{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105896"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105896","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Stakeholder management reputation and its effects on CEO dismissal and CEO compensation","abstract":"\"This dissertation examines the influence of an organization’s reputation for stakeholder management on outcomes relevant to corporate executives. I theorize that organizations develop two distinct reputations for stakeholder management. The first (for ease of exposition) is a reputation for “doing good.” \"\"Do good\"\" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by organizational actions that are perceived to generate positive spillovers. The second is a reputation for “avoiding harm.” \"\"Avoid harm\"\" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by organizational actions that are perceived to reduce negative spillovers. I propose that stakeholder management reputation offers a lens through which board members may make sense of a corporate executive’s competencies. This sensemaking process triggers cognitive evaluation processes that influence the type of attributions made about the ability of corporate leaders. These attributions in turn inform the decisions that are made on their behalf. The first study examines the effect of the reputation for stakeholder management on CEO dismissal. I propose that a reputation for \"\"avoid harm\"\" stakeholder management is more beneficial to alleviate the negative effects of poor financial performance on CEO dismissal. The second study examines the effect of the organization’s reputation for stakeholder management on CEO compensation. Here I propose that a reputation for \"\"do good\"\" stakeholder management holds a more positive association with CEO compensation relative to the reputation for \"\"avoid harm\"\" stakeholder management. I also examine the moderating role of firm performance, board independence and information uncertainty. I test these ideas on a sample of S&P-500 firms and the empirical analysis provides partial support for these ideas.\"","abstract_html":""This dissertation examines the influence of an organization’s reputation for stakeholder management on outcomes relevant to corporate executives. I theorize that organizations develop two distinct reputations for stakeholder management. The first (for ease of exposition) is a reputation for “doing good.” ""Do good"" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by organizational actions that are perceived to generate positive spillovers. The second is a reputation for “avoiding harm.” ""Avoid harm"" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by organizational actions that are perceived to reduce negative spillovers. I propose that stakeholder management reputation offers a lens through which board members may make sense of a corporate executive’s competencies. This sensemaking process triggers cognitive evaluation processes that influence the type of attributions made about the ability of corporate leaders. These attributions in turn inform the decisions that are made on their behalf. The first study examines the effect of the reputation for stakeholder management on CEO dismissal. I propose that a reputation for ""avoid harm"" stakeholder management is more beneficial to alleviate the negative effects of poor financial performance on CEO dismissal. The second study examines the effect of the organization’s reputation for stakeholder management on CEO compensation. Here I propose that a reputation for ""do good"" stakeholder management holds a more positive association with CEO compensation relative to the reputation for ""avoid harm"" stakeholder management. I also examine the moderating role of firm performance, board independence and information uncertainty. I test these ideas on a sample of S&P-500 firms and the empirical analysis provides partial support for these ideas."","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran, Anand"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Business Administration","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Bednar, Michael","Kraatz, Matthew","Love, Geoffrey","Mahoney, Joseph"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-11-26T20:58:37Z","date_published":"2019-11-26T20:58:37Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:45Z","subjects":["CEO dismissal, CEO compensation"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2019 Anand Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105896","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Bednar, Michael","Kraatz, Matthew","Love, Geoffrey","Mahoney, Joseph"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran, Anand"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-11-26T20:58:37Z","2019-07-03","2019-08"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Business Administration"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["CEO dismissal, CEO compensation"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2019 Anand Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105896"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["\"This dissertation examines the influence of an organization’s reputation for stakeholder management on outcomes relevant to corporate executives. I theorize that organizations develop two distinct reputations for stakeholder management. The first (for ease of exposition) is a reputation for “doing good.” \"\"Do good\"\" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by organizational actions that are perceived to generate positive spillovers. The second is a reputation for “avoiding harm.” \"\"Avoid harm\"\" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by organizational actions that are perceived to reduce negative spillovers. I propose that stakeholder management reputation offers a lens through which board members may make sense of a corporate executive’s competencies. This sensemaking process triggers cognitive evaluation processes that influence the type of attributions made about the ability of corporate leaders. These attributions in turn inform the decisions that are made on their behalf. The first study examines the effect of the reputation for stakeholder management on CEO dismissal. I propose that a reputation for \"\"avoid harm\"\" stakeholder management is more beneficial to alleviate the negative effects of poor financial performance on CEO dismissal. The second study examines the effect of the organization’s reputation for stakeholder management on CEO compensation. Here I propose that a reputation for \"\"do good\"\" stakeholder management holds a more positive association with CEO compensation relative to the reputation for \"\"avoid harm\"\" stakeholder management. I also examine the moderating role of firm performance, board independence and information uncertainty. I test these ideas on a sample of S&P-500 firms and the empirical analysis provides partial support for these ideas.\"","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'Closed Access', the embargo will last until 2021-08-01","The student, Anand Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran, accepted the attached license on 2019-07-03 at 03:49.","The student, Anand Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2019-07-03 at 03:56.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-07-03 at 15:01.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14143 on 2019-11-26 at 14:00:52","Made available in DSpace on 2019-11-26T20:58:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 RAMASWAMYVIJAYASANKARAN-DISSERTATION-2019.pdf: 1256632 bytes, checksum: dddc6652f71d62aefc0b8f4481b554be (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4227 bytes, checksum: 0b66c7998c89c9f574dd8916a15d385f (MD5) PROQUEST_LICENSE.txt: 4573 bytes, checksum: bf4064139a86c5ea5beb8cd912ce38d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-07-03","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 113042 Lift date: 2021-11-26T20:58:44Z Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 113042 Lift date: 2021-11-26T20:59:54Z Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Open Restriction set for Item 113042 on 2021-09-21T15:47:40Z with date null by eliasbh2@illinois.edu.","Open Restriction set for Item 113042 on 2021-09-21T15:47:46Z with date null by eliasbh2@illinois.edu.","Open"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Stakeholder management reputation and its effects on CEO dismissal and CEO compensation"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Bednar, Michael","Kraatz, Matthew","Love, Geoffrey","Mahoney, Joseph"],"dc:creator":["Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran, Anand"],"dc:date":["2019-11-26T20:58:37Z","2019-07-03","2019-08"],"dc:description":["\"This dissertation examines the influence of an organization’s reputation for stakeholder management on outcomes relevant to corporate executives. I theorize that organizations develop two distinct reputations for stakeholder management. The first (for ease of exposition) is a reputation for “doing good.” \"\"Do good\"\" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by organizational actions that are perceived to generate positive spillovers. The second is a reputation for “avoiding harm.” \"\"Avoid harm\"\" stakeholder management reputation is exemplified by organizational actions that are perceived to reduce negative spillovers. I propose that stakeholder management reputation offers a lens through which board members may make sense of a corporate executive’s competencies. This sensemaking process triggers cognitive evaluation processes that influence the type of attributions made about the ability of corporate leaders. These attributions in turn inform the decisions that are made on their behalf. The first study examines the effect of the reputation for stakeholder management on CEO dismissal. I propose that a reputation for \"\"avoid harm\"\" stakeholder management is more beneficial to alleviate the negative effects of poor financial performance on CEO dismissal. The second study examines the effect of the organization’s reputation for stakeholder management on CEO compensation. Here I propose that a reputation for \"\"do good\"\" stakeholder management holds a more positive association with CEO compensation relative to the reputation for \"\"avoid harm\"\" stakeholder management. I also examine the moderating role of firm performance, board independence and information uncertainty. I test these ideas on a sample of S&P-500 firms and the empirical analysis provides partial support for these ideas.\"","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'Closed Access', the embargo will last until 2021-08-01","The student, Anand Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran, accepted the attached license on 2019-07-03 at 03:49.","The student, Anand Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2019-07-03 at 03:56.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-07-03 at 15:01.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14143 on 2019-11-26 at 14:00:52","Made available in DSpace on 2019-11-26T20:58:37Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 RAMASWAMYVIJAYASANKARAN-DISSERTATION-2019.pdf: 1256632 bytes, checksum: dddc6652f71d62aefc0b8f4481b554be (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4227 bytes, checksum: 0b66c7998c89c9f574dd8916a15d385f (MD5) PROQUEST_LICENSE.txt: 4573 bytes, checksum: bf4064139a86c5ea5beb8cd912ce38d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-07-03","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 113042 Lift date: 2021-11-26T20:58:44Z Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 113042 Lift date: 2021-11-26T20:59:54Z Reason: Author requested closed access (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","Open Restriction set for Item 113042 on 2021-09-21T15:47:40Z with date null by eliasbh2@illinois.edu.","Open Restriction set for Item 113042 on 2021-09-21T15:47:46Z with date null by eliasbh2@illinois.edu.","Open"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105896"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2019 Anand Ramaswamy Vijayasankaran"],"dc:subject":["CEO dismissal, CEO compensation"],"dc:title":["Stakeholder management reputation and its effects on CEO dismissal and CEO compensation"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Business Administration"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:45Z"}