{"id":{"repo_id":"texas","oai_identifier":"oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5115"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/texas/oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5115","repository":{"repo_id":"texas","name":"University of Texas","base_url":"https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Credit rating agencies and conflicts of interest","abstract":"Credit rating agencies are controversial yet influential financial gatekeepers. Many have attributed the recent failures of credit rating agencies to conflicts of interest, such as the agencies’ issuer-pays business model and the agencies’ provision of ancillary services. This report identifies these conflicts; examines recently-finalized Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations proscribing these conflicts; and suggests other possible regulatory measures. The strategies available to regulators are diverse and differ widely in their political and administrative feasibility. These strategies include outright prohibition of conflicts; removing regulatory references to credit ratings; enhancing agency liability; organizational firewalls; performance disclosures; demonstrating due diligence and its results; increasing competition; staleness reforms; internal governance; administrative registration; and requiring alternative business models. While the report primarily focuses on how the most recent financial crisis—and the related market for asset-backed securities—highlighted conflicts of interest at credit rating agencies, this report also examines how credit ratings—and their limitations—affect sovereign debt markets.","abstract_html":"Credit rating agencies are controversial yet influential financial gatekeepers. Many have attributed the recent failures of credit rating agencies to conflicts of interest, such as the agencies’ issuer-pays business model and the agencies’ provision of ancillary services. This report identifies these conflicts; examines recently-finalized Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations proscribing these conflicts; and suggests other possible regulatory measures. The strategies available to regulators are diverse and differ widely in their political and administrative feasibility. These strategies include outright prohibition of conflicts; removing regulatory references to credit ratings; enhancing agency liability; organizational firewalls; performance disclosures; demonstrating due diligence and its results; increasing competition; staleness reforms; internal governance; administrative registration; and requiring alternative business models. While the report primarily focuses on how the most recent financial crisis—and the related market for asset-backed securities—highlighted conflicts of interest at credit rating agencies, this report also examines how credit ratings—and their limitations—affect sovereign debt markets.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Crumley, Diana G."],"institution":"University of Texas at Austin","degree_name":"Doctor of Jurisprudence","degree_level":"Masters","degree_discipline":"Law - Jurisprudence","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Galbraith, James K."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["McGarity, Thomas O."],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-05","date_published":"2012-05","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:00:58Z","subjects":["Credit rating agency","NRSRO","Conflict of interest","SEC","Issuer-pays model"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5115","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Galbraith, James K."]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["McGarity, Thomas O."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Crumley, Diana G."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2012-08-21T17:48:51Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2012-08-21T17:48:51Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2012-05"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Law - Jurisprudence","Public Affairs"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Masters","Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Jurisprudence","Master of Public Affairs"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["University of Texas at Austin"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Credit rating agency","NRSRO","Conflict of interest","SEC","Issuer-pays model"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2152/ETD-UT-2012-05-5115"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description","label":"Description","values":["text"]},{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Credit rating agencies are controversial yet influential financial gatekeepers. Many have attributed the recent failures of credit rating agencies to conflicts of interest, such as the agencies’ issuer-pays business model and the agencies’ provision of ancillary services. This report identifies these conflicts; examines recently-finalized Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) regulations proscribing these conflicts; and suggests other possible regulatory measures. The strategies available to regulators are diverse and differ widely in their political and administrative feasibility. These strategies include outright prohibition of conflicts; removing regulatory references to credit ratings; enhancing agency liability; organizational firewalls; performance disclosures; demonstrating due diligence and its results; increasing competition; staleness reforms; internal governance; administrative registration; and requiring alternative business models. 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