranges, and the receiver coordinates. The constraints are cast such that the receiver and satellite positions computed from the solution of the optimization problem will be close to their pre-attack values to avoid detection. We show that the spoofing attack is feasible for any number of visible satellites. Simulation results, in which four and seven satellites are spoofed, are presented to illustrate the effect of the attack on the phase measurements provided by a PMU.","abstract_has_math":true,"creators":["Jiang, Xichen"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Electrical & Computer Engr","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Domínguez-García, Alejandro D."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-05","date_published":"2012-05","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:30Z","subjects":["GPS Spoofing","phasor measurement unit (PMU)","Global Positioning System (GPS)"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2012 Xichen Jiang"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/31122","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Domínguez-García, Alejandro D."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Jiang, Xichen"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2012-05","2012-05-22T00:29:32Z"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical & Computer Engr"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["GPS Spoofing","phasor measurement unit (PMU)","Global Positioning System (GPS)"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2012 Xichen Jiang"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/31122"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["We demonstrate the feasibility of a spoofing attack on the GPS receiver of a phasor measurement unit (PMU). We formulate the attack as an optimization problem where the objective is to maximize the difference between the time offset of the PMU's receiver clock before and after the attack. Since the PMU uses this clock offset to compute a time-stamp for its measurements, an error in the receiver clock offset introduces a proportional phase error in the voltage or current phase measurements provided by the PMU with a phase-wrap of $2\\pi$ (in practice, the computed maximum receiver clock offset error is never large enough to induce a phase error that requires a phase-wrap of $2\\pi$) . The decision variables in the optimization problem are the satellites' ephemerides, pseudoranges, and the receiver coordinates. The constraints are cast such that the receiver and satellite positions computed from the solution of the optimization problem will be close to their pre-attack values to avoid detection. We show that the spoofing attack is feasible for any number of visible satellites. Simulation results, in which four and seven satellites are spoofed, are presented to illustrate the effect of the attack on the phase measurements provided by a PMU.","Item withdrawn by Rebecca Bryant (rabryant@illinois.edu) on 2012-04-18T21:59:07Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Jiang_Xichen.pdf: 365935 bytes, checksum: 06a0756a40282071c9c3c9e38b83c118 (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2012-05-22T00:29:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Jiang_Xichen.pdf: 365935 bytes, checksum: 06a0756a40282071c9c3c9e38b83c118 (MD5) license.txt: 4061 bytes, checksum: 99a2e1274d89a408b87442c5dd5b4ec0 (MD5)"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Spoofing GPS receiver clock offset of phasor measurement units"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Domínguez-García, Alejandro D."],"dc:creator":["Jiang, Xichen"],"dc:date":["2012-05","2012-05-22T00:29:32Z"],"dc:description":["We demonstrate the feasibility of a spoofing attack on the GPS receiver of a phasor measurement unit (PMU). We formulate the attack as an optimization problem where the objective is to maximize the difference between the time offset of the PMU's receiver clock before and after the attack. Since the PMU uses this clock offset to compute a time-stamp for its measurements, an error in the receiver clock offset introduces a proportional phase error in the voltage or current phase measurements provided by the PMU with a phase-wrap of $2\\pi$ (in practice, the computed maximum receiver clock offset error is never large enough to induce a phase error that requires a phase-wrap of $2\\pi$) . The decision variables in the optimization problem are the satellites' ephemerides, pseudoranges, and the receiver coordinates. The constraints are cast such that the receiver and satellite positions computed from the solution of the optimization problem will be close to their pre-attack values to avoid detection. We show that the spoofing attack is feasible for any number of visible satellites. Simulation results, in which four and seven satellites are spoofed, are presented to illustrate the effect of the attack on the phase measurements provided by a PMU.","Item withdrawn by Rebecca Bryant (rabryant@illinois.edu) on 2012-04-18T21:59:07Z Item was in collections: University of Illinois Theses & Dissertations (ID: 1) No. of bitstreams: 1 Jiang_Xichen.pdf: 365935 bytes, checksum: 06a0756a40282071c9c3c9e38b83c118 (MD5)","Made available in DSpace on 2012-05-22T00:29:32Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Jiang_Xichen.pdf: 365935 bytes, checksum: 06a0756a40282071c9c3c9e38b83c118 (MD5) license.txt: 4061 bytes, checksum: 99a2e1274d89a408b87442c5dd5b4ec0 (MD5)"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/31122"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2012 Xichen Jiang"],"dc:subject":["GPS Spoofing","phasor measurement unit (PMU)","Global Positioning System (GPS)"],"dc:title":["Spoofing GPS receiver clock offset of phasor measurement units"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Electrical & Computer Engr"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.S."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:30Z"}