{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105611"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105611","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"GPS spoofing detection for the power grid network via a multi-receiver hierarchical architecture","abstract":"In the process of modernizing the North American electric power grid with the creation of the Smart Grid, thousands of devices called phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been deployed across the U.S. continent to continuously monitor the power grid state in real-time. Each PMU measures voltage and current phasors at its local substation, then synchronizes these measurements across the continental network using the Global Positioning System (GPS) as a common timing reference. GPS serves as an excellent timing source due to its global coverage as well as its precise, sub-microsecond level timing accuracy. However, because civilian GPS signals are unencrypted with a publicly available signal structure, any individual with the appropriate equipment can mimic these signals in order to establish a false timing solution at the PMU sites. This type of attack, commonly known as GPS spoofing, presents a major concern to our future power grid infrastructure. Indeed, even minor timing manipulations can cause inaccurate power flow representations and corresponding corrective measures, potentially inducing large-scale power disruptions, instability within the power grid, and/or damage to generators and other power equipment. In this thesis, we present a multi-receiver spoofing detection algorithm for PMU devices, utilizing a hierarchical architecture framework. For the received GPS signal at each PMU station, we create conditioned signal fragments containing the military P(Y) GPS signal, which bears a binary spreading code sequence that is unavailable to civilian users and thus cannot be forged by an attacker. As a result, the military P(Y) signal establishes an encrypted signature in the background of all authentic GPS signals. The presence of the authentic signature can be verified, without knowledge of the precise bit sequence, by correlating amongst conditioned signal fragments obtained from other PMU sites in a sub-network of cross-check receivers, thereby leveraging the secure communication network available within the power grid infrastructure. We further defend against coordinated spoofing attacks conducted against the sub-network of PMU devices by comparing condensed, representative signals generated for each sub-network within the power grid. Using real-world data recorded during a government-sponsored, live-sky spoofing event, we demonstrate that our algorithm successfully evaluates the authenticity of each receiver in a widely dispersed network.","abstract_html":"In the process of modernizing the North American electric power grid with the creation of the Smart Grid, thousands of devices called phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been deployed across the U.S. continent to continuously monitor the power grid state in real-time. Each PMU measures voltage and current phasors at its local substation, then synchronizes these measurements across the continental network using the Global Positioning System (GPS) as a common timing reference. GPS serves as an excellent timing source due to its global coverage as well as its precise, sub-microsecond level timing accuracy. However, because civilian GPS signals are unencrypted with a publicly available signal structure, any individual with the appropriate equipment can mimic these signals in order to establish a false timing solution at the PMU sites. This type of attack, commonly known as GPS spoofing, presents a major concern to our future power grid infrastructure. Indeed, even minor timing manipulations can cause inaccurate power flow representations and corresponding corrective measures, potentially inducing large-scale power disruptions, instability within the power grid, and/or damage to generators and other power equipment. In this thesis, we present a multi-receiver spoofing detection algorithm for PMU devices, utilizing a hierarchical architecture framework. For the received GPS signal at each PMU station, we create conditioned signal fragments containing the military P(Y) GPS signal, which bears a binary spreading code sequence that is unavailable to civilian users and thus cannot be forged by an attacker. As a result, the military P(Y) signal establishes an encrypted signature in the background of all authentic GPS signals. The presence of the authentic signature can be verified, without knowledge of the precise bit sequence, by correlating amongst conditioned signal fragments obtained from other PMU sites in a sub-network of cross-check receivers, thereby leveraging the secure communication network available within the power grid infrastructure. We further defend against coordinated spoofing attacks conducted against the sub-network of PMU devices by comparing condensed, representative signals generated for each sub-network within the power grid. Using real-world data recorded during a government-sponsored, live-sky spoofing event, we demonstrate that our algorithm successfully evaluates the authenticity of each receiver in a widely dispersed network.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Mina, Tara Yasmin"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Electrical & Computer Engr","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Gao, Grace X"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-11-26T20:33:42Z","date_published":"2019-11-26T20:33:42Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:44Z","subjects":["GPS","GNSS","GPS Security","GPS Spoofing Detection","Smart Grid"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2019 Tara Mina"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105611","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Gao, Grace X"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Mina, Tara Yasmin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-11-26T20:33:42Z","2019-06-19","2019-08"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical & Computer Engr"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["GPS","GNSS","GPS Security","GPS Spoofing Detection","Smart Grid"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2019 Tara Mina"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105611"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["In the process of modernizing the North American electric power grid with the creation of the Smart Grid, thousands of devices called phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been deployed across the U.S. continent to continuously monitor the power grid state in real-time. Each PMU measures voltage and current phasors at its local substation, then synchronizes these measurements across the continental network using the Global Positioning System (GPS) as a common timing reference. GPS serves as an excellent timing source due to its global coverage as well as its precise, sub-microsecond level timing accuracy. However, because civilian GPS signals are unencrypted with a publicly available signal structure, any individual with the appropriate equipment can mimic these signals in order to establish a false timing solution at the PMU sites. This type of attack, commonly known as GPS spoofing, presents a major concern to our future power grid infrastructure. Indeed, even minor timing manipulations can cause inaccurate power flow representations and corresponding corrective measures, potentially inducing large-scale power disruptions, instability within the power grid, and/or damage to generators and other power equipment. In this thesis, we present a multi-receiver spoofing detection algorithm for PMU devices, utilizing a hierarchical architecture framework. For the received GPS signal at each PMU station, we create conditioned signal fragments containing the military P(Y) GPS signal, which bears a binary spreading code sequence that is unavailable to civilian users and thus cannot be forged by an attacker. As a result, the military P(Y) signal establishes an encrypted signature in the background of all authentic GPS signals. The presence of the authentic signature can be verified, without knowledge of the precise bit sequence, by correlating amongst conditioned signal fragments obtained from other PMU sites in a sub-network of cross-check receivers, thereby leveraging the secure communication network available within the power grid infrastructure. We further defend against coordinated spoofing attacks conducted against the sub-network of PMU devices by comparing condensed, representative signals generated for each sub-network within the power grid. Using real-world data recorded during a government-sponsored, live-sky spoofing event, we demonstrate that our algorithm successfully evaluates the authenticity of each receiver in a widely dispersed network.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2019-11-26 without embargo terms","The student, Tara Mina, accepted the attached license on 2019-06-19 at 09:09.","The student, Tara Mina, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2019-06-19 at 09:41.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2019-06-19 at 15:43.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14056 on 2019-11-26 at 12:49:56","Made available in DSpace on 2019-11-26T20:33:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 MINA-THESIS-2019.pdf: 3544040 bytes, checksum: d9b79f5619e56f7901c04748c6797465 (MD5) GPS SPOOFING DETECTION FOR THE POWER GRID NETWORKVIA A MULTI-RECEIVER HIERARCHICAL ARCHITECTURE.zip: 10685100 bytes, checksum: b29dcb002351c6f0eab8feae7178a135 (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4206 bytes, checksum: e7e4dcced5884d1fdb139226a9cf596d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-06-19"]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["GPS spoofing detection for the power grid network via a multi-receiver hierarchical architecture"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Gao, Grace X"],"dc:creator":["Mina, Tara Yasmin"],"dc:date":["2019-11-26T20:33:42Z","2019-06-19","2019-08"],"dc:description":["In the process of modernizing the North American electric power grid with the creation of the Smart Grid, thousands of devices called phasor measurement units (PMUs) have been deployed across the U.S. continent to continuously monitor the power grid state in real-time. Each PMU measures voltage and current phasors at its local substation, then synchronizes these measurements across the continental network using the Global Positioning System (GPS) as a common timing reference. GPS serves as an excellent timing source due to its global coverage as well as its precise, sub-microsecond level timing accuracy. However, because civilian GPS signals are unencrypted with a publicly available signal structure, any individual with the appropriate equipment can mimic these signals in order to establish a false timing solution at the PMU sites. This type of attack, commonly known as GPS spoofing, presents a major concern to our future power grid infrastructure. Indeed, even minor timing manipulations can cause inaccurate power flow representations and corresponding corrective measures, potentially inducing large-scale power disruptions, instability within the power grid, and/or damage to generators and other power equipment. In this thesis, we present a multi-receiver spoofing detection algorithm for PMU devices, utilizing a hierarchical architecture framework. For the received GPS signal at each PMU station, we create conditioned signal fragments containing the military P(Y) GPS signal, which bears a binary spreading code sequence that is unavailable to civilian users and thus cannot be forged by an attacker. As a result, the military P(Y) signal establishes an encrypted signature in the background of all authentic GPS signals. The presence of the authentic signature can be verified, without knowledge of the precise bit sequence, by correlating amongst conditioned signal fragments obtained from other PMU sites in a sub-network of cross-check receivers, thereby leveraging the secure communication network available within the power grid infrastructure. We further defend against coordinated spoofing attacks conducted against the sub-network of PMU devices by comparing condensed, representative signals generated for each sub-network within the power grid. Using real-world data recorded during a government-sponsored, live-sky spoofing event, we demonstrate that our algorithm successfully evaluates the authenticity of each receiver in a widely dispersed network.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2019-11-26 without embargo terms","The student, Tara Mina, accepted the attached license on 2019-06-19 at 09:09.","The student, Tara Mina, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2019-06-19 at 09:41.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2019-06-19 at 15:43.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #14056 on 2019-11-26 at 12:49:56","Made available in DSpace on 2019-11-26T20:33:42Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 3 MINA-THESIS-2019.pdf: 3544040 bytes, checksum: d9b79f5619e56f7901c04748c6797465 (MD5) GPS SPOOFING DETECTION FOR THE POWER GRID NETWORKVIA A MULTI-RECEIVER HIERARCHICAL ARCHITECTURE.zip: 10685100 bytes, checksum: b29dcb002351c6f0eab8feae7178a135 (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4206 bytes, checksum: e7e4dcced5884d1fdb139226a9cf596d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-06-19"],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105611"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2019 Tara Mina"],"dc:subject":["GPS","GNSS","GPS Security","GPS Spoofing Detection","Smart Grid"],"dc:title":["GPS spoofing detection for the power grid network via a multi-receiver hierarchical architecture"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Electrical & Computer Engr"],"thesis:degree_level":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_name":["M.S."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:44Z"}