{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/132577"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/132577","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Private network access management systems in wi-fi environments","abstract":"Wi-Fi has become integral to modern life, yet its pervasive connectivity introduces significant privacy risks as devices broadcast identifiable information during network discovery and communication. While MAC address randomization has been widely deployed to mitigate tracking, existing implementations remain vulnerable to sophisticated attacks that exploit temporal patterns, cross-layer features, and protocol-level information leakage. This dissertation presents a comprehensive investigation of privacy vulnerabilities in Wi-Fi MAC-layer protocols and proposes standards-compliant solutions to enhance user privacy. First, I demonstrate the Burst Interval Attack, which exploits predictable timing patterns in probe request transmissions to re-identify devices despite MAC randomization. To counter this, I introduce Jittery, a defense suite that anonymizes network discovery through bounded randomization of transmission timing while preserving connectivity and performance. Next, I present TRACE, a cross-layer fingerprinting attack that combines physical-layer signal characteristics with MAC-layer behavior to link randomized MAC addresses with high accuracy in real-world environments. Finally, I develop MIRAGE, a system enabling dynamic MAC randomization during active AP connections through multi-interface coordination, addressing a critical limitation where devices remain trackable throughout network sessions. Collectively, this research reveals that robust Wi-Fi privacy requires eliminating cross-layer linkability during network discovery and association. The proposed mechanisms demonstrate that standards-compliant solutions can achieve strong privacy guarantees without compromising connectivity or performance, contributing to a safer and more private wireless ecosystem.","abstract_html":"Wi-Fi has become integral to modern life, yet its pervasive connectivity introduces significant privacy risks as devices broadcast identifiable information during network discovery and communication. While MAC address randomization has been widely deployed to mitigate tracking, existing implementations remain vulnerable to sophisticated attacks that exploit temporal patterns, cross-layer features, and protocol-level information leakage. This dissertation presents a comprehensive investigation of privacy vulnerabilities in Wi-Fi MAC-layer protocols and proposes standards-compliant solutions to enhance user privacy. First, I demonstrate the Burst Interval Attack, which exploits predictable timing patterns in probe request transmissions to re-identify devices despite MAC randomization. To counter this, I introduce Jittery, a defense suite that anonymizes network discovery through bounded randomization of transmission timing while preserving connectivity and performance. Next, I present TRACE, a cross-layer fingerprinting attack that combines physical-layer signal characteristics with MAC-layer behavior to link randomized MAC addresses with high accuracy in real-world environments. Finally, I develop MIRAGE, a system enabling dynamic MAC randomization during active AP connections through multi-interface coordination, addressing a critical limitation where devices remain trackable throughout network sessions. Collectively, this research reveals that robust Wi-Fi privacy requires eliminating cross-layer linkability during network discovery and association. The proposed mechanisms demonstrate that standards-compliant solutions can achieve strong privacy guarantees without compromising connectivity or performance, contributing to a safer and more private wireless ecosystem.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Cifuentes-Urtubey, Federico"],"institution":"University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Computer Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Kravets, Robin","Vasisht, Deepak","Wang, Gang","Ramirez, David"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025-12","date_published":"2025-12","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:07Z","subjects":["Wireless networks","Wireless systems","Wi-Fi","Privacy"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2025 Federico Cifuentes-Urtubey"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2142/132577","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Kravets, Robin","Vasisht, Deepak","Wang, Gang","Ramirez, David"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Cifuentes-Urtubey, Federico"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2025-12","2025-12-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Wireless networks","Wireless systems","Wi-Fi","Privacy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2025 Federico Cifuentes-Urtubey"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/132577"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Wi-Fi has become integral to modern life, yet its pervasive connectivity introduces significant privacy risks as devices broadcast identifiable information during network discovery and communication. While MAC address randomization has been widely deployed to mitigate tracking, existing implementations remain vulnerable to sophisticated attacks that exploit temporal patterns, cross-layer features, and protocol-level information leakage. This dissertation presents a comprehensive investigation of privacy vulnerabilities in Wi-Fi MAC-layer protocols and proposes standards-compliant solutions to enhance user privacy. First, I demonstrate the Burst Interval Attack, which exploits predictable timing patterns in probe request transmissions to re-identify devices despite MAC randomization. To counter this, I introduce Jittery, a defense suite that anonymizes network discovery through bounded randomization of transmission timing while preserving connectivity and performance. Next, I present TRACE, a cross-layer fingerprinting attack that combines physical-layer signal characteristics with MAC-layer behavior to link randomized MAC addresses with high accuracy in real-world environments. Finally, I develop MIRAGE, a system enabling dynamic MAC randomization during active AP connections through multi-interface coordination, addressing a critical limitation where devices remain trackable throughout network sessions. Collectively, this research reveals that robust Wi-Fi privacy requires eliminating cross-layer linkability during network discovery and association. The proposed mechanisms demonstrate that standards-compliant solutions can achieve strong privacy guarantees without compromising connectivity or performance, contributing to a safer and more private wireless ecosystem.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2026-02-19 without embargo terms","The student, Federico Cifuentes-Urtubey, accepted the attached license on 2025-12-04 at 17:15.","The student, Federico Cifuentes-Urtubey, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2025-12-04 at 17:27.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2025-12-05 at 07:18.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #23067 on 2026-02-19 at 18:29:33"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Private network access management systems in wi-fi environments"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Kravets, Robin","Vasisht, Deepak","Wang, Gang","Ramirez, David"],"dc:creator":["Cifuentes-Urtubey, Federico"],"dc:date":["2025-12","2025-12-05"],"dc:description":["Wi-Fi has become integral to modern life, yet its pervasive connectivity introduces significant privacy risks as devices broadcast identifiable information during network discovery and communication. While MAC address randomization has been widely deployed to mitigate tracking, existing implementations remain vulnerable to sophisticated attacks that exploit temporal patterns, cross-layer features, and protocol-level information leakage. This dissertation presents a comprehensive investigation of privacy vulnerabilities in Wi-Fi MAC-layer protocols and proposes standards-compliant solutions to enhance user privacy. First, I demonstrate the Burst Interval Attack, which exploits predictable timing patterns in probe request transmissions to re-identify devices despite MAC randomization. To counter this, I introduce Jittery, a defense suite that anonymizes network discovery through bounded randomization of transmission timing while preserving connectivity and performance. Next, I present TRACE, a cross-layer fingerprinting attack that combines physical-layer signal characteristics with MAC-layer behavior to link randomized MAC addresses with high accuracy in real-world environments. Finally, I develop MIRAGE, a system enabling dynamic MAC randomization during active AP connections through multi-interface coordination, addressing a critical limitation where devices remain trackable throughout network sessions. Collectively, this research reveals that robust Wi-Fi privacy requires eliminating cross-layer linkability during network discovery and association. The proposed mechanisms demonstrate that standards-compliant solutions can achieve strong privacy guarantees without compromising connectivity or performance, contributing to a safer and more private wireless ecosystem.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2026-02-19 without embargo terms","The student, Federico Cifuentes-Urtubey, accepted the attached license on 2025-12-04 at 17:15.","The student, Federico Cifuentes-Urtubey, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2025-12-04 at 17:27.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2025-12-05 at 07:18.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #23067 on 2026-02-19 at 18:29:33"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/132577"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2025 Federico Cifuentes-Urtubey"],"dc:subject":["Wireless networks","Wireless systems","Wi-Fi","Privacy"],"dc:title":["Private network access management systems in wi-fi environments"],"dc:type":["text","Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Computer Science"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:25:07Z"}