Kant on Personhood

Kant is clear that we owe duties to persons, chief among them the duty to treat persons as ends and never as mere means. But the very ability to act with respect for this duty is grounded on the prior ability to distinguish between persons and non-persons. How is this possible given Kant’s view that we are given to one another as appearances operating according to deterministic natural laws? As an idea of practical reason, it should be impossible to apply

Department dc:contributor.department

Philosophy

Year dc:date.issued

2024

Author dc:creator

• Hamblin, Caitlin Mary

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Stang, Nicholas

• Ethics
• Kant
• Personhood

Handle dc:identifier.uri

http://hdl.handle.net/1807/141044

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/141044