{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/109455"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/109455","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"A Stackelberg signaling game for co-operative rendezvous in uncertain environments in a search-and-rescue context","abstract":"Search and rescue (SAR) operations are challenging in the absence of a medium of communication between the rescuers and the rescuee. Natural signaling, grounded in rationality, can play a decisive role in achieving rapid and effective mitigation in such rescue scenarios. In this work, we model a particular rescue scenario as a modified asymmetric rendezvous game where limited communication capabilities are present between the two players. The scenario can be modeled as a co-operative Stackelberg Game where the rescuer acts as a leader in signaling his intent to the rescuee. We present an efficient approach to obtaining the optimal signaling policy, as well as its robust counterpart, when the topology of the rescue environment is unknown. We also analyze the sensitivity of the optimal signaling policy to the velocities of the two players as further motivation for the robust solution. We observe that a completely robust approach in designing the signaling policy can lead to highly conservative solutions. To address this conservativeness, we then introduce a stochastic nature on the unknown topology and provide a signaling policy that probabilistic performance guarantees.","abstract_html":"Search and rescue (SAR) operations are challenging in the absence of a medium of communication between the rescuers and the rescuee. Natural signaling, grounded in rationality, can play a decisive role in achieving rapid and effective mitigation in such rescue scenarios. In this work, we model a particular rescue scenario as a modified asymmetric rendezvous game where limited communication capabilities are present between the two players. The scenario can be modeled as a co-operative Stackelberg Game where the rescuer acts as a leader in signaling his intent to the rescuee. We present an efficient approach to obtaining the optimal signaling policy, as well as its robust counterpart, when the topology of the rescue environment is unknown. We also analyze the sensitivity of the optimal signaling policy to the velocities of the two players as further motivation for the robust solution. We observe that a completely robust approach in designing the signaling policy can lead to highly conservative solutions. To address this conservativeness, we then introduce a stochastic nature on the unknown topology and provide a signaling policy that probabilistic performance guarantees.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Hebbar, Vijeth"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Aerospace Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Langbort, Cedric"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-03-05T21:38:25Z","date_published":"2021-03-05T21:38:25Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:50Z","subjects":["Rescue Robotics"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2020 Vijeth Hebbar"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/109455","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Langbort, Cedric"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Hebbar, Vijeth"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2021-03-05T21:38:25Z","2020-12-10","2020-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Aerospace Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Rescue Robotics"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2020 Vijeth Hebbar"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/109455"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Search and rescue (SAR) operations are challenging in the absence of a medium of communication between the rescuers and the rescuee. Natural signaling, grounded in rationality, can play a decisive role in achieving rapid and effective mitigation in such rescue scenarios. In this work, we model a particular rescue scenario as a modified asymmetric rendezvous game where limited communication capabilities are present between the two players. The scenario can be modeled as a co-operative Stackelberg Game where the rescuer acts as a leader in signaling his intent to the rescuee. We present an efficient approach to obtaining the optimal signaling policy, as well as its robust counterpart, when the topology of the rescue environment is unknown. We also analyze the sensitivity of the optimal signaling policy to the velocities of the two players as further motivation for the robust solution. We observe that a completely robust approach in designing the signaling policy can lead to highly conservative solutions. To address this conservativeness, we then introduce a stochastic nature on the unknown topology and provide a signaling policy that probabilistic performance guarantees.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2021-03-04 without embargo terms","The student, Vijeth Hebbar, accepted the attached license on 2020-12-10 at 13:45.","The student, Vijeth Hebbar, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2020-12-10 at 13:56.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2020-12-10 at 16:59.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #16115 on 2021-03-04 at 15:36:31","Made available in DSpace on 2021-03-05T21:38:25Z (GMT). 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In this work, we model a particular rescue scenario as a modified asymmetric rendezvous game where limited communication capabilities are present between the two players. The scenario can be modeled as a co-operative Stackelberg Game where the rescuer acts as a leader in signaling his intent to the rescuee. We present an efficient approach to obtaining the optimal signaling policy, as well as its robust counterpart, when the topology of the rescue environment is unknown. We also analyze the sensitivity of the optimal signaling policy to the velocities of the two players as further motivation for the robust solution. We observe that a completely robust approach in designing the signaling policy can lead to highly conservative solutions. To address this conservativeness, we then introduce a stochastic nature on the unknown topology and provide a signaling policy that probabilistic performance guarantees.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. 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