{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/23353"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/23353","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Effect of separation of duties on firm costs and employee incentives for fraud, theft, and embezzlement","abstract":"U of I Only","abstract_html":"U of I Only","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Jones, Roberta Ann"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Accountancy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Chandler, John S."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-05-07T14:11:10Z","date_published":"2011-05-07T14:11:10Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:21Z","subjects":["Business Administration, Accounting","Business Administration, General","Sociology, Criminology and Penology"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright 1996 Jones, Roberta Ann"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["9780591198522","AAI9712325","(UMI)AAI9712325"],"render_values":[{"text":"9780591198522","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"AAI9712325","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"(UMI)AAI9712325","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/23353","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Chandler, John S."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Jones, Roberta Ann"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2011-05-07T14:11:10Z","10000-01-01","1996"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Accountancy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Business Administration, Accounting","Business Administration, General","Sociology, Criminology and Penology"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 1996 Jones, Roberta Ann"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["9780591198522","AAI9712325","(UMI)AAI9712325","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/23353"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["U of I Only","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:30:29-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","Using a principal-agent model this research examines the efficacy of a fundamental internal control-separation of duties (SOD). The firm is the principal and non-managerial employees are agents. Three cases are studied. The first case is a bench-mark single-agent model. The second case is a SOD model that employs two agents. Finally, an n-agent SOD model is examined.","The firm seeks to minimize the costs of unintentional errors and fraud by utilizing SOD. However, SOD is not cost-free so that a trade-off exists between the costs of SOD and the costs of errors and fraud.","The agents consider benefits from asset misappropriation, costs of committing fraud, and costs of collusion. The utility an employee derives from fraud is different for each employee, but I assume every employee has a threshold amount that acts as a fraud incentive.","One employee is the fraud instigator who decides if to approach other agents to collude. This employee bears all the costs of collusion. The other employees decide if to accept the instigator's offer. These employees consider their utility from asset misappropriation relative to penalties if caught. Should these employees decide not to collude they decide if to report the collusion attempt. This brings with it a risk of censure which is part of their decision to collude.","I find as that cost of collusion increases the fraud incentive amount and the probability of collusion also increase. This does not ensure the cost of collusion is a disincentive for fraud. SOD may merely caused the amount stolen to increase.","Further, if additional employees are hired to implement SOD then, more likely than not, SOD will not be cost effective for the firm. Finally, if employees increase the amount stolen when their effort increases the probability that SOD is cost effective is strictly less than one.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T14:11:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 9712325.pdf: 5260159 bytes, checksum: cbff5097268c8075bfb0509a40b6de0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 1996","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T15:03:54Z Item is restricted indefinitely.","ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Effect of separation of duties on firm costs and employee incentives for fraud, theft, and embezzlement"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Chandler, John S."],"dc:creator":["Jones, Roberta Ann"],"dc:date":["2011-05-07T14:11:10Z","10000-01-01","1996"],"dc:description":["U of I Only","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:30:29-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","Using a principal-agent model this research examines the efficacy of a fundamental internal control-separation of duties (SOD). The firm is the principal and non-managerial employees are agents. Three cases are studied. The first case is a bench-mark single-agent model. The second case is a SOD model that employs two agents. Finally, an n-agent SOD model is examined.","The firm seeks to minimize the costs of unintentional errors and fraud by utilizing SOD. However, SOD is not cost-free so that a trade-off exists between the costs of SOD and the costs of errors and fraud.","The agents consider benefits from asset misappropriation, costs of committing fraud, and costs of collusion. The utility an employee derives from fraud is different for each employee, but I assume every employee has a threshold amount that acts as a fraud incentive.","One employee is the fraud instigator who decides if to approach other agents to collude. This employee bears all the costs of collusion. The other employees decide if to accept the instigator's offer. These employees consider their utility from asset misappropriation relative to penalties if caught. Should these employees decide not to collude they decide if to report the collusion attempt. This brings with it a risk of censure which is part of their decision to collude.","I find as that cost of collusion increases the fraud incentive amount and the probability of collusion also increase. This does not ensure the cost of collusion is a disincentive for fraud. SOD may merely caused the amount stolen to increase.","Further, if additional employees are hired to implement SOD then, more likely than not, SOD will not be cost effective for the firm. Finally, if employees increase the amount stolen when their effort increases the probability that SOD is cost effective is strictly less than one.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T14:11:10Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 9712325.pdf: 5260159 bytes, checksum: cbff5097268c8075bfb0509a40b6de0e (MD5) Previous issue date: 1996","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T15:03:54Z Item is restricted indefinitely.","ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission"],"dc:identifier":["9780591198522","AAI9712325","(UMI)AAI9712325","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/23353"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 1996 Jones, Roberta Ann"],"dc:subject":["Business Administration, Accounting","Business Administration, General","Sociology, Criminology and Penology"],"dc:title":["Effect of separation of duties on firm costs and employee incentives for fraud, theft, and embezzlement"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Accountancy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:21Z"}