{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/110524"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/110524","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Securing distributed energy resource integration","abstract":"The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.","abstract_html":"The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Culler, Megan Jordan"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Electrical & Computer Engr","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Levchenko, Kirll","Sauer, Peter"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-09-17T01:11:08Z","date_published":"2021-09-17T01:11:08Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:50Z","subjects":["distributed energy resources","cybersecurity","battery storage","cyber-physical security","renewable energy","smart grid","communication","standards"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2021 Megan Jordan Culler"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/110524","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Levchenko, Kirll","Sauer, Peter"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Culler, Megan Jordan"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2021-09-17T01:11:08Z","2021-04-23","2021-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical & Computer Engr"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["distributed energy resources","cybersecurity","battery storage","cyber-physical security","renewable energy","smart grid","communication","standards"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2021 Megan Jordan Culler"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/110524"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2021-09-16 without embargo terms","The student, Megan Culler, accepted the attached license on 2021-04-20 at 22:45.","The student, Megan Culler, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2021-04-20 at 22:55.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2021-04-23 at 15:46.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #16452 on 2021-09-16 at 16:45:08","Made available in DSpace on 2021-09-17T01:11:08Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 CULLER-THESIS-2021.pdf: 1535509 bytes, checksum: be5d32f246e24cc2b90bf52f90375047 (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4209 bytes, checksum: b9a1385174a18eaea21309df3cb0745d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2021-04-23"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Securing distributed energy resource integration"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Levchenko, Kirll","Sauer, Peter"],"dc:creator":["Culler, Megan Jordan"],"dc:date":["2021-09-17T01:11:08Z","2021-04-23","2021-05"],"dc:description":["The penetration of distributed energy resources (DER) is growing at much higher rates than predicted 20 years ago. Far from being used only in residential settings, DER are now installed on distribution and transmission circuits. In this position, they do not have the same properties as traditional generators and are more flexible in many cases. The growing penetration and range of uses for DER motivate the need to reliably and safely integrate them into the grid. Operators must be able to rely on them not only for normal operation, but also during abnormal conditions like black starts or adverse cyber scenarios. To that end, we study the communications, device interfaces, and potential consequences of DER operation under abnormal and adversarial conditions. The weaknesses of communications networks are studied based on the industrial protocols used, and the benefits of security features are examined. The device interfaces are found to be vulnerable to attack based on the requirements in the IEEE-1547 standard for DER interconnection and interoperability, which is expected to be adopted in the next ten years. In addition to exploring the requirements of the standard, we show that these vulnerabilities and others do exist and can be used maliciously in a modern storage system DER. Consequences of these vulnerabilities range from exacerbated grid instability, to simultaneous loss of large portions of DER penetration, to physical damage to inverters or DER themselves and other sensitive equipment. We tie these outcomes to specific attacker actions in an effort to give operators a better threat intelligence view that allows them to prioritize mitigations. Finally, we discuss mitigations that could prevent many of the adversarial scenarios described. Some solutions can be added to existing infrastructure, while others may require longer term planning for grid modernization with consideration for security.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2021-09-16 without embargo terms","The student, Megan Culler, accepted the attached license on 2021-04-20 at 22:45.","The student, Megan Culler, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2021-04-20 at 22:55.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2021-04-23 at 15:46.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #16452 on 2021-09-16 at 16:45:08","Made available in DSpace on 2021-09-17T01:11:08Z (GMT). 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