{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/23765"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/23765","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Behavioral decision theory and the negotiation process; effects of agenda and frame","abstract":"The current study examines the effect of segregation or integration of the issues under negotiation. Subjects negotiated a transaction under four conditions of Frame (profit or loss) and Agenda (5 segregated issues vs. 1 integrated issue). It also provides a competitive test of several economic models of preference (Expected Value, Expected Utility, and Prospect Theory) by fitting utility functions to negotiation behavior observed in a laboratory setting. In addition to inferring the form of the utility function from observed negotiation behavior, utility functions were measured directly. Results strongly suggest that the Prospect Theory value function provides the best prediction of actual negotiation behavior. Results have implications for the optimal way to set the agenda of a negotiation. Recent international negotiations are interpreted within the context of agenda and frame.","abstract_html":"The current study examines the effect of segregation or integration of the issues under negotiation. Subjects negotiated a transaction under four conditions of Frame (profit or loss) and Agenda (5 segregated issues vs. 1 integrated issue). It also provides a competitive test of several economic models of preference (Expected Value, Expected Utility, and Prospect Theory) by fitting utility functions to negotiation behavior observed in a laboratory setting. In addition to inferring the form of the utility function from observed negotiation behavior, utility functions were measured directly. Results strongly suggest that the Prospect Theory value function provides the best prediction of actual negotiation behavior. Results have implications for the optimal way to set the agenda of a negotiation. Recent international negotiations are interpreted within the context of agenda and frame.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Bontempo, Robert Nathaniel"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Psychology, Social","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Triandis, Harry C."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-05-07T14:26:14Z","date_published":"2011-05-07T14:26:14Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:22Z","subjects":["Psychology, Social","Business Administration, Management","Economics, Theory"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright 1990 Bontempo, Robert Nathaniel"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI9114179","(UMI)AAI9114179"],"render_values":[{"text":"AAI9114179","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"(UMI)AAI9114179","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/23765","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Triandis, Harry C."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Bontempo, Robert Nathaniel"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2011-05-07T14:26:14Z","10000-01-01","1990"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Psychology, Social","Business Administration, Management","Economics, Theory"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Psychology, Social","Business Administration, Management","Economics, Theory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 1990 Bontempo, Robert Nathaniel"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/23765","AAI9114179","(UMI)AAI9114179"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The current study examines the effect of segregation or integration of the issues under negotiation. 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Subjects negotiated a transaction under four conditions of Frame (profit or loss) and Agenda (5 segregated issues vs. 1 integrated issue). It also provides a competitive test of several economic models of preference (Expected Value, Expected Utility, and Prospect Theory) by fitting utility functions to negotiation behavior observed in a laboratory setting. In addition to inferring the form of the utility function from observed negotiation behavior, utility functions were measured directly. Results strongly suggest that the Prospect Theory value function provides the best prediction of actual negotiation behavior. Results have implications for the optimal way to set the agenda of a negotiation. Recent international negotiations are interpreted within the context of agenda and frame.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T14:26:14Z (GMT). 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