{"id":{"repo_id":"toronto-retro","oai_identifier":"oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/150675"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/toronto-retro/oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/150675","repository":{"repo_id":"toronto-retro","name":"University of Toronto","base_url":"https://utoronto.scholaris.ca/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Thinking as a Mere Citizen of the World: Kantian Morality in a Pluralist Frame","abstract":"This dissertation argues that Kantian morality is more compatible with cultural pluralism than has thus far been acknowledged. Cultural pluralism denotes a normative commitment to the idea that we ought to uphold diversity and protect the rights of individuals within a given society to hold a multiplicity of divergent views, beliefs, and values. I argue that cultural pluralism should also be understood as being invested in certain basic liberal values and a concern for protecting fundamental human rights. As such, the pluralist needs a moral theory that balances the commitment to protecting diversity with the commitment to protecting human rights and provides a way of determining the appropriate limits of toleration. While moral relativism can be seen as a natural entailment of cultural pluralism, the kind of moral theory that the pluralist needs cannot be provided by relativism. I argue that there is good reason for the cultural pluralist to consider Kantian morality as a viable and compelling alternative. I do so by developing and clarifying elements of Kant’s thought which are often mischaracterized, oversimplified, or overlooked when discussing his moral theory, including egoism, broad-mindedness, the relationship between culture and practical judgment, and the importance of community in our moral lives. I attend to these elements with the dual aim of clarifying what Kant's position is and exploring which entailments might reasonably be drawn from his thought and developed further. In contrast with many stereotypical views of Kant’s moral system, I hold that his approach balances objectivity of principles with an awareness of the complexity of the historically located and socially embedded subject who makes moral judgments. I conclude by arguing that, while the two positions do not perfectly converge, Kantian morality and cultural pluralism stand much more closely to one another than has been imagined.","abstract_html":"This dissertation argues that Kantian morality is more compatible with cultural pluralism than has thus far been acknowledged. Cultural pluralism denotes a normative commitment to the idea that we ought to uphold diversity and protect the rights of individuals within a given society to hold a multiplicity of divergent views, beliefs, and values. I argue that cultural pluralism should also be understood as being invested in certain basic liberal values and a concern for protecting fundamental human rights. As such, the pluralist needs a moral theory that balances the commitment to protecting diversity with the commitment to protecting human rights and provides a way of determining the appropriate limits of toleration. While moral relativism can be seen as a natural entailment of cultural pluralism, the kind of moral theory that the pluralist needs cannot be provided by relativism. I argue that there is good reason for the cultural pluralist to consider Kantian morality as a viable and compelling alternative. I do so by developing and clarifying elements of Kant’s thought which are often mischaracterized, oversimplified, or overlooked when discussing his moral theory, including egoism, broad-mindedness, the relationship between culture and practical judgment, and the importance of community in our moral lives. I attend to these elements with the dual aim of clarifying what Kant's position is and exploring which entailments might reasonably be drawn from his thought and developed further. In contrast with many stereotypical views of Kant’s moral system, I hold that his approach balances objectivity of principles with an awareness of the complexity of the historically located and socially embedded subject who makes moral judgments. I conclude by arguing that, while the two positions do not perfectly converge, Kantian morality and cultural pluralism stand much more closely to one another than has been imagined.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Murphy, Allison George Braye"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":"Religion, Study of","school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["DiCenso, James J."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2025,"date_issued":"2025-10","date_published":"2025-10","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:27:58Z","subjects":["diversity","Kant","moral relativism","morality","multiculturalism","pluralism"],"languages":[],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/1807/150675","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["DiCenso, James J."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.department","label":"Department","values":["Religion, Study of"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Murphy, Allison George Braye"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date","label":"Dc Date","values":["2025-10"]},{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2025-12-01T17:55:14Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2025-10"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["diversity","Kant","moral relativism","morality","multiculturalism","pluralism"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/1807/150675"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation argues that Kantian morality is more compatible with cultural pluralism than has thus far been acknowledged. Cultural pluralism denotes a normative commitment to the idea that we ought to uphold diversity and protect the rights of individuals within a given society to hold a multiplicity of divergent views, beliefs, and values. I argue that cultural pluralism should also be understood as being invested in certain basic liberal values and a concern for protecting fundamental human rights. As such, the pluralist needs a moral theory that balances the commitment to protecting diversity with the commitment to protecting human rights and provides a way of determining the appropriate limits of toleration. While moral relativism can be seen as a natural entailment of cultural pluralism, the kind of moral theory that the pluralist needs cannot be provided by relativism. I argue that there is good reason for the cultural pluralist to consider Kantian morality as a viable and compelling alternative. I do so by developing and clarifying elements of Kant’s thought which are often mischaracterized, oversimplified, or overlooked when discussing his moral theory, including egoism, broad-mindedness, the relationship between culture and practical judgment, and the importance of community in our moral lives. I attend to these elements with the dual aim of clarifying what Kant's position is and exploring which entailments might reasonably be drawn from his thought and developed further. In contrast with many stereotypical views of Kant’s moral system, I hold that his approach balances objectivity of principles with an awareness of the complexity of the historically located and socially embedded subject who makes moral judgments. I conclude by arguing that, while the two positions do not perfectly converge, Kantian morality and cultural pluralism stand much more closely to one another than has been imagined."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Thinking as a Mere Citizen of the World: Kantian Morality in a Pluralist Frame"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["DiCenso, James J."],"dc:contributor.department":["Religion, Study of"],"dc:creator":["Murphy, Allison George Braye"],"dc:date":["2025-10"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2025-12-01T17:55:14Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2025-10"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation argues that Kantian morality is more compatible with cultural pluralism than has thus far been acknowledged. 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I do so by developing and clarifying elements of Kant’s thought which are often mischaracterized, oversimplified, or overlooked when discussing his moral theory, including egoism, broad-mindedness, the relationship between culture and practical judgment, and the importance of community in our moral lives. I attend to these elements with the dual aim of clarifying what Kant's position is and exploring which entailments might reasonably be drawn from his thought and developed further. In contrast with many stereotypical views of Kant’s moral system, I hold that his approach balances objectivity of principles with an awareness of the complexity of the historically located and socially embedded subject who makes moral judgments. I conclude by arguing that, while the two positions do not perfectly converge, Kantian morality and cultural pluralism stand much more closely to one another than has been imagined."],"dc:description.degree":["Ph.D."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/1807/150675"],"dc:subject":["diversity","Kant","moral relativism","morality","multiculturalism","pluralism"],"dc:title":["Thinking as a Mere Citizen of the World: Kantian Morality in a Pluralist Frame"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:27:58Z"}