Abstract
dc:description.abstractDevelopments in artificial intelligence and robotics promise increased interaction between humans and autonomous machines, presenting novel risks of accidental harm to individuals and property. This thesis situates the problem of autonomous-machine-caused harm within tort law’s doctrinal and theoretical framework, conceived as a practice of corrective justice. Crucially, due to machine-learning capabilities, harmful effects of autonomous machines may be principally un-foreseeable, and therefore, not legally attributable to the human agency of designers, manufacturers or users. This thesis assesses which tort doctrines—negligence, strict liability or vicarious liability—are most amenable to developing a theory of liability for autonomous-machine-caused harm. To this end, it argues that the doctrine of vicarious liability may be reconceived to hold human or corporate deployers vicariously liable for tortious harm caused by autonomous machines in the course of deployment. Under this approach, autonomous machines constitute a novel category of legal subject: pure legal agents without legal personhood.
Degree
thesis:*- Department dc:contributor.department
- Law
- Year dc:date.issued
- 2019
Author and committee
dc:creator, dc:contributor.*- Author dc:creator
-
- Huberman, Pinchas
- Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
-
- Benson, Peter
Subjects
dc:subject × 6Identifiers
dc:identifier.*- Handle dc:identifier.uri
- http://hdl.handle.net/1807/108347
- OAI identifier oai:identifier
- oai:utoronto.scholaris.ca:1807/108347