{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/121442"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/121442","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Software security challenges in the era of modern hardware","abstract":"Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2023-12-04 without embargo terms","abstract_html":"Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2023-12-04 without embargo terms","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Paccagnella, Riccardo"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Computer Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Fletcher, Christopher","Baumann, Andrew","Torrellas, Josep","Bailey, Michael","Shacham, Hovav","Yan, Mengjia"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2023,"date_issued":"2023-08","date_published":"2023-08","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:57Z","subjects":["Hardware Security","Side-channel Attacks","Constant-time Programming","Resource Partitioning","Computer Processors","Frequency Scaling","On-chip Interconnect"],"languages":["en","eng"],"rights":["Copyright 2023 Riccardo Paccagnella"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2142/121442","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Fletcher, Christopher","Baumann, Andrew","Torrellas, Josep","Bailey, Michael","Shacham, Hovav","Yan, Mengjia"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Paccagnella, Riccardo"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2023-08","2023-07-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Hardware Security","Side-channel Attacks","Constant-time Programming","Resource Partitioning","Computer Processors","Frequency Scaling","On-chip Interconnect"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en","eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2023 Riccardo Paccagnella"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/121442"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2023-12-04 without embargo terms","The student, Riccardo Paccagnella, accepted the attached license on 2023-06-29 at 03:35.","The student, Riccardo Paccagnella, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2023-06-29 at 03:49.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2023-07-05 at 11:34.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #19480 on 2023-12-04 at 17:00:18","Today's hardware cannot keep secrets. Indeed, the past two decades have seen the discovery of a slew of attacks where an adversary exploits hardware features to leak software's sensitive data. These attacks have shaken the foundations of computer security and caused a disruption in the software industry. Fortunately, there has been a saving grace, namely the widespread adoption of models that have enabled developers to build secure software while comprehensively preventing hardware vulnerabilities. This dissertation studies these prevailing models for building secure software and evaluates the extent to which they break down in the context of today's hardware. In the first part, we introduce Hertzbleed attacks, demonstrating that the principles underpinning constant-time programming are inadequate to guarantee constant-time execution of software. In the second part, we introduce interconnect side-channel attacks, demonstrating that the current implementation principles for resource partitioning are inadequate to guarantee software isolation. Both vulnerabilities are not mere extensions of existing ones but rather constitute entirely new attack vectors, which undermine established defenses. We present an in-depth examination of these new attacks and discuss their implications for secure software design."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Software security challenges in the era of modern hardware"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Fletcher, Christopher","Baumann, Andrew","Torrellas, Josep","Bailey, Michael","Shacham, Hovav","Yan, Mengjia"],"dc:creator":["Paccagnella, Riccardo"],"dc:date":["2023-08","2023-07-05"],"dc:description":["Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2023-12-04 without embargo terms","The student, Riccardo Paccagnella, accepted the attached license on 2023-06-29 at 03:35.","The student, Riccardo Paccagnella, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2023-06-29 at 03:49.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2023-07-05 at 11:34.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #19480 on 2023-12-04 at 17:00:18","Today's hardware cannot keep secrets. Indeed, the past two decades have seen the discovery of a slew of attacks where an adversary exploits hardware features to leak software's sensitive data. These attacks have shaken the foundations of computer security and caused a disruption in the software industry. Fortunately, there has been a saving grace, namely the widespread adoption of models that have enabled developers to build secure software while comprehensively preventing hardware vulnerabilities. This dissertation studies these prevailing models for building secure software and evaluates the extent to which they break down in the context of today's hardware. In the first part, we introduce Hertzbleed attacks, demonstrating that the principles underpinning constant-time programming are inadequate to guarantee constant-time execution of software. In the second part, we introduce interconnect side-channel attacks, demonstrating that the current implementation principles for resource partitioning are inadequate to guarantee software isolation. Both vulnerabilities are not mere extensions of existing ones but rather constitute entirely new attack vectors, which undermine established defenses. We present an in-depth examination of these new attacks and discuss their implications for secure software design."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/121442"],"dc:language":["en","eng"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2023 Riccardo Paccagnella"],"dc:subject":["Hardware Security","Side-channel Attacks","Constant-time Programming","Resource Partitioning","Computer Processors","Frequency Scaling","On-chip Interconnect"],"dc:title":["Software security challenges in the era of modern hardware"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Computer Science"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:57Z"}