{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/22617"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/22617","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Rules for water allocation in a small watershed: A game theoretic approach","abstract":"\"Exchanges of either long term rights (property right transfer) or spot rights (rights rental) to water may result in third party effects that place practical limits on the geographic scope of a water market. The result will be a market with few eligible participants. A \"\"thin\"\" market suffers from strategic manipulation and allocational distortions. Using a game theoretic approach based on multilateral bargaining models, this study addresses the issue of designing trade rules to facilitate smooth functioning of a thin spot rights market operating in a variety of exchange environments.\"","abstract_html":""Exchanges of either long term rights (property right transfer) or spot rights (rights rental) to water may result in third party effects that place practical limits on the geographic scope of a water market. The result will be a market with few eligible participants. A ""thin"" market suffers from strategic manipulation and allocational distortions. Using a game theoretic approach based on multilateral bargaining models, this study addresses the issue of designing trade rules to facilitate smooth functioning of a thin spot rights market operating in a variety of exchange environments."","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Saleth, R. Maria"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Agricultural and Consumer Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Braden, John B."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-05-07T13:45:39Z","date_published":"2011-05-07T13:45:39Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:20Z","subjects":["Economics, Agricultural"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright 1989 Saleth, R. Maria"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI8916301","(UMI)AAI8916301"],"render_values":[{"text":"AAI8916301","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"(UMI)AAI8916301","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/22617","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Braden, John B."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Saleth, R. 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Maria"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI8916301","(UMI)AAI8916301","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/22617"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["\"Exchanges of either long term rights (property right transfer) or spot rights (rights rental) to water may result in third party effects that place practical limits on the geographic scope of a water market. The result will be a market with few eligible participants. A \"\"thin\"\" market suffers from strategic manipulation and allocational distortions. Using a game theoretic approach based on multilateral bargaining models, this study addresses the issue of designing trade rules to facilitate smooth functioning of a thin spot rights market operating in a variety of exchange environments.\"","Six different trade rules were analyzed under 24 exchange environments. Numerical results were based on a hypothetical water market operating in conditions representing the Crane Creek Watershed of Kankakee County, Illinois. The water market equilibria under various trade rules and exchange environments were identified by simulating the multilateral bargaining among the participants. By comparing these equilibria, the relative efficacy of the candidate trade rules was determined.","The results were that a price bidding signal produced maximal gains in most environments and the settlements based on the average of the buyer's and seller's prices performed best in most cases. As the market size increases, the bargaining equilibrium prices resulting from various trade rules converge to the competitive equilibrium prices in all exchange environments.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:45:39Z (GMT). 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Maria"],"dc:date":["2011-05-07T13:45:39Z","10000-01-01","1989"],"dc:description":["\"Exchanges of either long term rights (property right transfer) or spot rights (rights rental) to water may result in third party effects that place practical limits on the geographic scope of a water market. The result will be a market with few eligible participants. A \"\"thin\"\" market suffers from strategic manipulation and allocational distortions. Using a game theoretic approach based on multilateral bargaining models, this study addresses the issue of designing trade rules to facilitate smooth functioning of a thin spot rights market operating in a variety of exchange environments.\"","Six different trade rules were analyzed under 24 exchange environments. Numerical results were based on a hypothetical water market operating in conditions representing the Crane Creek Watershed of Kankakee County, Illinois. The water market equilibria under various trade rules and exchange environments were identified by simulating the multilateral bargaining among the participants. By comparing these equilibria, the relative efficacy of the candidate trade rules was determined.","The results were that a price bidding signal produced maximal gains in most environments and the settlements based on the average of the buyer's and seller's prices performed best in most cases. As the market size increases, the bargaining equilibrium prices resulting from various trade rules converge to the competitive equilibrium prices in all exchange environments.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:45:39Z (GMT). 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Maria"],"dc:subject":["Economics, Agricultural"],"dc:title":["Rules for water allocation in a small watershed: A game theoretic approach"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Agricultural and Consumer Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:20Z"}