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The University of Texas at Austin

Hop integrity: a defense against denial-of-service attacks

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

A computer network is said to provide hop integrity iff the following three conditions hold for every pair of adjacent routers p and q in the network. First, p does not forward any message to q if q has not been up and reachable. Second, when q receives a message m supposedly from p, then q can check that m was not modified after it was sent. Third, when q receives a message m supposedly from p, then q can check that m was not a replay of an old message sent by p. In this dissertation, we propose three protocols that can be added to the routers in a computer network so that the network can provide hop integrity, and thus overcome most denial-of-service attacks. These three protocols are the secure address resolution protocol, the weak hop integrity protocol, and the strong hop integrity protocol. The secure address resolution protocol includes an inviteaccept protocol and a request-reply protocol, and requires a secure server connected to the Ethernet. The weak hop integrity protocol includes a secret exchange protocol and an integrity check protocol. The strong hop integrity protocol combines a soft sequence number protocol with the weak hop integrity protocol. We also present an alternative way to achieve strong hop integrity with hard sequence numbers. All the protocols are stateless, require small overhead, and do not constrain the network protocol in the routers in any way.

Degree

thesis:*
Name thesis:degree_name
Doctor of Philosophy
Level thesis:degree_level
Doctoral
Discipline thesis:degree_discipline
Computer Sciences
Grantor
The University of Texas at Austin
Year dc:date.issued
2003

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Huang, Chin-Tser
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Gouda, Mohamed G., 1947-

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • Copyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Identifier
b56832424
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/652

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
University of Texas
Base URL
repositories.lib.utexas.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-24
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
related terms
citation

Huang, Chin-Tser. Hop integrity: a defense against denial-of-service attacks. Doctoral thesis, The University of Texas at Austin, 2003. http://hdl.handle.net/2152/652