{"id":{"repo_id":"temple","oai_identifier":"oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/817"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/temple/oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/817","repository":{"repo_id":"temple","name":"Temple University","base_url":"https://scholarshare.temple.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The Politics of Development Aid: Understanding the Lending Practices of the World Bank Group","abstract":"This study examines variations in the lending strategies of the four main agencies of the World Bank. Countries with similar basic development and demographic attributes often receive very different amounts of financial support from the different agencies of the World Bank. Utilizing regression analysis of panel-data covering the years between 1990 through 2011, the study finds that variation in the allocation of development aid both within and between the different World Bank agencies (IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA) do not generally reflect patterns in objective indicators of economic need or institutional quality among recipients. Rather, statistical analysis shows that World Bank aid is positively correlated with several measures of donor influence. Utilizing a multi-donor model of political influence, the study finds evidence that the Bank’s top donors, countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan disproportionately influence the Bank to lend in ways that support their foreign policy interests. Countries with close economic, political, and geostrategic ties to powerful donors tend to receive more aid on average than their less well-connected peers. The data show that the Bank often lends in ways that contradict its own lending criteria. Despite the Bank’s explicit emphasis on economic need and institutional quality, the agencies of the World Bank often provide greater amounts of assistance to those with less need and poor quality governance. The study has implications for the study of international organizations, institutional design, and how donor influence at the World Bank is mediated by variations in internal agency structures.","abstract_html":"This study examines variations in the lending strategies of the four main agencies of the World Bank. Countries with similar basic development and demographic attributes often receive very different amounts of financial support from the different agencies of the World Bank. Utilizing regression analysis of panel-data covering the years between 1990 through 2011, the study finds that variation in the allocation of development aid both within and between the different World Bank agencies (IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA) do not generally reflect patterns in objective indicators of economic need or institutional quality among recipients. Rather, statistical analysis shows that World Bank aid is positively correlated with several measures of donor influence. Utilizing a multi-donor model of political influence, the study finds evidence that the Bank’s top donors, countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan disproportionately influence the Bank to lend in ways that support their foreign policy interests. Countries with close economic, political, and geostrategic ties to powerful donors tend to receive more aid on average than their less well-connected peers. The data show that the Bank often lends in ways that contradict its own lending criteria. Despite the Bank’s explicit emphasis on economic need and institutional quality, the agencies of the World Bank often provide greater amounts of assistance to those with less need and poor quality governance. The study has implications for the study of international organizations, institutional design, and how donor influence at the World Bank is mediated by variations in internal agency structures.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Blemings, Travis I."],"institution":"Temple University. Libraries","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Fioretos, Karl Orfeo, 1966-"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Pollack, Mark A., 1966-","Arceneaux, Kevin","Bush, Sarah S.","Kaya, Ayse"],"year":2017,"date_issued":"2017","date_published":"2017","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:20:51Z","subjects":["Political science","International relations","Economics","Development aid","Economic development","Foreign aid","International organizations","Multilateral aid","World bank"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["IN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available."],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/817","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Fioretos, Karl Orfeo, 1966-"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Pollack, Mark A., 1966-","Arceneaux, Kevin","Bush, Sarah S.","Kaya, Ayse"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Blemings, Travis I."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2020-10-20T13:33:38Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2020-10-20T13:33:38Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2017"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Temple University. 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Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available."]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/817"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This study examines variations in the lending strategies of the four main agencies of the World Bank. Countries with similar basic development and demographic attributes often receive very different amounts of financial support from the different agencies of the World Bank. Utilizing regression analysis of panel-data covering the years between 1990 through 2011, the study finds that variation in the allocation of development aid both within and between the different World Bank agencies (IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA) do not generally reflect patterns in objective indicators of economic need or institutional quality among recipients. Rather, statistical analysis shows that World Bank aid is positively correlated with several measures of donor influence. Utilizing a multi-donor model of political influence, the study finds evidence that the Bank’s top donors, countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan disproportionately influence the Bank to lend in ways that support their foreign policy interests. Countries with close economic, political, and geostrategic ties to powerful donors tend to receive more aid on average than their less well-connected peers. The data show that the Bank often lends in ways that contradict its own lending criteria. Despite the Bank’s explicit emphasis on economic need and institutional quality, the agencies of the World Bank often provide greater amounts of assistance to those with less need and poor quality governance. The study has implications for the study of international organizations, institutional design, and how donor influence at the World Bank is mediated by variations in internal agency structures."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The Politics of Development Aid: Understanding the Lending Practices of the World Bank Group"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Fioretos, Karl Orfeo, 1966-"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Pollack, Mark A., 1966-","Arceneaux, Kevin","Bush, Sarah S.","Kaya, Ayse"],"dc:creator":["Blemings, Travis I."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2020-10-20T13:33:38Z"],"dc:date.available":["2020-10-20T13:33:38Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2017"],"dc:description.abstract":["This study examines variations in the lending strategies of the four main agencies of the World Bank. Countries with similar basic development and demographic attributes often receive very different amounts of financial support from the different agencies of the World Bank. Utilizing regression analysis of panel-data covering the years between 1990 through 2011, the study finds that variation in the allocation of development aid both within and between the different World Bank agencies (IBRD, IDA, IFC, and MIGA) do not generally reflect patterns in objective indicators of economic need or institutional quality among recipients. Rather, statistical analysis shows that World Bank aid is positively correlated with several measures of donor influence. Utilizing a multi-donor model of political influence, the study finds evidence that the Bank’s top donors, countries such as the United States, United Kingdom, and Japan disproportionately influence the Bank to lend in ways that support their foreign policy interests. Countries with close economic, political, and geostrategic ties to powerful donors tend to receive more aid on average than their less well-connected peers. The data show that the Bank often lends in ways that contradict its own lending criteria. Despite the Bank’s explicit emphasis on economic need and institutional quality, the agencies of the World Bank often provide greater amounts of assistance to those with less need and poor quality governance. The study has implications for the study of international organizations, institutional design, and how donor influence at the World Bank is mediated by variations in internal agency structures."],"dc:description.degree":["Ph.D."],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/817"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Temple University. Libraries"],"dc:rights":["IN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Political science","International relations","Economics","Development aid","Economic development","Foreign aid","International organizations","Multilateral aid","World bank"],"dc:title":["The Politics of Development Aid: Understanding the Lending Practices of the World Bank Group"],"dc:type":["Text"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:20:51Z"}