Moral Equality: Article of Faith

In the first part of this thesis I demonstrate that the best arguments we have for the equal moral worth of all human beings are incorrigibly defective. This is a problem because many people hold that equality between persons in the political, legal and social realms depends on and is justified by their equal value in the moral realm. I solve the problem in the second part of my thesis by developing an account of human worth which cuts the chain of dependency so that political, legal and social equality needn’t hang on moral equality. The result is an account of human value as neither equal nor unequal and which preserves and satisfies the spirit of moral and political egalitarianism. What is that spirit? That everyone matters and no-one more than any other.

Name dc:type.qualificationname

phd

Level dc:type.qualificationlevel

doctoral

Grantor dc:publisher.institution

The Open University

Year dc:date.issued

2017

Author dc:creator

• Mcbride, David

Language dc:language

en