{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105055"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105055","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"International evidence and implications of student take-up of income share agreements on U.S. higher education","abstract":"Income Share Agreements (ISAs), often presented as “loan alternatives”, have the potential to address the student loan crisis and to provide protections to students’ income downside risks. Despite interest in implementing ISAs at the federal level and the growing number of ISA programs being offered, little is known about the role of ISAs in education or about moral hazard and adverse selection in ISAs. I use administrative data from an ISA provider in Colombia and Peru called Lumni, and I combine it with a survey of ISA Takers and ISA Non-Takers to shed light on the role that ISAs play in college persistence and on the factors that explain student selection into ISAs. The results of the survey indicate that 37% of the Takers took up ISAs because they did not have financial alternatives. If ISAs had not been available, 25% of these students would have not persisted, 12% would have studied at a cheaper institution, and nearly 1% would have studied a different major. Individuals who perceive that loans are riskier than ISAs, who are 25-29 years old, single, poor, and financially dependent on their parents are more likely to take-up ISAs. ISA Takers are more confident about their future salaries, but tend to have lower academic performance, consistent with the presence of adverse selection. Takers also value that ISA payments are tied to income, a feature of the contract that insures students against income risk, possibly enhancing their ability of freely choosing majors and institutions. Non-Takers perceive that ISAs are riskier than loans and dislike the conditions of the ISA contract. The results of this study inform design and policy evaluation of ISAs both in the US, where legislation has been introduced and ISA programs are proliferating, and in other countries considering new financing reforms in higher education.","abstract_html":"Income Share Agreements (ISAs), often presented as “loan alternatives”, have the potential to address the student loan crisis and to provide protections to students’ income downside risks. Despite interest in implementing ISAs at the federal level and the growing number of ISA programs being offered, little is known about the role of ISAs in education or about moral hazard and adverse selection in ISAs. I use administrative data from an ISA provider in Colombia and Peru called Lumni, and I combine it with a survey of ISA Takers and ISA Non-Takers to shed light on the role that ISAs play in college persistence and on the factors that explain student selection into ISAs. The results of the survey indicate that 37% of the Takers took up ISAs because they did not have financial alternatives. If ISAs had not been available, 25% of these students would have not persisted, 12% would have studied at a cheaper institution, and nearly 1% would have studied a different major. Individuals who perceive that loans are riskier than ISAs, who are 25-29 years old, single, poor, and financially dependent on their parents are more likely to take-up ISAs. ISA Takers are more confident about their future salaries, but tend to have lower academic performance, consistent with the presence of adverse selection. Takers also value that ISA payments are tied to income, a feature of the contract that insures students against income risk, possibly enhancing their ability of freely choosing majors and institutions. Non-Takers perceive that ISAs are riskier than loans and dislike the conditions of the ISA contract. The results of this study inform design and policy evaluation of ISAs both in the US, where legislation has been introduced and ISA programs are proliferating, and in other countries considering new financing reforms in higher education.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Soler Salazar, Maria Claudia"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Educ Policy, Orgzn & Leadrshp","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Bragg, Debra D.","Zamani-Gallaher, Eboni M.","Trent, William T.","Pak, Yoon"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-08-23T20:36:02Z","date_published":"2019-08-23T20:36:02Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:44Z","subjects":["Income Share Agreements","higher education financing","student loan debt","persistence","college outcome","risk attitudes","adverse selection","credit constraints."],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2019 Maria Claudia Soler Salazar"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105055","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Bragg, Debra D.","Zamani-Gallaher, Eboni M.","Trent, William T.","Pak, Yoon"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Soler Salazar, Maria Claudia"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-08-23T20:36:02Z","2021-08-24T09:15:24Z","2019-04-19","2019-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Educ Policy, Orgzn & Leadrshp"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Income Share Agreements","higher education financing","student loan debt","persistence","college outcome","risk attitudes","adverse selection","credit constraints."]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2019 Maria Claudia Soler Salazar"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105055"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Income Share Agreements (ISAs), often presented as “loan alternatives”, have the potential to address the student loan crisis and to provide protections to students’ income downside risks. Despite interest in implementing ISAs at the federal level and the growing number of ISA programs being offered, little is known about the role of ISAs in education or about moral hazard and adverse selection in ISAs. I use administrative data from an ISA provider in Colombia and Peru called Lumni, and I combine it with a survey of ISA Takers and ISA Non-Takers to shed light on the role that ISAs play in college persistence and on the factors that explain student selection into ISAs. The results of the survey indicate that 37% of the Takers took up ISAs because they did not have financial alternatives. If ISAs had not been available, 25% of these students would have not persisted, 12% would have studied at a cheaper institution, and nearly 1% would have studied a different major. Individuals who perceive that loans are riskier than ISAs, who are 25-29 years old, single, poor, and financially dependent on their parents are more likely to take-up ISAs. ISA Takers are more confident about their future salaries, but tend to have lower academic performance, consistent with the presence of adverse selection. Takers also value that ISA payments are tied to income, a feature of the contract that insures students against income risk, possibly enhancing their ability of freely choosing majors and institutions. Non-Takers perceive that ISAs are riskier than loans and dislike the conditions of the ISA contract. The results of this study inform design and policy evaluation of ISAs both in the US, where legislation has been introduced and ISA programs are proliferating, and in other countries considering new financing reforms in higher education.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2021-05-01","The student, Maria Soler Salazar, accepted the attached license on 2019-04-18 at 00:36.","The student, Maria Soler Salazar, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2019-04-18 at 00:42.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-04-19 at 10:53.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #13732 on 2019-08-22 at 15:07:22","Made available in DSpace on 2019-08-23T20:36:02Z (GMT). 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Despite interest in implementing ISAs at the federal level and the growing number of ISA programs being offered, little is known about the role of ISAs in education or about moral hazard and adverse selection in ISAs. I use administrative data from an ISA provider in Colombia and Peru called Lumni, and I combine it with a survey of ISA Takers and ISA Non-Takers to shed light on the role that ISAs play in college persistence and on the factors that explain student selection into ISAs. The results of the survey indicate that 37% of the Takers took up ISAs because they did not have financial alternatives. If ISAs had not been available, 25% of these students would have not persisted, 12% would have studied at a cheaper institution, and nearly 1% would have studied a different major. Individuals who perceive that loans are riskier than ISAs, who are 25-29 years old, single, poor, and financially dependent on their parents are more likely to take-up ISAs. ISA Takers are more confident about their future salaries, but tend to have lower academic performance, consistent with the presence of adverse selection. Takers also value that ISA payments are tied to income, a feature of the contract that insures students against income risk, possibly enhancing their ability of freely choosing majors and institutions. Non-Takers perceive that ISAs are riskier than loans and dislike the conditions of the ISA contract. The results of this study inform design and policy evaluation of ISAs both in the US, where legislation has been introduced and ISA programs are proliferating, and in other countries considering new financing reforms in higher education.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2021-05-01","The student, Maria Soler Salazar, accepted the attached license on 2019-04-18 at 00:36.","The student, Maria Soler Salazar, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2019-04-18 at 00:42.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-04-19 at 10:53.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #13732 on 2019-08-22 at 15:07:22","Made available in DSpace on 2019-08-23T20:36:02Z (GMT). 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