{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19836"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19836","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"The structure of equilibrium marketing channels: Common versus exclusive retailers","abstract":"Coordination and control are critical aspects in the design of marketing channels due to the interdependence of various channel members and the complex flow of products, title to the products, payments and information. Important marketing decisions, such as prices and the level of promotional services, are often delegated to members of the marketing channel with divergent individual incentives. In this dissertation, I study equilibria in marketing channels in a differentiated product duopoly consisting of a single common retailer and two exclusive retailers. Interactions due to retail prices and the level of unobservable promotional effort provided by the retailer(s) contribute to interdependence of marketing decisions. Both exclusive retailers and common retailers will be observed in equilibrium marketing channels. If linear (one-part) wholesale prices are used in transactions between manufacturers and retailers, the argument that a common retailer is a device to implement collusive outcomes among manufacturers is questionable. The negative cross elasticity of competing products results in a higher markup by a common retailer than an exclusive retailer. The higher retail prices with a common retailer results in less intensive competition. Utilizing a common retailer has the beneficial effect of softening the competition among manufacturers. If the promotional services are predatory, the common retailer provides lower levels of promotional services than would exclusive retailers. This has a negative impact on manufacturers' profits. A common retailer will be utilized when the products are close substitutes, promotional services are not very predatory, and the provision of promotional services is not very costly.","abstract_html":"Coordination and control are critical aspects in the design of marketing channels due to the interdependence of various channel members and the complex flow of products, title to the products, payments and information. Important marketing decisions, such as prices and the level of promotional services, are often delegated to members of the marketing channel with divergent individual incentives. In this dissertation, I study equilibria in marketing channels in a differentiated product duopoly consisting of a single common retailer and two exclusive retailers. Interactions due to retail prices and the level of unobservable promotional effort provided by the retailer(s) contribute to interdependence of marketing decisions. Both exclusive retailers and common retailers will be observed in equilibrium marketing channels. If linear (one-part) wholesale prices are used in transactions between manufacturers and retailers, the argument that a common retailer is a device to implement collusive outcomes among manufacturers is questionable. The negative cross elasticity of competing products results in a higher markup by a common retailer than an exclusive retailer. The higher retail prices with a common retailer results in less intensive competition. Utilizing a common retailer has the beneficial effect of softening the competition among manufacturers. If the promotional services are predatory, the common retailer provides lower levels of promotional services than would exclusive retailers. This has a negative impact on manufacturers' profits. 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The higher retail prices with a common retailer results in less intensive competition. Utilizing a common retailer has the beneficial effect of softening the competition among manufacturers. If the promotional services are predatory, the common retailer provides lower levels of promotional services than would exclusive retailers. This has a negative impact on manufacturers' profits. A common retailer will be utilized when the products are close substitutes, promotional services are not very predatory, and the provision of promotional services is not very costly.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T12:20:08Z (GMT). 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Important marketing decisions, such as prices and the level of promotional services, are often delegated to members of the marketing channel with divergent individual incentives. In this dissertation, I study equilibria in marketing channels in a differentiated product duopoly consisting of a single common retailer and two exclusive retailers. Interactions due to retail prices and the level of unobservable promotional effort provided by the retailer(s) contribute to interdependence of marketing decisions. Both exclusive retailers and common retailers will be observed in equilibrium marketing channels. If linear (one-part) wholesale prices are used in transactions between manufacturers and retailers, the argument that a common retailer is a device to implement collusive outcomes among manufacturers is questionable. The negative cross elasticity of competing products results in a higher markup by a common retailer than an exclusive retailer. The higher retail prices with a common retailer results in less intensive competition. Utilizing a common retailer has the beneficial effect of softening the competition among manufacturers. If the promotional services are predatory, the common retailer provides lower levels of promotional services than would exclusive retailers. This has a negative impact on manufacturers' profits. A common retailer will be utilized when the products are close substitutes, promotional services are not very predatory, and the provision of promotional services is not very costly.","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T12:20:08Z (GMT). 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