{"id":{"repo_id":"toronto-retro","oai_identifier":"oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/35718"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/toronto-retro/oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/35718","repository":{"repo_id":"toronto-retro","name":"University of Toronto","base_url":"https://utoronto.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Justification of Deontology","abstract":"Agent-centered restrictions are widely accepted both in commonsense morality and across social and legal institutions, making it all the more striking that we have yet to ground them in a compelling theoretical rationale. This dissertation amounts to an effort to fill that gap by seeking out a new principled basis for justifying such constraints. I devote each of the first three chapters, respectively, to the three established deontological normative ethical theories: Rossian intuitionism, Kantianism, and Neo-Thomism. In each of these chapters, I lay out the relevant portion of the view’s deontological apparatus, analyzing it both for its plausibility as a whole and for its ability to justify constraints of the appropriate shape. After assessing and rejecting all three approaches, I devote the next two chapters to developing a new rationale for grounding constraints—one that avoids the pitfalls indicated in the prominent historical alternatives. Specifically, I anchor constraints in the distinction between the agent-neutral and agent-relative points of view, basing them in the widely accepted psychological fact of the natural independence of the personal point of view.","abstract_html":"Agent-centered restrictions are widely accepted both in commonsense morality and across social and legal institutions, making it all the more striking that we have yet to ground them in a compelling theoretical rationale. This dissertation amounts to an effort to fill that gap by seeking out a new principled basis for justifying such constraints. I devote each of the first three chapters, respectively, to the three established deontological normative ethical theories: Rossian intuitionism, Kantianism, and Neo-Thomism. In each of these chapters, I lay out the relevant portion of the view’s deontological apparatus, analyzing it both for its plausibility as a whole and for its ability to justify constraints of the appropriate shape. After assessing and rejecting all three approaches, I devote the next two chapters to developing a new rationale for grounding constraints—one that avoids the pitfalls indicated in the prominent historical alternatives. Specifically, I anchor constraints in the distinction between the agent-neutral and agent-relative points of view, basing them in the widely accepted psychological fact of the natural independence of the personal point of view.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sinha, Gaurav Alex"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Philosophy","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Hurka, Thomas"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-03","date_published":"2012-03","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:28:07Z","subjects":["Deontology","Agent-Centered Restrictions","Consequentialism","Constraints"],"languages":["en_US"],"rights":["Attribution 3.0 Unported"],"rights_urls":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/1807/35718","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Hurka, Thomas"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Sinha, Gaurav Alex"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2012-03"]},{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2013-07-18T14:51:49Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["WITHHELD_ONE_YEAR","2013-07-18T14:51:49Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2012-03"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Deontology","Agent-Centered Restrictions","Consequentialism","Constraints"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en_US"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Attribution 3.0 Unported"]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/1807/35718"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Agent-centered restrictions are widely accepted both in commonsense morality and across social and legal institutions, making it all the more striking that we have yet to ground them in a compelling theoretical rationale. This dissertation amounts to an effort to fill that gap by seeking out a new principled basis for justifying such constraints. I devote each of the first three chapters, respectively, to the three established deontological normative ethical theories: Rossian intuitionism, Kantianism, and Neo-Thomism. In each of these chapters, I lay out the relevant portion of the view’s deontological apparatus, analyzing it both for its plausibility as a whole and for its ability to justify constraints of the appropriate shape. After assessing and rejecting all three approaches, I devote the next two chapters to developing a new rationale for grounding constraints—one that avoids the pitfalls indicated in the prominent historical alternatives. 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