A Social Psychological Window into How Americans Think About First Amendment Religious Exemption Requests

How do Americans decide what types of beliefs rise to the standard of a sincerely held religious belief and deserve First Amendment protection? We answer this question in four studies. Study 1a (N = 99) and Study 1b (N = 151) suggest that Americans across the ideological spectrum hold schemas associating conservative (but not liberal) stances on religion-relevant culture war issues with sincerely held religious belief. Studies 2 and 3 build on these findings by interrogating how politically diverse Americans evaluate exemption requests that are either schema-consistent (e.g., a conservative stance requesting exemption from a liberal law; Study 2; N = 402) or inconsistent (e.g., a liberal stance requesting exemption from a conservative law; Study 3; N = 400). These studies reveal that Americans are more willing to grant both conservative schema-consistent and liberal schema-inconsistent religious exemption claims over nonreligious claims. However, ideological alignment between exemption claims and personal ideology also shapes Americans’ judgments about the religious sincerity of beliefs, whether denying exemption requests constitutes First Amendment violations, and whether exemptions should ultimately be granted. Collectively, results suggest that Americans hold strong schemas associating sincere religious beliefs and conservatism, but that this might not matter so much, as ideological biases influence Americans’ willingness to grant religious exemptions via both perceptual and decision-making processes.

Author dc:creator

• Mary Katz (23292133)

• Social Psychology
• Political Psychology

Statement dc:rights

• In Copyright
• Open Access after 2028-01-01

DOI dc:identifier

https://doi.org/10.25417/uic.31451875.v1

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:figshare.com:article/31451875