A study of the congressional hearings on the dismissal of General MacArthur
The eye witnesses against MacArthur were members of the Truman Administration. Acheson and Marshall were the principal critics of MacArthur’s stand. Secretary Acheson testified that MacArthur had done a fine job in Japan and our allies agreed without policy there. Acheson replied to the alleged lack of policy by making a distinction between our policy and our war aims. Our policy in Korea looked to a unified, independent democratic government, but our war aim was to stop the attack on South Korea. Regarding the proposal that the United States take unilateral action if our allies did not support us, he said that our collective-security system could not survive if we took action other members of the system disapproved. He opposed the use of Nationalist troops on the grounds that it would weaken the defense of Formosa, and was complicated by other nations fighting in Korea that did not recognize the Nationalist Government. Finally Acheson denied that MacArthur was not allowed to issue battle communiques on the real military situation in Korea. However he felt that the General’s release of March 20 concerning truce negotiations gave the impression that the United States was speaking with two voices. Secretary of Defense George Marshall has a military point of view and at the same time a global picture of the situation. He believed that the Nationalist forces would not be effective in Korea. He testified that MacArthur’s removal was necessitated by his public disagreement with the foreign and defense policies of the United States. He made it clear that MacArthur had not violated any military policy, but he had made public his disagreement with it to such a degree that it interfered with the carrying out of that policy. All of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marshall testified, concurred in the relief of General MacArthur. General Bradley’s testimony was probably the most damaging to MacArthur. The principal point bought out by Bradley was that MacArthur’s strategy would involve us in the wrong war, at the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy. He pointed out that we also had sanctuary since the Chinese did not bomb out ports and supply bases. He felt that a blockade would involve the ports of Hong Kong and Dairen, and therefore would not be tenable. Furthermore, MacArthur was not in agreement with the decision to limit the conflict to Korea, and his actions, Bradley said, jeopardized the civilian control of the military authorities. Both Generals Breadeley and Collins agreed that they would have to resign and speak out in case they were involved in a conflict in which duty and the best interest of the country could not be reconciled.
MacArthur, Douglas, 1880-1964;University of the Pacific Dissertations, History, Political History, Political Science, United States History
Networked Digital Library of Theses and Dissertations