{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19124"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/19124","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Federal-local relations: A discriminant model of the grant interaction process","abstract":"\"Most characterizations of the intergovernmental system portray it in unidimensional terms and assume that interactions occur between a relatively stable set of actors, pursuing identifiable goals, attending, at more or less constant levels, to all issues, and classified best by level of government. This analysis demonstrates the variability inherent in grant interactions and attempts to identify, operationalize, and examine the determinants of that variation. We begin by concluding that progress toward an explanatory model is not possible within the confines of the traditional assumptions. Interactions are better described as non-purposive, unstable, and non-levelled. These observations lead us to the identification of four sets of factors--environmental, actor, issue, and time--that have the greatest influence on interaction variation. Close scrutiny of each set yields a series of variables that are used to \"\"discriminate\"\" among five major types of observed grant interactions--disintegrative conflict, symmetric and asymmetric bargaining, mutual accommodation, indifference, and standard operating procedure (routine). In the end, two \"\"solution\"\" models are derived, each accounting for almost 60% of the observed variation in interaction type. These results move us one very significant step closer to an heretofore elusive empirical model of intergovernmental relations.\"","abstract_html":"&quot;Most characterizations of the intergovernmental system portray it in unidimensional terms and assume that interactions occur between a relatively stable set of actors, pursuing identifiable goals, attending, at more or less constant levels, to all issues, and classified best by level of government. This analysis demonstrates the variability inherent in grant interactions and attempts to identify, operationalize, and examine the determinants of that variation. We begin by concluding that progress toward an explanatory model is not possible within the confines of the traditional assumptions. Interactions are better described as non-purposive, unstable, and non-levelled. These observations lead us to the identification of four sets of factors--environmental, actor, issue, and time--that have the greatest influence on interaction variation. Close scrutiny of each set yields a series of variables that are used to &quot;&quot;discriminate&quot;&quot; among five major types of observed grant interactions--disintegrative conflict, symmetric and asymmetric bargaining, mutual accommodation, indifference, and standard operating procedure (routine). In the end, two &quot;&quot;solution&quot;&quot; models are derived, each accounting for almost 60% of the observed variation in interaction type. These results move us one very significant step closer to an heretofore elusive empirical model of intergovernmental relations.&quot;","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Chambers, David Darold"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Political Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Wirt, Frederick M."],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2011,"date_issued":"2011-05-07T11:57:40Z","date_published":"2011-05-07T11:57:40Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:12Z","subjects":["Political Science, General"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright 1990 Chambers, David Darold"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI9114193","(UMI)AAI9114193"],"render_values":[{"text":"AAI9114193","href":null,"code":true},{"text":"(UMI)AAI9114193","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/19124","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Wirt, Frederick M."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Chambers, David Darold"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2011-05-07T11:57:40Z","10000-01-01","1990"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Political Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Political Science, General"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 1990 Chambers, David Darold"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["AAI9114193","(UMI)AAI9114193","http://hdl.handle.net/2142/19124"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["\"Most characterizations of the intergovernmental system portray it in unidimensional terms and assume that interactions occur between a relatively stable set of actors, pursuing identifiable goals, attending, at more or less constant levels, to all issues, and classified best by level of government. This analysis demonstrates the variability inherent in grant interactions and attempts to identify, operationalize, and examine the determinants of that variation. We begin by concluding that progress toward an explanatory model is not possible within the confines of the traditional assumptions. Interactions are better described as non-purposive, unstable, and non-levelled. These observations lead us to the identification of four sets of factors--environmental, actor, issue, and time--that have the greatest influence on interaction variation. Close scrutiny of each set yields a series of variables that are used to \"\"discriminate\"\" among five major types of observed grant interactions--disintegrative conflict, symmetric and asymmetric bargaining, mutual accommodation, indifference, and standard operating procedure (routine). In the end, two \"\"solution\"\" models are derived, each accounting for almost 60% of the observed variation in interaction type. These results move us one very significant step closer to an heretofore elusive empirical model of intergovernmental relations.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T11:57:40Z (GMT). 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This analysis demonstrates the variability inherent in grant interactions and attempts to identify, operationalize, and examine the determinants of that variation. We begin by concluding that progress toward an explanatory model is not possible within the confines of the traditional assumptions. Interactions are better described as non-purposive, unstable, and non-levelled. These observations lead us to the identification of four sets of factors--environmental, actor, issue, and time--that have the greatest influence on interaction variation. Close scrutiny of each set yields a series of variables that are used to \"\"discriminate\"\" among five major types of observed grant interactions--disintegrative conflict, symmetric and asymmetric bargaining, mutual accommodation, indifference, and standard operating procedure (routine). In the end, two \"\"solution\"\" models are derived, each accounting for almost 60% of the observed variation in interaction type. These results move us one very significant step closer to an heretofore elusive empirical model of intergovernmental relations.\"","Made available in DSpace on 2011-05-07T11:57:40Z (GMT). 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