{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/102432"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/102432","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Detecting the presence of hidden wireless eavesdroppers","abstract":"This thesis explores the possibility of detecting the hidden presence of wireless eavesdroppers. Such eavesdroppers employ passive receivers that only listen and never transmit any signals, making them very hard to detect. We show that even passive receivers leak RF signals on the wireless medium. This RF leakage, however, is extremely weak and buried under noise and other transmitted signals that can be 3-5 orders of magnitude larger. Hence, it is missed by today's radios. We design and build Ghostbuster, the first device that can reliably extract this leakage, even when it is buried under ongoing transmissions, in order to detect the hidden presence of eavesdroppers. Ghostbuster does not require any modifications to current transmitters and receivers, and can accurately detect the eavesdropper in the presence of ongoing transmissions. Empirical results show that Ghostbuster can detect eavesdroppers with more than 95% accuracy up to 5 meters away.","abstract_html":"This thesis explores the possibility of detecting the hidden presence of wireless eavesdroppers. Such eavesdroppers employ passive receivers that only listen and never transmit any signals, making them very hard to detect. We show that even passive receivers leak RF signals on the wireless medium. This RF leakage, however, is extremely weak and buried under noise and other transmitted signals that can be 3-5 orders of magnitude larger. Hence, it is missed by today's radios. We design and build Ghostbuster, the first device that can reliably extract this leakage, even when it is buried under ongoing transmissions, in order to detect the hidden presence of eavesdroppers. Ghostbuster does not require any modifications to current transmitters and receivers, and can accurately detect the eavesdropper in the presence of ongoing transmissions. Empirical results show that Ghostbuster can detect eavesdroppers with more than 95% accuracy up to 5 meters away.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Chaman, Anadi"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Electrical & Computer Engr","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Hassanieh, Haitham"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-02-06T19:32:51Z","date_published":"2019-02-06T19:32:51Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:40Z","subjects":["Wireless","Security","Eavesdroppers","Leakage"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2018 Anadi Chaman"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/102432","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Hassanieh, Haitham"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Chaman, Anadi"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-02-06T19:32:51Z","2018-11-15","2018-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical & Computer Engr"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Wireless","Security","Eavesdroppers","Leakage"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2018 Anadi Chaman"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/102432"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["This thesis explores the possibility of detecting the hidden presence of wireless eavesdroppers. Such eavesdroppers employ passive receivers that only listen and never transmit any signals, making them very hard to detect. We show that even passive receivers leak RF signals on the wireless medium. This RF leakage, however, is extremely weak and buried under noise and other transmitted signals that can be 3-5 orders of magnitude larger. Hence, it is missed by today's radios. We design and build Ghostbuster, the first device that can reliably extract this leakage, even when it is buried under ongoing transmissions, in order to detect the hidden presence of eavesdroppers. Ghostbuster does not require any modifications to current transmitters and receivers, and can accurately detect the eavesdropper in the presence of ongoing transmissions. Empirical results show that Ghostbuster can detect eavesdroppers with more than 95% accuracy up to 5 meters away.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2019-02-05 without embargo terms","The student, Anadi Chaman, accepted the attached license on 2018-11-13 at 14:03.","The student, Anadi Chaman, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2018-11-13 at 14:13.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2018-11-15 at 13:50.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #13084 on 2019-02-05 at 11:09:14","Made available in DSpace on 2019-02-06T19:32:51Z (GMT). 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Hence, it is missed by today's radios. We design and build Ghostbuster, the first device that can reliably extract this leakage, even when it is buried under ongoing transmissions, in order to detect the hidden presence of eavesdroppers. Ghostbuster does not require any modifications to current transmitters and receivers, and can accurately detect the eavesdropper in the presence of ongoing transmissions. Empirical results show that Ghostbuster can detect eavesdroppers with more than 95% accuracy up to 5 meters away.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2019-02-05 without embargo terms","The student, Anadi Chaman, accepted the attached license on 2018-11-13 at 14:03.","The student, Anadi Chaman, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2018-11-13 at 14:13.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2018-11-15 at 13:50.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #13084 on 2019-02-05 at 11:09:14","Made available in DSpace on 2019-02-06T19:32:51Z (GMT). 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