{"id":{"repo_id":"texas","oai_identifier":"oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/17897"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/texas/oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/17897","repository":{"repo_id":"texas","name":"University of Texas","base_url":"https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Universals, particulars, and the identity of indiscernables","abstract":"This project is about the distinction between universals and particulars. The fundamental claim I defend is this: The distinction between universals and particulars can be vindicated via the fact that universals are identical if indiscernible while particulars are not identical if indiscernible. This way of "making" the universal-particular distinction is "extensionally" adequate--it (by and large) gets the pre-theoretical extensions of 'universal' and 'particular' right. The entities that one would ordinarily classify as universals get classified as universals, and the entities that one would ordinarily classify as particulars get classified as particulars. Furthermore, this way of making the distinction is "intensionally" adequate--it situates smoothly in the theory of universals and particulars motivated independently of the need to vindicate the distinction. The natures that universals and particulars must have if they are to play their respective theoretical roles require that universals are identical if indiscernible and that particulars are not. No more can reasonably be asked of a proposed universal-particular distinction.","abstract_html":"This project is about the distinction between universals and particulars. The fundamental claim I defend is this: The distinction between universals and particulars can be vindicated via the fact that universals are identical if indiscernible while particulars are not identical if indiscernible. This way of "making" the universal-particular distinction is "extensionally" adequate--it (by and large) gets the pre-theoretical extensions of 'universal' and 'particular' right. The entities that one would ordinarily classify as universals get classified as universals, and the entities that one would ordinarily classify as particulars get classified as particulars. Furthermore, this way of making the distinction is "intensionally" adequate--it situates smoothly in the theory of universals and particulars motivated independently of the need to vindicate the distinction. The natures that universals and particulars must have if they are to play their respective theoretical roles require that universals are identical if indiscernible and that particulars are not. No more can reasonably be asked of a proposed universal-particular distinction.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Pickavance, Timothy Haymond, 1979-"],"institution":"The University of Texas at Austin","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Philosophy","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Koons, Robert C."],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2008,"date_issued":"2008-08","date_published":"2008-08","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:01:08Z","subjects":[],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["Copyright is held by the author. Presentation of this material on the Libraries' web site by University Libraries, The University of Texas at Austin was made possible under a limited license grant from the author who has retained all copyrights in the works."],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/2152/17897","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Koons, Robert C."]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Pickavance, Timothy Haymond, 1979-"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2012-09-13T20:08:41Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2012-09-13T20:08:41Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2008-08"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The University of Texas at Austin"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["Copyright is held by the author. 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This way of "making" the universal-particular distinction is "extensionally" adequate--it (by and large) gets the pre-theoretical extensions of 'universal' and 'particular' right. The entities that one would ordinarily classify as universals get classified as universals, and the entities that one would ordinarily classify as particulars get classified as particulars. Furthermore, this way of making the distinction is "intensionally" adequate--it situates smoothly in the theory of universals and particulars motivated independently of the need to vindicate the distinction. The natures that universals and particulars must have if they are to play their respective theoretical roles require that universals are identical if indiscernible and that particulars are not. No more can reasonably be asked of a proposed universal-particular distinction."]},{"key":"dc:format.medium","label":"Dc Format Medium","values":["electronic"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Universals, particulars, and the identity of indiscernables"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Koons, Robert C."],"dc:creator":["Pickavance, Timothy Haymond, 1979-"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2012-09-13T20:08:41Z"],"dc:date.available":["2012-09-13T20:08:41Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2008-08"],"dc:description":["text"],"dc:description.abstract":["This project is about the distinction between universals and particulars. The fundamental claim I defend is this: The distinction between universals and particulars can be vindicated via the fact that universals are identical if indiscernible while particulars are not identical if indiscernible. This way of "making" the universal-particular distinction is "extensionally" adequate--it (by and large) gets the pre-theoretical extensions of 'universal' and 'particular' right. The entities that one would ordinarily classify as universals get classified as universals, and the entities that one would ordinarily classify as particulars get classified as particulars. Furthermore, this way of making the distinction is "intensionally" adequate--it situates smoothly in the theory of universals and particulars motivated independently of the need to vindicate the distinction. The natures that universals and particulars must have if they are to play their respective theoretical roles require that universals are identical if indiscernible and that particulars are not. 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