{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/21752"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/21752","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Negotiation teams: The impact of caucusing and team accountability on interaction processes and outcomes","abstract":"The model proposed here suggests that within-team processes in team negotiation moderate the effect of situational variables (e.g., accountability) on between-team negotiation processes. To test this model, representation structure (teams that caucus, teams that do not caucus, and solo negotiators) was crossed with accountability to constituents (low, high). The model was supported in this study. Following a pre-negotiation task phase, solo negotiators reported that they trusted the other less than teams did. Yet, teams made more individualistic first offers. These effects were enhanced under conditions of high accountability such that solos in this condition had lower first offers than teams and also felt they were less advantaged in the upcoming negotiation than negotiators in any other condition. There was no effect for caucusing. Following the negotiation, teams were more accurate in their judgments of the other's priorities for the integrative issues, but not the common value issue. This cognitive advantage did not translate into more integrative outcomes for teams. Following the negotiation, teams more than solos reported that they were more powerful than the other party; teams liked the other party less than solos did; and, solos trusted the other party more than teams did. Under conditions of low accountability, teams achieved the highest outcomes for the integrative issues. Implications for these results on future studies of team negotiation are also discussed.","abstract_html":"The model proposed here suggests that within-team processes in team negotiation moderate the effect of situational variables (e.g., accountability) on between-team negotiation processes. To test this model, representation structure (teams that caucus, teams that do not caucus, and solo negotiators) was crossed with accountability to constituents (low, high). The model was supported in this study. Following a pre-negotiation task phase, solo negotiators reported that they trusted the other less than teams did. Yet, teams made more individualistic first offers. These effects were enhanced under conditions of high accountability such that solos in this condition had lower first offers than teams and also felt they were less advantaged in the upcoming negotiation than negotiators in any other condition. There was no effect for caucusing. Following the negotiation, teams were more accurate in their judgments of the other's priorities for the integrative issues, but not the common value issue. This cognitive advantage did not translate into more integrative outcomes for teams. Following the negotiation, teams more than solos reported that they were more powerful than the other party; teams liked the other party less than solos did; and, solos trusted the other party more than teams did. Under conditions of low accountability, teams achieved the highest outcomes for the integrative issues. Implications for these results on future studies of team negotiation are also discussed.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["O'Connor, Kathleen Mary"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Psychology","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Carnevale, Peter J."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-05-07T13:18:05Z","date_published":"2011-05-07T13:18:05Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:18Z","subjects":["Psychology, Social","Psychology, Industrial","Sociology, Industrial and Labor Relations"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright 1994 O'Connor, Kathleen Mary"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI9512501","(UMI)AAI9512501"],"render_values":[{"text":"AAI9512501","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"(UMI)AAI9512501","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/21752","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Carnevale, Peter J."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["O'Connor, Kathleen Mary"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2011-05-07T13:18:05Z","10000-01-01","1994"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Psychology"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Psychology, Social","Psychology, Industrial","Sociology, Industrial and Labor Relations"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 1994 O'Connor, Kathleen Mary"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI9512501","(UMI)AAI9512501","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/21752"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The model proposed here suggests that within-team processes in team negotiation moderate the effect of situational variables (e.g., accountability) on between-team negotiation processes. To test this model, representation structure (teams that caucus, teams that do not caucus, and solo negotiators) was crossed with accountability to constituents (low, high). The model was supported in this study. Following a pre-negotiation task phase, solo negotiators reported that they trusted the other less than teams did. Yet, teams made more individualistic first offers. These effects were enhanced under conditions of high accountability such that solos in this condition had lower first offers than teams and also felt they were less advantaged in the upcoming negotiation than negotiators in any other condition. There was no effect for caucusing. Following the negotiation, teams were more accurate in their judgments of the other's priorities for the integrative issues, but not the common value issue. This cognitive advantage did not translate into more integrative outcomes for teams. Following the negotiation, teams more than solos reported that they were more powerful than the other party; teams liked the other party less than solos did; and, solos trusted the other party more than teams did. Under conditions of low accountability, teams achieved the highest outcomes for the integrative issues. Implications for these results on future studies of team negotiation are also discussed.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:18:05Z (GMT). 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To test this model, representation structure (teams that caucus, teams that do not caucus, and solo negotiators) was crossed with accountability to constituents (low, high). The model was supported in this study. Following a pre-negotiation task phase, solo negotiators reported that they trusted the other less than teams did. Yet, teams made more individualistic first offers. These effects were enhanced under conditions of high accountability such that solos in this condition had lower first offers than teams and also felt they were less advantaged in the upcoming negotiation than negotiators in any other condition. There was no effect for caucusing. Following the negotiation, teams were more accurate in their judgments of the other's priorities for the integrative issues, but not the common value issue. This cognitive advantage did not translate into more integrative outcomes for teams. Following the negotiation, teams more than solos reported that they were more powerful than the other party; teams liked the other party less than solos did; and, solos trusted the other party more than teams did. Under conditions of low accountability, teams achieved the highest outcomes for the integrative issues. Implications for these results on future studies of team negotiation are also discussed.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:18:05Z (GMT). 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