{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/108090"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/108090","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Natural teleology and Kant’s duties to oneself as an animal being","abstract":"\"In the \"\"Metaphysics of Morals,\"\" Kant appears to claim that there is a category of duties to oneself, known as the duties to oneself as animal beings, that is based in the natural teleology of the natural appetites (self-love, the desire for sex, and the desire for food). Commentators, rightly puzzled by these claims, have said that any appeal to natural teleology would be inconsistent with Kant’s account of the ground of the moral law, and also with Kant’s understanding of human beings as autonomous. As such, the duties to oneself as an animal being are typically given some sort of non-teleological explanation. I claim that such an explanation leads to conceptual and interpretive difficulties. In this dissertation I defend a teleological account of the duties to oneself as an animal being. I begin by explaining the duties to oneself as an animal being in the context of Kant’s moral psychology and his account of human nature. The duties to oneself as an animal being are properly understood as limiting one’s actions only in cases where one acts to satisfy a natural appetite. Kant’s understanding of natural appetite satisfaction, moreover, is teleological from the outset. The feeling of pleasure and displeasure, according to Kant, just is an awareness of some condition as agreeing or disagreeing with one’s life. Because natural appetite satisfaction is teleological from the beginning, Kant’s appeal to natural teleology in the account of the duties to oneself as an animal being does not involve the introduction of some external or heteronomous commitment.\"","abstract_html":""In the ""Metaphysics of Morals,"" Kant appears to claim that there is a category of duties to oneself, known as the duties to oneself as animal beings, that is based in the natural teleology of the natural appetites (self-love, the desire for sex, and the desire for food). Commentators, rightly puzzled by these claims, have said that any appeal to natural teleology would be inconsistent with Kant’s account of the ground of the moral law, and also with Kant’s understanding of human beings as autonomous. As such, the duties to oneself as an animal being are typically given some sort of non-teleological explanation. I claim that such an explanation leads to conceptual and interpretive difficulties. In this dissertation I defend a teleological account of the duties to oneself as an animal being. I begin by explaining the duties to oneself as an animal being in the context of Kant’s moral psychology and his account of human nature. The duties to oneself as an animal being are properly understood as limiting one’s actions only in cases where one acts to satisfy a natural appetite. Kant’s understanding of natural appetite satisfaction, moreover, is teleological from the outset. The feeling of pleasure and displeasure, according to Kant, just is an awareness of some condition as agreeing or disagreeing with one’s life. Because natural appetite satisfaction is teleological from the beginning, Kant’s appeal to natural teleology in the account of the duties to oneself as an animal being does not involve the introduction of some external or heteronomous commitment."","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Meyer, Daniel"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Sussman, David","Varden, Helga","Murphy, Colleen","Sanders, Kirk"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020-08-26T23:51:24Z","date_published":"2020-08-26T23:51:24Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:47Z","subjects":["Philosophy","Moral Philosophy","Immanuel Kant","Natural Teleology","Duties to Oneself"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2020 Daniel Meyer"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/108090","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Sussman, David","Varden, Helga","Murphy, Colleen","Sanders, Kirk"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Meyer, Daniel"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2020-08-26T23:51:24Z","2022-08-26T23:58:55Z","2020-03-09","2020-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text","Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Philosophy","Moral Philosophy","Immanuel Kant","Natural Teleology","Duties to Oneself"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2020 Daniel Meyer"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/108090"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["\"In the \"\"Metaphysics of Morals,\"\" Kant appears to claim that there is a category of duties to oneself, known as the duties to oneself as animal beings, that is based in the natural teleology of the natural appetites (self-love, the desire for sex, and the desire for food). Commentators, rightly puzzled by these claims, have said that any appeal to natural teleology would be inconsistent with Kant’s account of the ground of the moral law, and also with Kant’s understanding of human beings as autonomous. As such, the duties to oneself as an animal being are typically given some sort of non-teleological explanation. I claim that such an explanation leads to conceptual and interpretive difficulties. In this dissertation I defend a teleological account of the duties to oneself as an animal being. I begin by explaining the duties to oneself as an animal being in the context of Kant’s moral psychology and his account of human nature. The duties to oneself as an animal being are properly understood as limiting one’s actions only in cases where one acts to satisfy a natural appetite. Kant’s understanding of natural appetite satisfaction, moreover, is teleological from the outset. The feeling of pleasure and displeasure, according to Kant, just is an awareness of some condition as agreeing or disagreeing with one’s life. Because natural appetite satisfaction is teleological from the beginning, Kant’s appeal to natural teleology in the account of the duties to oneself as an animal being does not involve the introduction of some external or heteronomous commitment.\"","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2022-05-01","The student, Daniel Meyer, accepted the attached license on 2020-03-09 at 10:35.","The student, Daniel Meyer, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2020-03-09 at 10:44.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2020-03-09 at 16:48.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14888 on 2020-08-25 at 17:26:58","Made available in DSpace on 2020-08-26T23:51:24Z (GMT). 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Commentators, rightly puzzled by these claims, have said that any appeal to natural teleology would be inconsistent with Kant’s account of the ground of the moral law, and also with Kant’s understanding of human beings as autonomous. As such, the duties to oneself as an animal being are typically given some sort of non-teleological explanation. I claim that such an explanation leads to conceptual and interpretive difficulties. In this dissertation I defend a teleological account of the duties to oneself as an animal being. I begin by explaining the duties to oneself as an animal being in the context of Kant’s moral psychology and his account of human nature. The duties to oneself as an animal being are properly understood as limiting one’s actions only in cases where one acts to satisfy a natural appetite. Kant’s understanding of natural appetite satisfaction, moreover, is teleological from the outset. The feeling of pleasure and displeasure, according to Kant, just is an awareness of some condition as agreeing or disagreeing with one’s life. Because natural appetite satisfaction is teleological from the beginning, Kant’s appeal to natural teleology in the account of the duties to oneself as an animal being does not involve the introduction of some external or heteronomous commitment.\"","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2022-05-01","The student, Daniel Meyer, accepted the attached license on 2020-03-09 at 10:35.","The student, Daniel Meyer, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2020-03-09 at 10:44.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2020-03-09 at 16:48.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14888 on 2020-08-25 at 17:26:58","Made available in DSpace on 2020-08-26T23:51:24Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 MEYER-DISSERTATION-2020.pdf: 906999 bytes, checksum: 8bb92dc16eff2cfb4c22b7ea996583b3 (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4209 bytes, checksum: 16a7d6572e5aa90c08b84d2c9a7213b7 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2020-03-09","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 115699 Lift date: 2022-08-26T23:51:32Z Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 115699 Lift date: 2022-08-26T23:54:40Z Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 115699 Lift date: 2022-08-26T23:55:59Z Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 115699 Lift date: 2022-08-26T23:57:28Z Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 115699 Lift date: 2022-08-26T23:58:55Z Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","U of I Only"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/108090"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2020 Daniel Meyer"],"dc:subject":["Philosophy","Moral Philosophy","Immanuel Kant","Natural Teleology","Duties to Oneself"],"dc:title":["Natural teleology and Kant’s duties to oneself as an animal being"],"dc:type":["text","Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Philosophy"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:47Z"}