{"id":{"repo_id":"texas","oai_identifier":"oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/123264"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/texas/oai:repositories.lib.utexas.edu:2152/123264","repository":{"repo_id":"texas","name":"University of Texas","base_url":"https://repositories.lib.utexas.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The politics of arming, postwar power, and war outcomes","abstract":"Military power following interstate war does not consistently reflect who wins and loses. What explains postwar power, and how might it relate to war outcome? I analyze two formal models of war termination in which a state (or coalition) and an opponent attempt to reach a settlement dividing a disputed good in an ongoing war, and do so again in a postwar period. The postwar distribution of power reflects domestic political constraints on arming: as postwar arming becomes increasingly costly to the government, states arm less, and therefore bargain from a weaker position. Postwar political constraints on arming create a commitment problem which compel states to pursue war outcomes which alter the distribution of power between themselves and their opponent to their advantage, thereby avoiding future relative weakness created by constraints on arming. While postwar constraints on arming harm a state’s postwar outlook, the possibility of cooperation with a partner can push states to reach a settlement during wartime, rather than pursue an absolute war outcome. However, coalition partners do not always diminish the scope of war goals: if a state expects to be powerful relative to its opponent following the war, this postwar position motivates it to accept a moderate negotiated settlement. However, if its interests will strongly align with the interests if its coalition partner who will be weak relative to the opponent after the war, shared postwar interests can push a state to join its partner’s pursuit of war goals which disarm their opponent(s). The models clarify the relationship between war outcome and postwar power: rather than reflecting outcome, concern about the postwar distribution of power and its implications for future bargaining determine the war outcomes governments pursue. I test the implications of the models by estimating a series of statistical models of postwar defense burden and using process tracing in a case study of Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).","abstract_html":"Military power following interstate war does not consistently reflect who wins and loses. What explains postwar power, and how might it relate to war outcome? I analyze two formal models of war termination in which a state (or coalition) and an opponent attempt to reach a settlement dividing a disputed good in an ongoing war, and do so again in a postwar period. The postwar distribution of power reflects domestic political constraints on arming: as postwar arming becomes increasingly costly to the government, states arm less, and therefore bargain from a weaker position. Postwar political constraints on arming create a commitment problem which compel states to pursue war outcomes which alter the distribution of power between themselves and their opponent to their advantage, thereby avoiding future relative weakness created by constraints on arming. While postwar constraints on arming harm a state’s postwar outlook, the possibility of cooperation with a partner can push states to reach a settlement during wartime, rather than pursue an absolute war outcome. However, coalition partners do not always diminish the scope of war goals: if a state expects to be powerful relative to its opponent following the war, this postwar position motivates it to accept a moderate negotiated settlement. However, if its interests will strongly align with the interests if its coalition partner who will be weak relative to the opponent after the war, shared postwar interests can push a state to join its partner’s pursuit of war goals which disarm their opponent(s). The models clarify the relationship between war outcome and postwar power: rather than reflecting outcome, concern about the postwar distribution of power and its implications for future bargaining determine the war outcomes governments pursue. I test the implications of the models by estimating a series of statistical models of postwar defense burden and using process tracing in a case study of Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883).","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Landry, Joshua"],"institution":"The University of Texas at Austin","degree_name":"Doctor of Philosophy","degree_level":"Doctoral","degree_discipline":"Government","degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Wolford, Scott"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Chapman, Terrence","McDonald, Patrick","Rider, Toby"],"year":2023,"date_issued":"2023-07-25","date_published":"2023-07-25","updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:01:10Z","subjects":["War","Arming","Military power","Postwar","International security"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/50062"],"render_values":[{"text":"https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/50062","href":"https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/50062","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2152/123264","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Wolford, Scott"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Chapman, Terrence","McDonald, Patrick","Rider, Toby"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Landry, Joshua"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2023-12-20T01:22:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2023-12-20T01:22:35Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2023-07-25"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_discipline","label":"Discipline","values":["Government"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_level","label":"Degree Level","values":["Doctoral"]},{"key":"thesis:degree_name","label":"Degree Name","values":["Doctor of Philosophy"]},{"key":"thesis:institution_name","label":"Thesis Institution Name","values":["The University of Texas at Austin"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["War","Arming","Military power","Postwar","International security"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2152/123264","https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/50062"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Military power following interstate war does not consistently reflect who wins and loses. What explains postwar power, and how might it relate to war outcome? I analyze two formal models of war termination in which a state (or coalition) and an opponent attempt to reach a settlement dividing a disputed good in an ongoing war, and do so again in a postwar period. The postwar distribution of power reflects domestic political constraints on arming: as postwar arming becomes increasingly costly to the government, states arm less, and therefore bargain from a weaker position. Postwar political constraints on arming create a commitment problem which compel states to pursue war outcomes which alter the distribution of power between themselves and their opponent to their advantage, thereby avoiding future relative weakness created by constraints on arming. While postwar constraints on arming harm a state’s postwar outlook, the possibility of cooperation with a partner can push states to reach a settlement during wartime, rather than pursue an absolute war outcome. However, coalition partners do not always diminish the scope of war goals: if a state expects to be powerful relative to its opponent following the war, this postwar position motivates it to accept a moderate negotiated settlement. However, if its interests will strongly align with the interests if its coalition partner who will be weak relative to the opponent after the war, shared postwar interests can push a state to join its partner’s pursuit of war goals which disarm their opponent(s). The models clarify the relationship between war outcome and postwar power: rather than reflecting outcome, concern about the postwar distribution of power and its implications for future bargaining determine the war outcomes governments pursue. I test the implications of the models by estimating a series of statistical models of postwar defense burden and using process tracing in a case study of Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883)."]},{"key":"dc:format.mimetype","label":"Dc Format Mimetype","values":["application/pdf"]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The politics of arming, postwar power, and war outcomes"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Wolford, Scott"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Chapman, Terrence","McDonald, Patrick","Rider, Toby"],"dc:creator":["Landry, Joshua"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2023-12-20T01:22:35Z"],"dc:date.available":["2023-12-20T01:22:35Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2023-07-25"],"dc:description.abstract":["Military power following interstate war does not consistently reflect who wins and loses. What explains postwar power, and how might it relate to war outcome? I analyze two formal models of war termination in which a state (or coalition) and an opponent attempt to reach a settlement dividing a disputed good in an ongoing war, and do so again in a postwar period. The postwar distribution of power reflects domestic political constraints on arming: as postwar arming becomes increasingly costly to the government, states arm less, and therefore bargain from a weaker position. Postwar political constraints on arming create a commitment problem which compel states to pursue war outcomes which alter the distribution of power between themselves and their opponent to their advantage, thereby avoiding future relative weakness created by constraints on arming. While postwar constraints on arming harm a state’s postwar outlook, the possibility of cooperation with a partner can push states to reach a settlement during wartime, rather than pursue an absolute war outcome. However, coalition partners do not always diminish the scope of war goals: if a state expects to be powerful relative to its opponent following the war, this postwar position motivates it to accept a moderate negotiated settlement. However, if its interests will strongly align with the interests if its coalition partner who will be weak relative to the opponent after the war, shared postwar interests can push a state to join its partner’s pursuit of war goals which disarm their opponent(s). The models clarify the relationship between war outcome and postwar power: rather than reflecting outcome, concern about the postwar distribution of power and its implications for future bargaining determine the war outcomes governments pursue. I test the implications of the models by estimating a series of statistical models of postwar defense burden and using process tracing in a case study of Chile in the War of the Pacific (1879-1883)."],"dc:format.mimetype":["application/pdf"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2152/123264","https://doi.org/10.26153/tsw/50062"],"dc:language.iso":["en"],"dc:subject":["War","Arming","Military power","Postwar","International security"],"dc:title":["The politics of arming, postwar power, and war outcomes"],"dc:type":["Thesis"],"thesis:degree_discipline":["Government"],"thesis:degree_level":["Doctoral"],"thesis:degree_name":["Doctor of Philosophy"],"thesis:institution_name":["The University of Texas at Austin"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-24T05:01:10Z"}