{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/106130"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/106130","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"On the role of signaling in mitigation of road-traffic congestion: The price of anarchy of signaling-based strategies in stochastic networks","abstract":"We study the influence of information design on routing in the presence of vagaries, following the canonical congestion game approach. We allow a central controller to observe nature's state and make exploit the information gap between her and the drivers, to cater information to drivers in a most social manner. In addition to the extreme cases of full and no information, she can also use randomized public signaling and personal recommendations. We revisit these programs and raise algorithmic concerns, but most importantly, we revisit Roughgarden's celebrated Price of Anarchy (PoA) in uncertain networks. Unexpectedly, no upper bound on the PoA holds if drivers are kept uninformed in the presence of vagaries, while fully informed drivers perform regularly. On the other hand, uninformed drivers might outperform informed drivers by a factor equal to the price of anarchy. Comparing pairwise all information provisions, we establish a table of competitive ratios, which turn out to only take vales one, the PoA, and infinity.","abstract_html":"We study the influence of information design on routing in the presence of vagaries, following the canonical congestion game approach. We allow a central controller to observe nature's state and make exploit the information gap between her and the drivers, to cater information to drivers in a most social manner. In addition to the extreme cases of full and no information, she can also use randomized public signaling and personal recommendations. We revisit these programs and raise algorithmic concerns, but most importantly, we revisit Roughgarden's celebrated Price of Anarchy (PoA) in uncertain networks. Unexpectedly, no upper bound on the PoA holds if drivers are kept uninformed in the presence of vagaries, while fully informed drivers perform regularly. On the other hand, uninformed drivers might outperform informed drivers by a factor equal to the price of anarchy. Comparing pairwise all information provisions, we establish a table of competitive ratios, which turn out to only take vales one, the PoA, and infinity.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Massicot, Olivier"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Aerospace Engineering","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Langbort, Cedric"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2020,"date_issued":"2020-03-02T21:57:51Z","date_published":"2020-03-02T21:57:51Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:45Z","subjects":["Road-traffic","congestion","signaling games","signal","information design","game theory","price of anarchy","Wardrop equilibrium","Bayesian game"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["© 2019 by Olivier Massicot. All rights reserved."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/106130","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Langbort, Cedric"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Massicot, Olivier"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2020-03-02T21:57:51Z","2019-07-22","2019-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Aerospace Engineering"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Road-traffic","congestion","signaling games","signal","information design","game theory","price of anarchy","Wardrop equilibrium","Bayesian game"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["© 2019 by Olivier Massicot. 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Unexpectedly, no upper bound on the PoA holds if drivers are kept uninformed in the presence of vagaries, while fully informed drivers perform regularly. On the other hand, uninformed drivers might outperform informed drivers by a factor equal to the price of anarchy. Comparing pairwise all information provisions, we establish a table of competitive ratios, which turn out to only take vales one, the PoA, and infinity.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2020-02-28 without embargo terms","The student, Olivier Massicot, accepted the attached license on 2019-07-19 at 16:11.","The student, Olivier Massicot, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2019-07-19 at 16:18.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2019-07-22 at 11:29.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14292 on 2020-02-28 at 17:10:42","Made available in DSpace on 2020-03-02T21:57:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 MASSICOT-THESIS-2019.pdf: 624450 bytes, checksum: 95336afa9e86d007532ee2ff66ae29cc (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4213 bytes, checksum: 053503e3222a727e0220e9bcd527f8e4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-07-22"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["On the role of signaling in mitigation of road-traffic congestion: The price of anarchy of signaling-based strategies in stochastic networks"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Langbort, Cedric"],"dc:creator":["Massicot, Olivier"],"dc:date":["2020-03-02T21:57:51Z","2019-07-22","2019-12"],"dc:description":["We study the influence of information design on routing in the presence of vagaries, following the canonical congestion game approach. We allow a central controller to observe nature's state and make exploit the information gap between her and the drivers, to cater information to drivers in a most social manner. In addition to the extreme cases of full and no information, she can also use randomized public signaling and personal recommendations. We revisit these programs and raise algorithmic concerns, but most importantly, we revisit Roughgarden's celebrated Price of Anarchy (PoA) in uncertain networks. Unexpectedly, no upper bound on the PoA holds if drivers are kept uninformed in the presence of vagaries, while fully informed drivers perform regularly. On the other hand, uninformed drivers might outperform informed drivers by a factor equal to the price of anarchy. Comparing pairwise all information provisions, we establish a table of competitive ratios, which turn out to only take vales one, the PoA, and infinity.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2020-02-28 without embargo terms","The student, Olivier Massicot, accepted the attached license on 2019-07-19 at 16:11.","The student, Olivier Massicot, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2019-07-19 at 16:18.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2019-07-22 at 11:29.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14292 on 2020-02-28 at 17:10:42","Made available in DSpace on 2020-03-02T21:57:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 MASSICOT-THESIS-2019.pdf: 624450 bytes, checksum: 95336afa9e86d007532ee2ff66ae29cc (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4213 bytes, checksum: 053503e3222a727e0220e9bcd527f8e4 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-07-22"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/106130"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["© 2019 by Olivier Massicot. All rights reserved."],"dc:subject":["Road-traffic","congestion","signaling games","signal","information design","game theory","price of anarchy","Wardrop equilibrium","Bayesian game"],"dc:title":["On the role of signaling in mitigation of road-traffic congestion: The price of anarchy of signaling-based strategies in stochastic networks"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Aerospace Engineering"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.S."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:45Z"}