{"id":{"repo_id":"texas","oai_identifier":"oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/18036"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/texas/oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/18036","repository":{"repo_id":"texas","name":"University of Texas","base_url":"https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Can investors fully adjust for known biases in manager communications?","abstract":"Managerial communications often contain biased information because of managerial incentives and other influences. A common assumption in the accounting literature is that if investors are aware of managerial biases, they will be able to fully adjust for those known biases when reacting to managerial communications. Drawing on insights from psychology, I experimentally document that investors are not able to fully adjust for known biases in managerial communications--even when investors know the quantitative amount of the manager's bias. Indeed, investors behave contrary to economic theory as they are unable to fully unravel the effects of known biases when rendering judgments about the firm. My study has implications for researchers, regulators, and investors.","abstract_html":"Managerial communications often contain biased information because of managerial incentives and other influences. A common assumption in the accounting literature is that if investors are aware of managerial biases, they will be able to fully adjust for those known biases when reacting to managerial communications. Drawing on insights from psychology, I experimentally document that investors are not able to fully adjust for known biases in managerial communications--even when investors know the quantitative amount of the manager's bias. Indeed, investors behave contrary to economic theory as they are unable to fully unravel the effects of known biases when rendering judgments about the firm. My study has implications for researchers, regulators, and investors.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Smith, James William, 1979-"],"institution":"The University of Texas at Austin","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Accounting","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Koonce, Lisa Lynn, 1959-"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2012,"date_issued":"2012-08","date_published":"2012-08","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:01:02Z","subjects":["Financial accounting","Managerial bias","Belief bias"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2152/18036","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Koonce, Lisa Lynn, 1959-"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Smith, James William, 1979-"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2012-09-26T21:18:13Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2012-09-26T21:18:13Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2012-08"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Accounting"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The University of Texas at Austin"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Financial accounting","Managerial bias","Belief bias"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright is held by the author. 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Drawing on insights from psychology, I experimentally document that investors are not able to fully adjust for known biases in managerial communications--even when investors know the quantitative amount of the manager's bias. Indeed, investors behave contrary to economic theory as they are unable to fully unravel the effects of known biases when rendering judgments about the firm. 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Drawing on insights from psychology, I experimentally document that investors are not able to fully adjust for known biases in managerial communications--even when investors know the quantitative amount of the manager's bias. Indeed, investors behave contrary to economic theory as they are unable to fully unravel the effects of known biases when rendering judgments about the firm. My study has implications for researchers, regulators, and investors."],"dc:format.medium":["electronic"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/2152/18036"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:rights":["Copyright is held by the author. 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