{"id":{"repo_id":"texas","oai_identifier":"oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/87812"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/texas/oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/87812","repository":{"repo_id":"texas","name":"University of Texas","base_url":"https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Intervention, war expansion, and the international sources of civil war","abstract":"Why do some civil wars become interstate wars while others do not? In this dissertation I develop a theory of rebellion, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation that connects civil and interstate war. I argue that civil wars expand when rebels and third parties underestimate the government's resolve, and there are three key predictors of interstate war: the size of the local stakes relative to the third party's territory, the rebels' loss of autonomy when receiving external support, and the third party's affinity for the rebels. I evaluate the model and test its predictions using a mixed-methods approach. I use newly collected data on war expansions to show how factors such as escalation costs affect risks of intervention and retaliation, and I explore the causal mechanisms of my theory through the Afghan Civil War from 1978 to 1989. My findings have implications for models of conflict, conflict prevention, and U.S. grand strategy.","abstract_html":"Why do some civil wars become interstate wars while others do not? In this dissertation I develop a theory of rebellion, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation that connects civil and interstate war. I argue that civil wars expand when rebels and third parties underestimate the government's resolve, and there are three key predictors of interstate war: the size of the local stakes relative to the third party's territory, the rebels' loss of autonomy when receiving external support, and the third party's affinity for the rebels. I evaluate the model and test its predictions using a mixed-methods approach. I use newly collected data on war expansions to show how factors such as escalation costs affect risks of intervention and retaliation, and I explore the causal mechanisms of my theory through the Afghan Civil War from 1978 to 1989. My findings have implications for models of conflict, conflict prevention, and U.S. grand strategy.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Langø, Hans-Inge Giske"],"institution":"The University of Texas at Austin","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Government","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Wolford, Scott"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Chapman, Terrence L.","Findley, Michael G.","Lawrence, Mark A.","McDonald, Patrick J."],"year":2021,"date_issued":"2021-07-22","date_published":"2021-07-22","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:01:16Z","subjects":["Civil war","Interstate war","Intervention","Formal theory"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/14756"],"render_values":[{"text":"http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/14756","href":"http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/14756","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2152/87812","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Wolford, Scott"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Chapman, Terrence L.","Findley, Michael G.","Lawrence, Mark A.","McDonald, Patrick J."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Langø, Hans-Inge Giske"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2021-09-16T00:33:29Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2021-09-16T00:33:29Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2021-07-22"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Government"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The University of Texas at Austin"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Civil war","Interstate war","Intervention","Formal theory"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2152/87812","http://dx.doi.org/10.26153/tsw/14756"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Why do some civil wars become interstate wars while others do not? In this dissertation I develop a theory of rebellion, rebel-sided intervention, and interstate retaliation that connects civil and interstate war. I argue that civil wars expand when rebels and third parties underestimate the government's resolve, and there are three key predictors of interstate war: the size of the local stakes relative to the third party's territory, the rebels' loss of autonomy when receiving external support, and the third party's affinity for the rebels. I evaluate the model and test its predictions using a mixed-methods approach. I use newly collected data on war expansions to show how factors such as escalation costs affect risks of intervention and retaliation, and I explore the causal mechanisms of my theory through the Afghan Civil War from 1978 to 1989. 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