The Ontology, Etiology, and Moral Psychology of Action: Aristotle and Today

Aristotle’s theory of action answers two central questions in Action Theory today: What causes action? What role do psychological attitudes play in action? Chapter 1 dispels misunderstandings about Aristotle’s theory of causation. Influential interpretations assume that Aristotle’s material, formal, and final causes are explanatory only as constituents of an efficient-causal event, and that all efficient causes are productive. Productive efficient causes are those for which the effect is numerically distinct from the causal activity of the cause. Aristotle makes neither assumption. Instead, he thinks that some efficient causes are not productive, and that material, formal, and final causes are explanatory in their own right rather than as constituents of efficient-causal events. Chapter 2 argues that Aristotle countenances four causes of action: Agents’ bodies are material causes of their self-movements, their occurrent psychological attitudes (such as desire and decision) are formal causes, agents themselves, as self-movers actualizing a particular potentiality, are efficient causes, and agents’ goals are final causes. This view challenges the prevailing assumption that psychological attitudes are efficient causes of actions. They are instead formal causes—paradigms for acting and parts of what defines the sort of action that the action is. Aristotle’s four-causal view makes progress in addressing problems for recent theories of action. Chapter 3 treats Davidsonian and Anscombean theories, the most prominent. Davidsonians face the problem of deviant causal chains (where psychological attitudes cause actions accidentally) and of the disappearing agent (the agent herself plays no role identifiable as agency). Anscombeans encounter the problem of deviant formal causation (a foreseen side-effect is wrongly counted by the theory as part of the intended aim) and of disappearing agency (without appeal to psychological attitudes, it is difficult to account for agential control). Aristotle's account makes headway on these problems. Chapter 4 treats constitutivist theories, which insist that agential control over action is at least partially constitutive of the action rather than a matter of antecedent efficient causes. Existing constitutivist accounts misconceive the causal role or range of psychological attitudes that are relevant for agential control. Constitutivists can advance by understanding psychological attitudes as Aristotelian formal causes of action.

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

2016

Author dc:creator

• Reece, Bryan

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Gerson, Lloyd P

• Action
• Ancient Philosophy
• Aristotle
• Causation
• Responsibility

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1807/89637

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/89637