{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19897"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19897","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Power growth and decay and conflict behavior in dyadic rivalries: A dynamic model","abstract":"This dissertation studies the dynamic relationship between two competing nations' power levels and their conflictual behavior toward one another. A formal model is developed by drawing on the balance of power and power transition literatures. The model, a system of differential equations, is then analyzed in order to answer several substantive questions generated from the balance of power-power transition debate. For example, under what conditions do power transitions occur, i.e., why do some rivalries experience transitions while others do not? What are the behavioral consequences of power transitions, or what level of conflict should we expect from a rivalry in transition? Which rival nation, the weaker or the stronger, is most conflictual? Last, an empirical test of the model is offered, using the Correlates of War data on power levels for major nations and Militarized Interstate Dispute data on dyadic conflict behavior.","abstract_html":"This dissertation studies the dynamic relationship between two competing nations' power levels and their conflictual behavior toward one another. A formal model is developed by drawing on the balance of power and power transition literatures. The model, a system of differential equations, is then analyzed in order to answer several substantive questions generated from the balance of power-power transition debate. For example, under what conditions do power transitions occur, i.e., why do some rivalries experience transitions while others do not? What are the behavioral consequences of power transitions, or what level of conflict should we expect from a rivalry in transition? Which rival nation, the weaker or the stronger, is most conflictual? Last, an empirical test of the model is offered, using the Correlates of War data on power levels for major nations and Militarized Interstate Dispute data on dyadic conflict behavior.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kadera, Kelly Michele"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-05-07T12:22:09Z","date_published":"2011-05-07T12:22:09Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:14Z","subjects":["Political Science, General","Political Science, International Law and Relations"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright 1995 Kadera, Kelly Michele"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI9543617","(UMI)AAI9543617"],"render_values":[{"text":"AAI9543617","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"(UMI)AAI9543617","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/19897","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kadera, Kelly Michele"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2011-05-07T12:22:09Z","10000-01-01","1995"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Political Science, General","Political Science, International Law and Relations"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 1995 Kadera, Kelly Michele"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI9543617","(UMI)AAI9543617","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/19897"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This dissertation studies the dynamic relationship between two competing nations' power levels and their conflictual behavior toward one another. 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A formal model is developed by drawing on the balance of power and power transition literatures. The model, a system of differential equations, is then analyzed in order to answer several substantive questions generated from the balance of power-power transition debate. For example, under what conditions do power transitions occur, i.e., why do some rivalries experience transitions while others do not? What are the behavioral consequences of power transitions, or what level of conflict should we expect from a rivalry in transition? Which rival nation, the weaker or the stronger, is most conflictual? Last, an empirical test of the model is offered, using the Correlates of War data on power levels for major nations and Militarized Interstate Dispute data on dyadic conflict behavior.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T12:22:09Z (GMT). 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