Against Modalities: On the Presumed Coherence and Alleged Indispensability of Some Modal Notions

Part I investigates the idea that kinds (as opposed to individuals) have some modal properties. I argue that concerning typical kind-essentialist claims there is a non-trivial question—the transworld identity problem—about what the relevant kind terms are supposed to refer to in non-actual possible worlds. I reject several ideas for solving the problem. The upshot is a worry about the coherence of modal talk concerning kinds. Waiving this worry for the sake of argument, in Part II the target is the use of modal talk in the sciences. I offer a deflationary account of modalities, based on the familiar idea of reducing modalities to logical relationships between non-modal statements and non-modal background theories. I argue that this account is adequate for making sense of modal talk in the sciences. Moreover, I argue that irreducible modal properties of the world, if there are any, cannot be scientifically discovered or inferred. Thus we have a number of arguments against modalities: the threat of incoherence, their epistemic inaccessibility, and the dispensability of modal talk in the sciences.

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

2009

Author dc:creator

• Lajevardi, Kaveh

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Chakravartty, Anjan

• Modalities
• Transworld Identity Problem
• Natural Kinds
• Essentialism

Language dc:language.iso

en_ca

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1807/16814

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/16814