Algorithm and mechanism design with nonlinear preferences

In real life, many combinatorial and economic problems have nonlinear objectives and constraints, where the nonlinearities typically arise from different risk preferences, non-rationality, etc. Solving these problems is often computationally hard but can be beneficial by providing more revenue or welfare. In this thesis, I am going to investigate three problems: route planning with a nonlinear objective, dynamic mechanism design with agents of bounded rationality, and economic mechanism design with risk-loving buyers.

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy

Level thesis:degree_level

Doctoral

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Grantor

The University of Texas at Austin

Year dc:date.issued

2018

Author dc:creator

• Yang, Ger

Advisor dc:contributor.advisor

• Nikolova, Evdokia

Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember

• Dimakis, Georgios-Alex
• Shakkottai, Sanjay
• Tran, Ngoc
• de Veciana, Gustavo

• Algorithm design
• Mechanism design
• Route-planning
• Approximation algorithm
• Dominant path
• Wireless coverage prediction
• Hysteresis
• Game theory
• Risk-loving
• Auction
• Linear programming
• Duality

Language dc:language.iso

en

Identifier

doi:10.15781/T2T14V885

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/71400