{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/115429"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/115429","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Attacking schedule indistinguishability in real-time systems","abstract":"Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2022-11-11 without embargo terms","abstract_html":"Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2022-11-11 without embargo terms","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sanyal, Debopam"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Computer Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Mohan, Sibin"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2022,"date_issued":"2022-05","date_published":"2022-05","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:54Z","subjects":["real-time systems","differential privacy","side-channel attack"],"languages":["en","eng"],"rights":["Copyright 2022 Debopam Sanyal"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2142/115429","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Mohan, Sibin"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sanyal, Debopam"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2022-05","2022-04-25"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["real-time systems","differential privacy","side-channel attack"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en","eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2022 Debopam Sanyal"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/115429"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2022-11-11 without embargo terms","The student, Debopam Sanyal, accepted the attached license on 2022-04-21 at 15:53.","The student, Debopam Sanyal, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2022-04-21 at 16:19.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2022-04-25 at 15:02.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #17891 on 2022-11-11 at 13:42:51","Real-Time Systems (RTS) have gained prominence in new domains such as autonomous cars, drones, and the Internet-of-Things (IoT). RTS have stringent timing requirements for ensuring their correct operation. Such requirements make it necessary for systems to be deterministic at run-time. This determinism can be used against them as an attack surface, like scheduler side-channels. One way to reduce determinism in systems is by adding noise to system components in order to disrupt their deterministic behavior. Schedule indistinguishability, that is inspired by differential privacy, protects RTS by increasing the indistinguishability of the schedule. It introduces the notion of ϵ-indistinguishability, that measures the probability of information leakage when system schedules are observed. Implemented in an ϵ-Scheduler, it is able to not only offer a higher degree of protection, but also do so with actual guarantees while still maintaining a high degree of performance. The efficacy of the ϵ-Scheduler is epitomized by its success in thwarting an identification attack on a real-time video streaming application. However, schedule indistinguishability can be compromised by side-channels, that leak critical information representative of the private timing data. This information can be combined with other observations made by an adversary to launch attacks on schedule indistinguishability. The scope of attacks using side-channels is explored in this thesis. Two attacks, namely, a timing-based attack and a privacy budget attack are presented. While the timing-based attack takes advantage of the time taken to draw a sample from the noise distribution, the privacy budget attack uses the value of the protection duration. After detailing their threat models and showing their success in disrupting schedule indistinguishability, the thesis investigates their effectiveness in causing security breaches in RTS. The evaluations are carried out using the aforementioned identification attack on the video streaming application. Our results show that side-channel attacks can break schedule indistinguishability and, in turn, undermine the security of RTS against scheduler side-channels. The work can be divided into three key steps: 1. Ascertain the type of information that can be leaked by systems implementing the ϵ-Scheduler. 2. Determine the scope of side-channel attacks using the leaked information. 3. Analyze the relationship between schedule indistinguishability and security of RTS."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Attacking schedule indistinguishability in real-time systems"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Mohan, Sibin"],"dc:creator":["Sanyal, Debopam"],"dc:date":["2022-05","2022-04-25"],"dc:description":["Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2022-11-11 without embargo terms","The student, Debopam Sanyal, accepted the attached license on 2022-04-21 at 15:53.","The student, Debopam Sanyal, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2022-04-21 at 16:19.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2022-04-25 at 15:02.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #17891 on 2022-11-11 at 13:42:51","Real-Time Systems (RTS) have gained prominence in new domains such as autonomous cars, drones, and the Internet-of-Things (IoT). RTS have stringent timing requirements for ensuring their correct operation. Such requirements make it necessary for systems to be deterministic at run-time. This determinism can be used against them as an attack surface, like scheduler side-channels. One way to reduce determinism in systems is by adding noise to system components in order to disrupt their deterministic behavior. Schedule indistinguishability, that is inspired by differential privacy, protects RTS by increasing the indistinguishability of the schedule. It introduces the notion of ϵ-indistinguishability, that measures the probability of information leakage when system schedules are observed. Implemented in an ϵ-Scheduler, it is able to not only offer a higher degree of protection, but also do so with actual guarantees while still maintaining a high degree of performance. The efficacy of the ϵ-Scheduler is epitomized by its success in thwarting an identification attack on a real-time video streaming application. However, schedule indistinguishability can be compromised by side-channels, that leak critical information representative of the private timing data. This information can be combined with other observations made by an adversary to launch attacks on schedule indistinguishability. The scope of attacks using side-channels is explored in this thesis. Two attacks, namely, a timing-based attack and a privacy budget attack are presented. While the timing-based attack takes advantage of the time taken to draw a sample from the noise distribution, the privacy budget attack uses the value of the protection duration. After detailing their threat models and showing their success in disrupting schedule indistinguishability, the thesis investigates their effectiveness in causing security breaches in RTS. The evaluations are carried out using the aforementioned identification attack on the video streaming application. Our results show that side-channel attacks can break schedule indistinguishability and, in turn, undermine the security of RTS against scheduler side-channels. The work can be divided into three key steps: 1. Ascertain the type of information that can be leaked by systems implementing the ϵ-Scheduler. 2. Determine the scope of side-channel attacks using the leaked information. 3. Analyze the relationship between schedule indistinguishability and security of RTS."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["https://hdl.handle.net/2142/115429"],"dc:language":["en","eng"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2022 Debopam Sanyal"],"dc:subject":["real-time systems","differential privacy","side-channel attack"],"dc:title":["Attacking schedule indistinguishability in real-time systems"],"dc:type":["text","Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Computer Science"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.S."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:54Z"}