{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/21196"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/21196","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"The effects of uncertainty and penalty on cooperative behavior in a resource dilemma","abstract":"\"A resource dilemma, a special case of a social dilemma, simulates a situation in which a group of individuals can \"\"harvest\"\" resources from a common resource pool. But if they overharvest from the common pool, the pool can become \"\"extinct.\"\" Thus, each member's decision must consider the level of the pool in the future as well as the current level. The effects of uncertainty about resource pool size and information about members' harvest decisions were investigated. Groups of four subjects (undergraduate students) were asked to harvest points from a replenishable resource pool. Three factors were crossed in a factorial design: uncertainty (high vs low), penalty for overharvest (high vs low), and feedback information (individual vs aggregated group level). The primary dependent measures were mean group harvest, whether members elected a leader who would harvest for the group instead of harvesting for themselves, and mean absolute deviation among members' harvests. Results showed that subjects harvested less when uncertainty was high, a finding opposite to the results of previous studies. The differences were discussed in terms of prospect theory. Uncertainty by penalty interaction showed that members' harvests tended to increase with high uncertainty, and the reverse with low uncertainty. For leader election, as total group harvest increased, and as members perceived others were greedy, a leader was more likely to be preferred. Finally, the dispersion of group members' harvests decreased over trials, supporting the \"\"equal division heuristic\"\" hypothesis.\"","abstract_html":""A resource dilemma, a special case of a social dilemma, simulates a situation in which a group of individuals can ""harvest"" resources from a common resource pool. But if they overharvest from the common pool, the pool can become ""extinct."" Thus, each member's decision must consider the level of the pool in the future as well as the current level. The effects of uncertainty about resource pool size and information about members' harvest decisions were investigated. Groups of four subjects (undergraduate students) were asked to harvest points from a replenishable resource pool. Three factors were crossed in a factorial design: uncertainty (high vs low), penalty for overharvest (high vs low), and feedback information (individual vs aggregated group level). The primary dependent measures were mean group harvest, whether members elected a leader who would harvest for the group instead of harvesting for themselves, and mean absolute deviation among members' harvests. Results showed that subjects harvested less when uncertainty was high, a finding opposite to the results of previous studies. The differences were discussed in terms of prospect theory. Uncertainty by penalty interaction showed that members' harvests tended to increase with high uncertainty, and the reverse with low uncertainty. For leader election, as total group harvest increased, and as members perceived others were greedy, a leader was more likely to be preferred. Finally, the dispersion of group members' harvests decreased over trials, supporting the ""equal division heuristic"" hypothesis."","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Nam, Kidok"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Psychology","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Komorita, Samuel S."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-05-07T13:01:19Z","date_published":"2011-05-07T13:01:19Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:17Z","subjects":["Psychology, Social"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright 1991 Nam, Kidok"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI9210933","(UMI)AAI9210933"],"render_values":[{"text":"AAI9210933","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"(UMI)AAI9210933","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/21196","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Komorita, Samuel S."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Nam, Kidok"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2011-05-07T13:01:19Z","10000-01-01","1991"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Psychology"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Psychology, Social"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 1991 Nam, Kidok"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI9210933","(UMI)AAI9210933","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/21196"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["\"A resource dilemma, a special case of a social dilemma, simulates a situation in which a group of individuals can \"\"harvest\"\" resources from a common resource pool. But if they overharvest from the common pool, the pool can become \"\"extinct.\"\" Thus, each member's decision must consider the level of the pool in the future as well as the current level. The effects of uncertainty about resource pool size and information about members' harvest decisions were investigated. Groups of four subjects (undergraduate students) were asked to harvest points from a replenishable resource pool. Three factors were crossed in a factorial design: uncertainty (high vs low), penalty for overharvest (high vs low), and feedback information (individual vs aggregated group level). The primary dependent measures were mean group harvest, whether members elected a leader who would harvest for the group instead of harvesting for themselves, and mean absolute deviation among members' harvests. Results showed that subjects harvested less when uncertainty was high, a finding opposite to the results of previous studies. The differences were discussed in terms of prospect theory. Uncertainty by penalty interaction showed that members' harvests tended to increase with high uncertainty, and the reverse with low uncertainty. For leader election, as total group harvest increased, and as members perceived others were greedy, a leader was more likely to be preferred. Finally, the dispersion of group members' harvests decreased over trials, supporting the \"\"equal division heuristic\"\" hypothesis.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:01:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 9210933.pdf: 4939898 bytes, checksum: fa765e696221c04c254223f4b7cebdec (MD5) Previous issue date: 1991","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T14:49:08Z Item is restricted indefinitely.","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:22:19-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","U of I Only"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The effects of uncertainty and penalty on cooperative behavior in a resource dilemma"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Komorita, Samuel S."],"dc:creator":["Nam, Kidok"],"dc:date":["2011-05-07T13:01:19Z","10000-01-01","1991"],"dc:description":["\"A resource dilemma, a special case of a social dilemma, simulates a situation in which a group of individuals can \"\"harvest\"\" resources from a common resource pool. But if they overharvest from the common pool, the pool can become \"\"extinct.\"\" Thus, each member's decision must consider the level of the pool in the future as well as the current level. The effects of uncertainty about resource pool size and information about members' harvest decisions were investigated. Groups of four subjects (undergraduate students) were asked to harvest points from a replenishable resource pool. Three factors were crossed in a factorial design: uncertainty (high vs low), penalty for overharvest (high vs low), and feedback information (individual vs aggregated group level). The primary dependent measures were mean group harvest, whether members elected a leader who would harvest for the group instead of harvesting for themselves, and mean absolute deviation among members' harvests. Results showed that subjects harvested less when uncertainty was high, a finding opposite to the results of previous studies. The differences were discussed in terms of prospect theory. Uncertainty by penalty interaction showed that members' harvests tended to increase with high uncertainty, and the reverse with low uncertainty. For leader election, as total group harvest increased, and as members perceived others were greedy, a leader was more likely to be preferred. Finally, the dispersion of group members' harvests decreased over trials, supporting the \"\"equal division heuristic\"\" hypothesis.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T13:01:19Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 license.txt: 4922 bytes, checksum: 910b249b4beec47e7ab768910c8f966f (MD5) 9210933.pdf: 4939898 bytes, checksum: fa765e696221c04c254223f4b7cebdec (MD5) Previous issue date: 1991","Item marked as restricted to the 'UIUC Users [automated]' Group (id=2) by Howard Ding (hding2@illinois.edu) on 2011-05-07T14:49:08Z Item is restricted indefinitely.","Restriction data tranferred 2014-07-01T11:22:19-05:00 Original Data Group with Access UIUC Users [automated] Release Date: none Reason: ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","ETDs are only available to UIUC Users without author permission","U of I Only"],"dc:identifier":["AAI9210933","(UMI)AAI9210933","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/21196"],"dc:language":["eng"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 1991 Nam, Kidok"],"dc:subject":["Psychology, Social"],"dc:title":["The effects of uncertainty and penalty on cooperative behavior in a resource dilemma"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Psychology"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:17Z"}