{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/102380"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/102380","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Privacy preserving outsourcing of state channel arbitration in microraiden","abstract":"Decentralized blockchain-based cryptocurrencies like Ethereum and Bitcoin offer a new way to hold and transact money. However, storage requirements for every node and difficulty in transaction confirmation make them difficult to match traditional payment processors. A proposed solution to scalability is the use of payment channels that allow mutually distrustful parties to create and authorize payments between one another off-line. Not only does this allow payments to be processed quickly, but it also reduces transaction volume in the underlying blockchain. An unsolved problem with off-chain payment channels is that participants in the channel must be on-line and alert to channel events all the time. If any participant in the channel goes offline for any reason (power outage, process crashes, cost too high) that party stands to lose money if other parties attempt to reverse payments. In an ideal world, a solution would involve a third party that can process payments on behalf of each party, but it requires trust establishment. In this work, we present a protocol that solves the monitoring problem called Pisa. Pisa allows channel participants to appoint distrusted third parties to watch their channel and handle finalization on their behalf without revealing any linkable state information. We also propose a fair exchange protocol that ensures that payment for appointment of a third party guarantees a penalty if the third party cheats. Further, we implement Pisa on top of an existing Ethereum payment channel framework, µ-Raiden, and we demonstrate its additional overhead to channel operation.","abstract_html":"Decentralized blockchain-based cryptocurrencies like Ethereum and Bitcoin offer a new way to hold and transact money. However, storage requirements for every node and difficulty in transaction confirmation make them difficult to match traditional payment processors. A proposed solution to scalability is the use of payment channels that allow mutually distrustful parties to create and authorize payments between one another off-line. Not only does this allow payments to be processed quickly, but it also reduces transaction volume in the underlying blockchain. An unsolved problem with off-chain payment channels is that participants in the channel must be on-line and alert to channel events all the time. If any participant in the channel goes offline for any reason (power outage, process crashes, cost too high) that party stands to lose money if other parties attempt to reverse payments. In an ideal world, a solution would involve a third party that can process payments on behalf of each party, but it requires trust establishment. In this work, we present a protocol that solves the monitoring problem called Pisa. Pisa allows channel participants to appoint distrusted third parties to watch their channel and handle finalization on their behalf without revealing any linkable state information. We also propose a fair exchange protocol that ensures that payment for appointment of a third party guarantees a penalty if the third party cheats. Further, we implement Pisa on top of an existing Ethereum payment channel framework, µ-Raiden, and we demonstrate its additional overhead to channel operation.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Bakshi, Surya"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"M.S.","degree_level":"Thesis","degree_discipline":"Electrical & Computer Engr","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Miller, Andrew"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2019,"date_issued":"2019-02-06T19:32:35Z","date_published":"2019-02-06T19:32:35Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:40Z","subjects":["Cryptocurrency, smart contracts, scalability, privacy"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2018 Surya Bakshi"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/102380","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Miller, Andrew"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Bakshi, Surya"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2019-02-06T19:32:35Z","2018-04-26","2018-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Electrical & Computer Engr"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["M.S."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Cryptocurrency, smart contracts, scalability, privacy"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2018 Surya Bakshi"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/102380"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Decentralized blockchain-based cryptocurrencies like Ethereum and Bitcoin offer a new way to hold and transact money. However, storage requirements for every node and difficulty in transaction confirmation make them difficult to match traditional payment processors. A proposed solution to scalability is the use of payment channels that allow mutually distrustful parties to create and authorize payments between one another off-line. Not only does this allow payments to be processed quickly, but it also reduces transaction volume in the underlying blockchain. An unsolved problem with off-chain payment channels is that participants in the channel must be on-line and alert to channel events all the time. If any participant in the channel goes offline for any reason (power outage, process crashes, cost too high) that party stands to lose money if other parties attempt to reverse payments. In an ideal world, a solution would involve a third party that can process payments on behalf of each party, but it requires trust establishment. In this work, we present a protocol that solves the monitoring problem called Pisa. Pisa allows channel participants to appoint distrusted third parties to watch their channel and handle finalization on their behalf without revealing any linkable state information. We also propose a fair exchange protocol that ensures that payment for appointment of a third party guarantees a penalty if the third party cheats. Further, we implement Pisa on top of an existing Ethereum payment channel framework, µ-Raiden, and we demonstrate its additional overhead to channel operation.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2019-02-05 without embargo terms","The student, Surya Bakshi, accepted the attached license on 2018-04-26 at 16:26.","The student, Surya Bakshi, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2018-04-26 at 16:33.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2018-04-26 at 16:56.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #12498 on 2019-02-05 at 11:07:17","Made available in DSpace on 2019-02-06T19:32:35Z (GMT). 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A proposed solution to scalability is the use of payment channels that allow mutually distrustful parties to create and authorize payments between one another off-line. Not only does this allow payments to be processed quickly, but it also reduces transaction volume in the underlying blockchain. An unsolved problem with off-chain payment channels is that participants in the channel must be on-line and alert to channel events all the time. If any participant in the channel goes offline for any reason (power outage, process crashes, cost too high) that party stands to lose money if other parties attempt to reverse payments. In an ideal world, a solution would involve a third party that can process payments on behalf of each party, but it requires trust establishment. In this work, we present a protocol that solves the monitoring problem called Pisa. Pisa allows channel participants to appoint distrusted third parties to watch their channel and handle finalization on their behalf without revealing any linkable state information. We also propose a fair exchange protocol that ensures that payment for appointment of a third party guarantees a penalty if the third party cheats. Further, we implement Pisa on top of an existing Ethereum payment channel framework, µ-Raiden, and we demonstrate its additional overhead to channel operation.","Submission original under an indefinite embargo labeled 'Open Access'. The submission was exported from vireo on 2019-02-05 without embargo terms","The student, Surya Bakshi, accepted the attached license on 2018-04-26 at 16:26.","The student, Surya Bakshi, submitted this Thesis for approval on 2018-04-26 at 16:33.","This Thesis was approved for publication on 2018-04-26 at 16:56.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #12498 on 2019-02-05 at 11:07:17","Made available in DSpace on 2019-02-06T19:32:35Z (GMT). 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