{"id":{"repo_id":"tu-berlin","oai_identifier":"oai:depositonce.tu-berlin.de:11303/22199"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/tu-berlin/oai:depositonce.tu-berlin.de:11303/22199","repository":{"repo_id":"tu-berlin","name":"Technische Universität Berlin","base_url":"https://api-depositonce.tu-berlin.de/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Essays in experimental macroeconomics","abstract":"This dissertation consists of four essays that use controlled experiments to address macroeconomic issues. Chapter 1 (coauthored with Camille Cornand and Adam Zylbersztejn) investigates the robustness of experience effects in laboratory experiments. We compare two scenarios in a beauty-contest game characterized by strategic complementarity: A baseline in which the same shock hits the economy four times, and a treatment in which the shocks are heterogeneous. We find that convergence to equilibrium accelerates with each shock in both scenarios. We then run a horse-race exercise between models of expectation formation. Chapter 2 (coauthored with David Hales, Patrick Julius, and Weiwei Tasch) examines the sources of asymmetric price transmission. We show that prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks in laboratory markets where subjects act as producers and demand is computerized. We show that subjects engage in tacit collusion, which is accentuated after negative shocks and is not expectation driven. Increasing the number of competitors from 3 to 10 does not significantly change the degree of asymmetry. Chapter 3 (coauthored with Lisa Bruttel, Camille Cornand, Adam Zylbersztejn, and Frank Heinemann) develops an experimental method for measuring strategic uncertainty attitudes. We compare certainty equivalents and beliefs across lotteries where the payoff depends on either the outcome of a stag-hunt game, a market-entry game, an ambiguous lottery, or a risky lottery. We use a model to determine whether participants exhibit optimism/pessimism or strategic-uncertainty aversion/seeking. We find that the median player is pessimistic in the stag-hunt game and optimistic in the entry game, but neutral toward strategic uncertainty. Chapter 4 employs survey experiments to measure German households’ beliefs about the European Central Bank’s inflation forecasts. I find that the accuracy of these forecasts is severely underestimated. Information treatments are effective in changing inflation expectations and uncertainty. A causal mechanism analysis shows that intervention increases trust in the central bank, which in turn changes inflation expectations. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of these results.","abstract_html":"This dissertation consists of four essays that use controlled experiments to address macroeconomic issues. Chapter 1 (coauthored with Camille Cornand and Adam Zylbersztejn) investigates the robustness of experience effects in laboratory experiments. We compare two scenarios in a beauty-contest game characterized by strategic complementarity: A baseline in which the same shock hits the economy four times, and a treatment in which the shocks are heterogeneous. We find that convergence to equilibrium accelerates with each shock in both scenarios. We then run a horse-race exercise between models of expectation formation. Chapter 2 (coauthored with David Hales, Patrick Julius, and Weiwei Tasch) examines the sources of asymmetric price transmission. We show that prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks in laboratory markets where subjects act as producers and demand is computerized. We show that subjects engage in tacit collusion, which is accentuated after negative shocks and is not expectation driven. Increasing the number of competitors from 3 to 10 does not significantly change the degree of asymmetry. Chapter 3 (coauthored with Lisa Bruttel, Camille Cornand, Adam Zylbersztejn, and Frank Heinemann) develops an experimental method for measuring strategic uncertainty attitudes. We compare certainty equivalents and beliefs across lotteries where the payoff depends on either the outcome of a stag-hunt game, a market-entry game, an ambiguous lottery, or a risky lottery. We use a model to determine whether participants exhibit optimism/pessimism or strategic-uncertainty aversion/seeking. We find that the median player is pessimistic in the stag-hunt game and optimistic in the entry game, but neutral toward strategic uncertainty. Chapter 4 employs survey experiments to measure German households’ beliefs about the European Central Bank’s inflation forecasts. I find that the accuracy of these forecasts is severely underestimated. Information treatments are effective in changing inflation expectations and uncertainty. A causal mechanism analysis shows that intervention increases trust in the central bank, which in turn changes inflation expectations. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of these results.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Bulutay, Muhammed"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Heinemann, Frank"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2024,"date_issued":"2024","date_published":"2024","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:28:54Z","subjects":[],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-21000"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-21000","href":"https://doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-21000","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/22199","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Heinemann, Frank"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Bulutay, Muhammed"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2024-08-14T11:29:22Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2024-08-14T11:29:22Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2024"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Doctoral Thesis"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/22199","https://doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-21000"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation consists of four essays that use controlled experiments to address macroeconomic issues. Chapter 1 (coauthored with Camille Cornand and Adam Zylbersztejn) investigates the robustness of experience effects in laboratory experiments. We compare two scenarios in a beauty-contest game characterized by strategic complementarity: A baseline in which the same shock hits the economy four times, and a treatment in which the shocks are heterogeneous. We find that convergence to equilibrium accelerates with each shock in both scenarios. We then run a horse-race exercise between models of expectation formation. Chapter 2 (coauthored with David Hales, Patrick Julius, and Weiwei Tasch) examines the sources of asymmetric price transmission. We show that prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks in laboratory markets where subjects act as producers and demand is computerized. We show that subjects engage in tacit collusion, which is accentuated after negative shocks and is not expectation driven. Increasing the number of competitors from 3 to 10 does not significantly change the degree of asymmetry. Chapter 3 (coauthored with Lisa Bruttel, Camille Cornand, Adam Zylbersztejn, and Frank Heinemann) develops an experimental method for measuring strategic uncertainty attitudes. We compare certainty equivalents and beliefs across lotteries where the payoff depends on either the outcome of a stag-hunt game, a market-entry game, an ambiguous lottery, or a risky lottery. We use a model to determine whether participants exhibit optimism/pessimism or strategic-uncertainty aversion/seeking. We find that the median player is pessimistic in the stag-hunt game and optimistic in the entry game, but neutral toward strategic uncertainty. Chapter 4 employs survey experiments to measure German households’ beliefs about the European Central Bank’s inflation forecasts. I find that the accuracy of these forecasts is severely underestimated. Information treatments are effective in changing inflation expectations and uncertainty. A causal mechanism analysis shows that intervention increases trust in the central bank, which in turn changes inflation expectations. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of these results.","Diese Dissertation umfasst vier Aufsätze, die kontrollierte Experimente zur Behandlung makroökonomischer Fragestellungen nutzen. Kapitel 1 (mitverfasst von Camille Cornand und Adam Zylbersztejn) untersucht die Robustheit von Erfahrungseffekten in Laborversuchen. Wir vergleichen zwei Szenarien in einem Schönheitswettbewerbsspiel, das durch strategische Komplementarität gekennzeichnet ist: ein Baseline-Szenario, in dem die gleiche ökonomische Schockwirkung viermal auftritt, und ein Treatment, in dem die Schocks heterogen sind. Wir stellen fest, dass die Konvergenz zum Gleichgewicht mit jedem Schock schneller verläuft. Anschließend führen wir einen Vergleich der Vorhersagen zwischen verschiedenen Modellen der Erwartungsbildung durch. Kapitel 2 (mitverfasst von David Hales, Patrick Julius und Weiwei Tasch) untersucht die Ursachen asymmetrischer Preisübertragungen. Wir zeigen, dass Preise asymmetrisch auf Kostenschocks in Labormärkten reagieren, in denen Probanden als Produzenten agieren und die Nachfrage computergesteuert ist. Wir zeigen, dass die Probanden stillschweigende Absprachen treffen, die sich nach negativen Schocks verstärken und nicht erwartungsgesteuert sind. Eine Erhöhung der Anzahl der Wettbewerber von 3 auf 10 ändert das Ausmaß der Asymmetrie nicht wesentlich. Kapitel 3 (mitverfasst von Lisa Bruttel, Camille Cornand, Adam Zylbersztejn und Frank Heinemann) entwickelt eine experimentelle Methode zur Messung von Einstellungen zur strategischen Unsicherheit. Wir vergleichen Sicherheitsäquivalente und Erwartungen von Probanden für Lotterien, deren Auszahlungen entweder vom Ausgang eines stag hunt game, eines Markteintrittsspiels, einer Lotterie mit gegebenen Wahrscheinlichkeiten und einer Lotterie mit ungewissen Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Mithilfe eines Modells bestimmen wir, ob die Teilnehmer Optimismus/Pessimismus oder eine Abneigung/Vorliebe gegenüber strategischer Unsicherheit zeigen. Wir finden heraus, dass der durchschnittliche Spieler im stag hunt game pessimistisch und im Eintrittsspiel optimistisch ist, jedoch neutral gegenüber strategischer Unsicherheit. Kapitel 4 verwendet Umfrageexperimente, um die Überzeugungen deutscher Haushalte bezüglich der Inflationsprognosen der Europäischen Zentralbank zu messen. Die Genauigkeit dieser Prognosen wird stark unterschätzt. Informations erweisen sich als wirksam, um Inflationserwartungen und die damit verbundene Unsicherheit zu verändern. Eine Analyse des kausalen Mechanismus zeigt, dass die Intervention das Vertrauen in die Zentralbank erhöht, was wiederum die Inflationserwartungen verändert. Kapitel 5 schließt mit einer Diskussion dieser Ergebnisse ab."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Essays in experimental macroeconomics"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Heinemann, Frank"],"dc:creator":["Bulutay, Muhammed"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2024-08-14T11:29:22Z"],"dc:date.available":["2024-08-14T11:29:22Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2024"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation consists of four essays that use controlled experiments to address macroeconomic issues. Chapter 1 (coauthored with Camille Cornand and Adam Zylbersztejn) investigates the robustness of experience effects in laboratory experiments. We compare two scenarios in a beauty-contest game characterized by strategic complementarity: A baseline in which the same shock hits the economy four times, and a treatment in which the shocks are heterogeneous. We find that convergence to equilibrium accelerates with each shock in both scenarios. We then run a horse-race exercise between models of expectation formation. Chapter 2 (coauthored with David Hales, Patrick Julius, and Weiwei Tasch) examines the sources of asymmetric price transmission. We show that prices respond asymmetrically to cost shocks in laboratory markets where subjects act as producers and demand is computerized. We show that subjects engage in tacit collusion, which is accentuated after negative shocks and is not expectation driven. Increasing the number of competitors from 3 to 10 does not significantly change the degree of asymmetry. Chapter 3 (coauthored with Lisa Bruttel, Camille Cornand, Adam Zylbersztejn, and Frank Heinemann) develops an experimental method for measuring strategic uncertainty attitudes. We compare certainty equivalents and beliefs across lotteries where the payoff depends on either the outcome of a stag-hunt game, a market-entry game, an ambiguous lottery, or a risky lottery. We use a model to determine whether participants exhibit optimism/pessimism or strategic-uncertainty aversion/seeking. We find that the median player is pessimistic in the stag-hunt game and optimistic in the entry game, but neutral toward strategic uncertainty. Chapter 4 employs survey experiments to measure German households’ beliefs about the European Central Bank’s inflation forecasts. I find that the accuracy of these forecasts is severely underestimated. Information treatments are effective in changing inflation expectations and uncertainty. A causal mechanism analysis shows that intervention increases trust in the central bank, which in turn changes inflation expectations. Chapter 5 concludes with a discussion of these results.","Diese Dissertation umfasst vier Aufsätze, die kontrollierte Experimente zur Behandlung makroökonomischer Fragestellungen nutzen. Kapitel 1 (mitverfasst von Camille Cornand und Adam Zylbersztejn) untersucht die Robustheit von Erfahrungseffekten in Laborversuchen. Wir vergleichen zwei Szenarien in einem Schönheitswettbewerbsspiel, das durch strategische Komplementarität gekennzeichnet ist: ein Baseline-Szenario, in dem die gleiche ökonomische Schockwirkung viermal auftritt, und ein Treatment, in dem die Schocks heterogen sind. Wir stellen fest, dass die Konvergenz zum Gleichgewicht mit jedem Schock schneller verläuft. Anschließend führen wir einen Vergleich der Vorhersagen zwischen verschiedenen Modellen der Erwartungsbildung durch. Kapitel 2 (mitverfasst von David Hales, Patrick Julius und Weiwei Tasch) untersucht die Ursachen asymmetrischer Preisübertragungen. Wir zeigen, dass Preise asymmetrisch auf Kostenschocks in Labormärkten reagieren, in denen Probanden als Produzenten agieren und die Nachfrage computergesteuert ist. Wir zeigen, dass die Probanden stillschweigende Absprachen treffen, die sich nach negativen Schocks verstärken und nicht erwartungsgesteuert sind. Eine Erhöhung der Anzahl der Wettbewerber von 3 auf 10 ändert das Ausmaß der Asymmetrie nicht wesentlich. Kapitel 3 (mitverfasst von Lisa Bruttel, Camille Cornand, Adam Zylbersztejn und Frank Heinemann) entwickelt eine experimentelle Methode zur Messung von Einstellungen zur strategischen Unsicherheit. Wir vergleichen Sicherheitsäquivalente und Erwartungen von Probanden für Lotterien, deren Auszahlungen entweder vom Ausgang eines stag hunt game, eines Markteintrittsspiels, einer Lotterie mit gegebenen Wahrscheinlichkeiten und einer Lotterie mit ungewissen Wahrscheinlichkeiten. Mithilfe eines Modells bestimmen wir, ob die Teilnehmer Optimismus/Pessimismus oder eine Abneigung/Vorliebe gegenüber strategischer Unsicherheit zeigen. Wir finden heraus, dass der durchschnittliche Spieler im stag hunt game pessimistisch und im Eintrittsspiel optimistisch ist, jedoch neutral gegenüber strategischer Unsicherheit. Kapitel 4 verwendet Umfrageexperimente, um die Überzeugungen deutscher Haushalte bezüglich der Inflationsprognosen der Europäischen Zentralbank zu messen. Die Genauigkeit dieser Prognosen wird stark unterschätzt. Informations erweisen sich als wirksam, um Inflationserwartungen und die damit verbundene Unsicherheit zu verändern. Eine Analyse des kausalen Mechanismus zeigt, dass die Intervention das Vertrauen in die Zentralbank erhöht, was wiederum die Inflationserwartungen verändert. Kapitel 5 schließt mit einer Diskussion dieser Ergebnisse ab."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://depositonce.tu-berlin.de/handle/11303/22199","https://doi.org/10.14279/depositonce-21000"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:title":["Essays in experimental macroeconomics"],"dc:type":["Doctoral Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:28:54Z"}