{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105014"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/105014","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Essays on auctions and mechanism design","abstract":"This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-04-15 at 11:49.","abstract_html":"This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-04-15 at 11:49.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Kim, Kwanghyun"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Economics","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Williams, Steven R.","Bernhardt, Dan","Lemus, Jorge","Marshall, Guillermo"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-08-23T20:35:51Z","date_published":"2019-08-23T20:35:51Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:44Z","subjects":["Auctions","Mechanism Design","Mechanisms","Ambiguity","Maxmin","Interdependent Values"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2019 Kwanghyun Kim"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105014","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Williams, Steven R.","Bernhardt, Dan","Lemus, Jorge","Marshall, Guillermo"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Kim, Kwanghyun"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-08-23T20:35:51Z","2021-08-24T09:15:10Z","2019-04-15","2019-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Economics"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Auctions","Mechanism Design","Mechanisms","Ambiguity","Maxmin","Interdependent Values"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2019 Kwanghyun Kim"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105014"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-04-15 at 11:49.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #13593 on 2019-08-22 at 15:06:00","Made available in DSpace on 2019-08-23T20:35:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 KIM-DISSERTATION-2019.pdf: 402491 bytes, checksum: 7228e707d704cbdbe234e27354add944 (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4210 bytes, checksum: 89a7164eb23d2c74e5c089cb8cc6e6c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-04-15","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 112133 Lift date: 2021-08-23T20:36:18Z Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 112133 on 2021-08-24T09:15:10Z.","There are two directions in studying trading mechanisms: studying outcomes that existing mechanisms generate and designing mechanisms that satisfy desired outcomes. In this dissertation, I explore trading mechanisms in these directions. In the first chapter, I study the first price auction with independent private valuations, wherein each bidder faces ambiguity about the probability distribution from which the other bidders’ valuations for the item are drawn. Each bidder is ambiguity averse and this ambiguity is represented by a set of priors. In this informational setting, I identify a maxmin Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auction and show that the bidders’ bids and the seller’s expected revenue increase with the level of the bidders’ ambiguity if the bidders’ valuation distribution satisfies the monotone inverse hazard rate condition. I also show that the seller’s expected revenue from the first price auction is greater than that from the second price auction. In the second chapter, I examine a trading mechanism in which traders’ valuations for an item are interdependent. Trade can occur between multiple buyers and multiple sellers. The transfer rules of the trading mechanism are motivated by the second price auction. The mechanism satisfies ex-post efficiency, ex-post incentive compatibility, and ex-post individual rationality. An example in which the mechanism generates a budget deficit is provided. The result of this chapter leads to my work on an impossibility result in the next chapter. In the third chapter, I study trading mechanisms in which traders’ valuations for an indivisible item are interdependent. Trade can occur between one buyer and one seller. Under the assumption that each trader’s information has a greater marginal effect on her own valuation than on the other trader’s valuation, no trading mechanisms satisfying ex-post efficiency, ex-post incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and no ex-post budget deficit exist.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2021-05-01","The student, Kwanghyun Kim, accepted the attached license on 2019-04-12 at 15:59.","The student, Kwanghyun Kim, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2019-04-12 at 16:38."]},{"key":"dc:format","label":"Dc Format","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays on auctions and mechanism design"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Williams, Steven R.","Bernhardt, Dan","Lemus, Jorge","Marshall, Guillermo"],"dc:creator":["Kim, Kwanghyun"],"dc:date":["2019-08-23T20:35:51Z","2021-08-24T09:15:10Z","2019-04-15","2019-05"],"dc:description":["This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-04-15 at 11:49.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #13593 on 2019-08-22 at 15:06:00","Made available in DSpace on 2019-08-23T20:35:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 KIM-DISSERTATION-2019.pdf: 402491 bytes, checksum: 7228e707d704cbdbe234e27354add944 (MD5) LICENSE.txt: 4210 bytes, checksum: 89a7164eb23d2c74e5c089cb8cc6e6c0 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2019-04-15","Embargo set by: Seth Robbins for item 112133 Lift date: 2021-08-23T20:36:18Z Reason: Author requested U of Illinois access only (OA after 2yrs) in Vireo ETD system","U of I Only Restriction Lifted for Item 112133 on 2021-08-24T09:15:10Z.","There are two directions in studying trading mechanisms: studying outcomes that existing mechanisms generate and designing mechanisms that satisfy desired outcomes. In this dissertation, I explore trading mechanisms in these directions. In the first chapter, I study the first price auction with independent private valuations, wherein each bidder faces ambiguity about the probability distribution from which the other bidders’ valuations for the item are drawn. Each bidder is ambiguity averse and this ambiguity is represented by a set of priors. In this informational setting, I identify a maxmin Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the auction and show that the bidders’ bids and the seller’s expected revenue increase with the level of the bidders’ ambiguity if the bidders’ valuation distribution satisfies the monotone inverse hazard rate condition. I also show that the seller’s expected revenue from the first price auction is greater than that from the second price auction. In the second chapter, I examine a trading mechanism in which traders’ valuations for an item are interdependent. Trade can occur between multiple buyers and multiple sellers. The transfer rules of the trading mechanism are motivated by the second price auction. The mechanism satisfies ex-post efficiency, ex-post incentive compatibility, and ex-post individual rationality. An example in which the mechanism generates a budget deficit is provided. The result of this chapter leads to my work on an impossibility result in the next chapter. In the third chapter, I study trading mechanisms in which traders’ valuations for an indivisible item are interdependent. Trade can occur between one buyer and one seller. Under the assumption that each trader’s information has a greater marginal effect on her own valuation than on the other trader’s valuation, no trading mechanisms satisfying ex-post efficiency, ex-post incentive compatibility, ex-post individual rationality, and no ex-post budget deficit exist.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2021-05-01","The student, Kwanghyun Kim, accepted the attached license on 2019-04-12 at 15:59.","The student, Kwanghyun Kim, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2019-04-12 at 16:38."],"dc:format":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/105014"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:rights":["Copyright 2019 Kwanghyun Kim"],"dc:subject":["Auctions","Mechanism Design","Mechanisms","Ambiguity","Maxmin","Interdependent Values"],"dc:title":["Essays on auctions and mechanism design"],"dc:type":["text"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Economics"],"thesis:degree_level":["Dissertation"],"thesis:degree_name":["Ph.D."],"thesis:institution_name":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:44Z"}