{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/110478"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/110478","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Asymmetric information, competitive intelligence, and organizational performance","abstract":"This dissertation examines the effects of two sources of asymmetric information on organizational performance. The first source, residual knowledge, is conceptualized in the first chapter as the knowledge held by organizations about their former resources that now belong to competitor organizations. It is posited that residual knowledge can lead to a competitive advantage against the focal rival relative to its other competitors by complementing the resources deployed against them in dyadic competition. The second source of asymmetric information, illicit competitive intelligence, is posited to lead to competitive advantage by providing an organization with exclusive access to a competitor’s secret information for use against them in dyadic competition. Chapters 2 and 3 test the effects of each source of asymmetric information respectively on organizational performance under certain conditions within the empirical context of Major League Baseball. Results from analysis of the relative performance of batters against their former organizations over 32 years in Chapter 2 corroborate the hypothesis that advantages from residual knowledge will erode with the proliferation of analytics capabilities across competitors. Evidence to corroborate the hypotheses related to employee and manager quality is not found. Chapter 3 exploits the Houston Astros cheating scandal from 2017-2018 as a documented usage of illicit competitive intelligence. A difference-in-differences approach analyzing home and away performance before and after the cheating period finds no evidence to corroborate the hypotheses relating the use of illicit competitive intelligence to positive performance. Implications of the findings and non-findings for each are discussed. Chapter 4 summarizes the dissertation and discusses the contributions to the literature concerning asymmetric information and organizational performance.","abstract_html":"This dissertation examines the effects of two sources of asymmetric information on organizational performance. The first source, residual knowledge, is conceptualized in the first chapter as the knowledge held by organizations about their former resources that now belong to competitor organizations. It is posited that residual knowledge can lead to a competitive advantage against the focal rival relative to its other competitors by complementing the resources deployed against them in dyadic competition. The second source of asymmetric information, illicit competitive intelligence, is posited to lead to competitive advantage by providing an organization with exclusive access to a competitor’s secret information for use against them in dyadic competition. Chapters 2 and 3 test the effects of each source of asymmetric information respectively on organizational performance under certain conditions within the empirical context of Major League Baseball. Results from analysis of the relative performance of batters against their former organizations over 32 years in Chapter 2 corroborate the hypothesis that advantages from residual knowledge will erode with the proliferation of analytics capabilities across competitors. Evidence to corroborate the hypotheses related to employee and manager quality is not found. Chapter 3 exploits the Houston Astros cheating scandal from 2017-2018 as a documented usage of illicit competitive intelligence. A difference-in-differences approach analyzing home and away performance before and after the cheating period finds no evidence to corroborate the hypotheses relating the use of illicit competitive intelligence to positive performance. Implications of the findings and non-findings for each are discussed. Chapter 4 summarizes the dissertation and discusses the contributions to the literature concerning asymmetric information and organizational performance.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Downs, Joshua Austin"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Business Administration","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Somaya, Deepak","Mahoney, Joseph M","Michael, Steven","Subramanyam, Ramanath"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-09-17T01:10:57Z","date_published":"2021-09-17T01:10:57Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:50Z","subjects":["Asymmetric Information","Competitive Intelligence","Strategic Factor Markets","Employee Mobility","Major League Baseball"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2021 Joshua Downs"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/110478","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Somaya, Deepak","Mahoney, Joseph M","Michael, Steven","Subramanyam, Ramanath"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Downs, Joshua Austin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2021-09-17T01:10:57Z","2021-04-19","2021-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Business Administration"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Asymmetric Information","Competitive Intelligence","Strategic Factor Markets","Employee Mobility","Major League Baseball"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2021 Joshua Downs"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/110478"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This dissertation examines the effects of two sources of asymmetric information on organizational performance. The first source, residual knowledge, is conceptualized in the first chapter as the knowledge held by organizations about their former resources that now belong to competitor organizations. It is posited that residual knowledge can lead to a competitive advantage against the focal rival relative to its other competitors by complementing the resources deployed against them in dyadic competition. The second source of asymmetric information, illicit competitive intelligence, is posited to lead to competitive advantage by providing an organization with exclusive access to a competitor’s secret information for use against them in dyadic competition. Chapters 2 and 3 test the effects of each source of asymmetric information respectively on organizational performance under certain conditions within the empirical context of Major League Baseball. Results from analysis of the relative performance of batters against their former organizations over 32 years in Chapter 2 corroborate the hypothesis that advantages from residual knowledge will erode with the proliferation of analytics capabilities across competitors. Evidence to corroborate the hypotheses related to employee and manager quality is not found. Chapter 3 exploits the Houston Astros cheating scandal from 2017-2018 as a documented usage of illicit competitive intelligence. A difference-in-differences approach analyzing home and away performance before and after the cheating period finds no evidence to corroborate the hypotheses relating the use of illicit competitive intelligence to positive performance. Implications of the findings and non-findings for each are discussed. Chapter 4 summarizes the dissertation and discusses the contributions to the literature concerning asymmetric information and organizational performance.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2021-09-16 without embargo terms","The student, Joshua Downs, accepted the attached license on 2021-04-15 at 05:37.","The student, Joshua Downs, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2021-04-15 at 06:01.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2021-04-19 at 16:46.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #16340 on 2021-09-16 at 16:41:52","Made available in DSpace on 2021-09-17T01:10:57Z (GMT). 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The first source, residual knowledge, is conceptualized in the first chapter as the knowledge held by organizations about their former resources that now belong to competitor organizations. It is posited that residual knowledge can lead to a competitive advantage against the focal rival relative to its other competitors by complementing the resources deployed against them in dyadic competition. The second source of asymmetric information, illicit competitive intelligence, is posited to lead to competitive advantage by providing an organization with exclusive access to a competitor’s secret information for use against them in dyadic competition. Chapters 2 and 3 test the effects of each source of asymmetric information respectively on organizational performance under certain conditions within the empirical context of Major League Baseball. Results from analysis of the relative performance of batters against their former organizations over 32 years in Chapter 2 corroborate the hypothesis that advantages from residual knowledge will erode with the proliferation of analytics capabilities across competitors. Evidence to corroborate the hypotheses related to employee and manager quality is not found. Chapter 3 exploits the Houston Astros cheating scandal from 2017-2018 as a documented usage of illicit competitive intelligence. A difference-in-differences approach analyzing home and away performance before and after the cheating period finds no evidence to corroborate the hypotheses relating the use of illicit competitive intelligence to positive performance. Implications of the findings and non-findings for each are discussed. Chapter 4 summarizes the dissertation and discusses the contributions to the literature concerning asymmetric information and organizational performance.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2021-09-16 without embargo terms","The student, Joshua Downs, accepted the attached license on 2021-04-15 at 05:37.","The student, Joshua Downs, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2021-04-15 at 06:01.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2021-04-19 at 16:46.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #16340 on 2021-09-16 at 16:41:52","Made available in DSpace on 2021-09-17T01:10:57Z (GMT). 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