{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/104878"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/104878","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Safety and security of cyber-physical systems","abstract":"The number of embedded controllers in charge of physical systems has rapidly increased over the past years. Embedded controllers are present in every aspect of our lives, from our homes to our vehicles and factories. The complexity of these systems is also more than ever. These systems are expected to deliver many features and high performance without trading off in robustness and assurance. As systems increase in complexity, however, the cost of formally verifying their correctness and eliminating security vulnerabilities can quickly explode. On top of the unintentional bugs and problems, malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPS) can also lead to adverse outcomes on physical plants. Some of the recent attacks on CPS are focused on causing physical damage to the plants or the environment. Such intruders make their way into the system using cyber exploits but then initiate actions that can destabilize and even damage the underlying (physical) systems. Given the reality mentioned above and the reliability standards of the industry, there is a need to embrace new CPS design paradigms where faults and security vulnerabilities are the norms rather than an anomaly. Such imperfections must be assumed to exist in every system and component unless it is formally verified and scanned. Faults and vulnerabilities should be safely handled and the CPS must be able to recover from them at run-time. Our goal in this work is to introduce and investigate a few designs compatible with this paradigm. The architectures and techniques proposed in this dissertation do not rely on the testing and complete system verification. Instead, they enforce safety at the highest level of the system and extend guaranteed safety from a few certified components to the entire system. These solutions are carefully curated to utilize unverified components and provide guaranteed performance.","abstract_html":"The number of embedded controllers in charge of physical systems has rapidly increased over the past years. Embedded controllers are present in every aspect of our lives, from our homes to our vehicles and factories. The complexity of these systems is also more than ever. These systems are expected to deliver many features and high performance without trading off in robustness and assurance. As systems increase in complexity, however, the cost of formally verifying their correctness and eliminating security vulnerabilities can quickly explode. On top of the unintentional bugs and problems, malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPS) can also lead to adverse outcomes on physical plants. Some of the recent attacks on CPS are focused on causing physical damage to the plants or the environment. Such intruders make their way into the system using cyber exploits but then initiate actions that can destabilize and even damage the underlying (physical) systems. Given the reality mentioned above and the reliability standards of the industry, there is a need to embrace new CPS design paradigms where faults and security vulnerabilities are the norms rather than an anomaly. Such imperfections must be assumed to exist in every system and component unless it is formally verified and scanned. Faults and vulnerabilities should be safely handled and the CPS must be able to recover from them at run-time. Our goal in this work is to introduce and investigate a few designs compatible with this paradigm. The architectures and techniques proposed in this dissertation do not rely on the testing and complete system verification. Instead, they enforce safety at the highest level of the system and extend guaranteed safety from a few certified components to the entire system. These solutions are carefully curated to utilize unverified components and provide guaranteed performance.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Abdi Taghi Abad, Fardin"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Computer Science","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Caccamo, Marco","Mohan, Sibin","Sha, Lui R.","Johnson, Taylor"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-08-23T19:55:48Z","date_published":"2019-08-23T19:55:48Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:42Z","subjects":["Cyber-Physical Systems"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2019 Fardin Abdi Taghi Abad"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/104878","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Caccamo, Marco","Mohan, Sibin","Sha, Lui R.","Johnson, Taylor"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Abdi Taghi Abad, Fardin"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-08-23T19:55:48Z","2019-04-19","2019-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Computer Science"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Cyber-Physical Systems"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2019 Fardin Abdi Taghi Abad"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/104878"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["The number of embedded controllers in charge of physical systems has rapidly increased over the past years. Embedded controllers are present in every aspect of our lives, from our homes to our vehicles and factories. The complexity of these systems is also more than ever. These systems are expected to deliver many features and high performance without trading off in robustness and assurance. As systems increase in complexity, however, the cost of formally verifying their correctness and eliminating security vulnerabilities can quickly explode. On top of the unintentional bugs and problems, malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPS) can also lead to adverse outcomes on physical plants. Some of the recent attacks on CPS are focused on causing physical damage to the plants or the environment. Such intruders make their way into the system using cyber exploits but then initiate actions that can destabilize and even damage the underlying (physical) systems. Given the reality mentioned above and the reliability standards of the industry, there is a need to embrace new CPS design paradigms where faults and security vulnerabilities are the norms rather than an anomaly. Such imperfections must be assumed to exist in every system and component unless it is formally verified and scanned. Faults and vulnerabilities should be safely handled and the CPS must be able to recover from them at run-time. Our goal in this work is to introduce and investigate a few designs compatible with this paradigm. The architectures and techniques proposed in this dissertation do not rely on the testing and complete system verification. Instead, they enforce safety at the highest level of the system and extend guaranteed safety from a few certified components to the entire system. These solutions are carefully curated to utilize unverified components and provide guaranteed performance.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. 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These systems are expected to deliver many features and high performance without trading off in robustness and assurance. As systems increase in complexity, however, the cost of formally verifying their correctness and eliminating security vulnerabilities can quickly explode. On top of the unintentional bugs and problems, malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems (CPS) can also lead to adverse outcomes on physical plants. Some of the recent attacks on CPS are focused on causing physical damage to the plants or the environment. Such intruders make their way into the system using cyber exploits but then initiate actions that can destabilize and even damage the underlying (physical) systems. Given the reality mentioned above and the reliability standards of the industry, there is a need to embrace new CPS design paradigms where faults and security vulnerabilities are the norms rather than an anomaly. Such imperfections must be assumed to exist in every system and component unless it is formally verified and scanned. Faults and vulnerabilities should be safely handled and the CPS must be able to recover from them at run-time. Our goal in this work is to introduce and investigate a few designs compatible with this paradigm. The architectures and techniques proposed in this dissertation do not rely on the testing and complete system verification. Instead, they enforce safety at the highest level of the system and extend guaranteed safety from a few certified components to the entire system. These solutions are carefully curated to utilize unverified components and provide guaranteed performance.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2019-08-22 without embargo terms","The student, Fardin Abdi Taghi Abad, accepted the attached license on 2019-04-19 at 03:03.","The student, Fardin Abdi Taghi Abad, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2019-04-19 at 03:08.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2019-04-19 at 09:05.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #13772 on 2019-08-22 at 14:44:59","Made available in DSpace on 2019-08-23T19:55:48Z (GMT). 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