{"id":{"repo_id":"uiuc","oai_identifier":"oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/101165"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/uiuc/oai:www.ideals.illinois.edu:2142/101165","repository":{"repo_id":"uiuc","name":"University of Illinois - Urbana-Champaign","base_url":"https://www.ideals.illinois.edu/oai-pmh"},"display":{"title":"Learning from others’ deficiencies: How group affiliation and election basis jointly affect auditors’ effective use of inspection feedback","abstract":"Both external and internal inspectors typically select audit engagements to inspect using a risk-based approach (i.e. they pick those they predict are more likely to have deficiencies). While reducing the amount of resources needed to find audit deficiencies, this approach can perversely influence the behavior of non-inspected auditors who read the inspection feedback. Using social identity theory and attribution theory, I predict that auditors’ effective use of inspection feedback depends on whose engagements are inspected (more vs. less closely affiliated auditors) and how the engagements are selected (risk vs. random basis). I predict and find that auditors identify more strongly with the inspected auditors when inspections are risk-based or pertain to more closely affiliated auditors (e.g., same office). This stronger identification triggers defensive attributions, decreasing the perceived value of the report, and reducing the degree to which they employ corrective action that addresses inspector feedback in their own audits. Random selection is more neutral in nature, reducing identification and improving incorporation of inspection feedback, but only when the feedback is for less closely affiliated auditors. Implications for auditors, audit firms, and regulators are discussed.","abstract_html":"Both external and internal inspectors typically select audit engagements to inspect using a risk-based approach (i.e. they pick those they predict are more likely to have deficiencies). While reducing the amount of resources needed to find audit deficiencies, this approach can perversely influence the behavior of non-inspected auditors who read the inspection feedback. Using social identity theory and attribution theory, I predict that auditors’ effective use of inspection feedback depends on whose engagements are inspected (more vs. less closely affiliated auditors) and how the engagements are selected (risk vs. random basis). I predict and find that auditors identify more strongly with the inspected auditors when inspections are risk-based or pertain to more closely affiliated auditors (e.g., same office). This stronger identification triggers defensive attributions, decreasing the perceived value of the report, and reducing the degree to which they employ corrective action that addresses inspector feedback in their own audits. Random selection is more neutral in nature, reducing identification and improving incorporation of inspection feedback, but only when the feedback is for less closely affiliated auditors. Implications for auditors, audit firms, and regulators are discussed.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Hetrick, Kamber Vittori"],"institution":"University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign","degree_name":"Ph.D.","degree_level":"Dissertation","degree_discipline":"Accountancy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Bauer, Tim D.","Peecher, Mark E.","Hobson, Jessen L.","Trotman, Ken T.","Laurent, Sean"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2018,"date_issued":"2018-09-04T20:34:05Z","date_published":"2018-09-04T20:34:05Z","updated_at":"2026-07-22T22:24:38Z","subjects":["risk-based selection","audit inspections","group affiliation","auditor behavior","feedback"],"languages":["en"],"rights":["Copyright 2018 Kamber Hetrick"],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2142/101165","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Bauer, Tim D.","Peecher, Mark E.","Hobson, Jessen L.","Trotman, Ken T.","Laurent, Sean"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Hetrick, Kamber Vittori"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2018-09-04T20:34:05Z","2020-09-05T09:15:26Z","2018-04-16","2018-05"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["text"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Accountancy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Dissertation"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["risk-based selection","audit inspections","group affiliation","auditor behavior","feedback"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright 2018 Kamber Hetrick"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2142/101165"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["Both external and internal inspectors typically select audit engagements to inspect using a risk-based approach (i.e. they pick those they predict are more likely to have deficiencies). While reducing the amount of resources needed to find audit deficiencies, this approach can perversely influence the behavior of non-inspected auditors who read the inspection feedback. Using social identity theory and attribution theory, I predict that auditors’ effective use of inspection feedback depends on whose engagements are inspected (more vs. less closely affiliated auditors) and how the engagements are selected (risk vs. random basis). I predict and find that auditors identify more strongly with the inspected auditors when inspections are risk-based or pertain to more closely affiliated auditors (e.g., same office). This stronger identification triggers defensive attributions, decreasing the perceived value of the report, and reducing the degree to which they employ corrective action that addresses inspector feedback in their own audits. Random selection is more neutral in nature, reducing identification and improving incorporation of inspection feedback, but only when the feedback is for less closely affiliated auditors. Implications for auditors, audit firms, and regulators are discussed.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2020-05-01","The student, Kamber Hetrick, accepted the attached license on 2018-04-13 at 21:05.","The student, Kamber Hetrick, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2018-04-13 at 21:20.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2018-04-16 at 10:10.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #12245 on 2018-08-31 at 17:18:40","Made available in DSpace on 2018-09-04T20:34:05Z (GMT). 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While reducing the amount of resources needed to find audit deficiencies, this approach can perversely influence the behavior of non-inspected auditors who read the inspection feedback. Using social identity theory and attribution theory, I predict that auditors’ effective use of inspection feedback depends on whose engagements are inspected (more vs. less closely affiliated auditors) and how the engagements are selected (risk vs. random basis). I predict and find that auditors identify more strongly with the inspected auditors when inspections are risk-based or pertain to more closely affiliated auditors (e.g., same office). This stronger identification triggers defensive attributions, decreasing the perceived value of the report, and reducing the degree to which they employ corrective action that addresses inspector feedback in their own audits. Random selection is more neutral in nature, reducing identification and improving incorporation of inspection feedback, but only when the feedback is for less closely affiliated auditors. Implications for auditors, audit firms, and regulators are discussed.","Submission published under a 24 month embargo labeled 'U of I Access', the embargo will last until 2020-05-01","The student, Kamber Hetrick, accepted the attached license on 2018-04-13 at 21:05.","The student, Kamber Hetrick, submitted this Dissertation for approval on 2018-04-13 at 21:20.","This Dissertation was approved for publication on 2018-04-16 at 10:10.","DSpace SAF Submission Ingestion Package generated from Vireo submission #12245 on 2018-08-31 at 17:18:40","Made available in DSpace on 2018-09-04T20:34:05Z (GMT). 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