{"id":{"repo_id":"temple","oai_identifier":"oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/1442"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/temple/oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/1442","repository":{"repo_id":"temple","name":"Temple University","base_url":"https://scholarshare.temple.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"Non-Parasitic Warlords and Geographical Distance","abstract":"This dissertation presents an extension of the warlord competition models found in Skaperdas (2002) and Konrad and Skaperdas (2012). I consider two non-parasitic warlords located on a line. Each warlord allocates resources for the extraction of natural resources, the production of goods and services, and conflict with the opposing warlord. Within the symmetric rates of seizure model, I use three different forms of the contest success function, a primary tool in the conflict theory literature, in my analysis. I show that the warlord closer to the point of conflict will invest less into the hiring of warriors and more into the production of goods and services, yet wins a larger proportion of total goods and services produced within the economy. Under certain conditions, the placement of the point of conflict at the midpoint between the two warlords maximizes the total resources toward war and minimizes total production. Under the asymmetric rates of seizure model, I find that the warlord closer to the point of conflict invests more in warfare and less in production; that is, results that counter what is found in the symmetric model.","abstract_html":"This dissertation presents an extension of the warlord competition models found in Skaperdas (2002) and Konrad and Skaperdas (2012). I consider two non-parasitic warlords located on a line. Each warlord allocates resources for the extraction of natural resources, the production of goods and services, and conflict with the opposing warlord. Within the symmetric rates of seizure model, I use three different forms of the contest success function, a primary tool in the conflict theory literature, in my analysis. I show that the warlord closer to the point of conflict will invest less into the hiring of warriors and more into the production of goods and services, yet wins a larger proportion of total goods and services produced within the economy. Under certain conditions, the placement of the point of conflict at the midpoint between the two warlords maximizes the total resources toward war and minimizes total production. Under the asymmetric rates of seizure model, I find that the warlord closer to the point of conflict invests more in warfare and less in production; that is, results that counter what is found in the symmetric model.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Hionis, Jerry Jr."],"institution":"Temple University. Libraries","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Diamantaras, Dimitrios"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Ritter, Moritz B.","Zusai, Dai","Rosenthal, Edward C., 1959-"],"year":2013,"date_issued":"2013","date_published":"2013","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:21:38Z","subjects":["Economics","Economic Theory","Conflict Theory","Contest Theory","Development Economics","Game Theory","Microeconomic Theory","Warlord Competition"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["IN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available."],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["864885813"],"render_values":[{"text":"864885813","href":null,"code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/1442","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Diamantaras, Dimitrios"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Ritter, Moritz B.","Zusai, Dai","Rosenthal, Edward C., 1959-"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Hionis, Jerry Jr."]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2020-10-26T19:19:23Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.available","label":"Dc Date Available","values":["2020-10-26T19:19:23Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2013"]},{"key":"dc:publisher","label":"Institution","values":["Temple University. Libraries"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Text"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Economics","Economic Theory","Conflict Theory","Contest Theory","Development Economics","Game Theory","Microeconomic Theory","Warlord Competition"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language.iso","label":"Language (ISO)","values":["eng"]},{"key":"dc:rights","label":"Dc Rights","values":["IN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available."]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.other","label":"Dc Identifier Other","values":["864885813"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/1442"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation presents an extension of the warlord competition models found in Skaperdas (2002) and Konrad and Skaperdas (2012). I consider two non-parasitic warlords located on a line. Each warlord allocates resources for the extraction of natural resources, the production of goods and services, and conflict with the opposing warlord. Within the symmetric rates of seizure model, I use three different forms of the contest success function, a primary tool in the conflict theory literature, in my analysis. I show that the warlord closer to the point of conflict will invest less into the hiring of warriors and more into the production of goods and services, yet wins a larger proportion of total goods and services produced within the economy. Under certain conditions, the placement of the point of conflict at the midpoint between the two warlords maximizes the total resources toward war and minimizes total production. Under the asymmetric rates of seizure model, I find that the warlord closer to the point of conflict invests more in warfare and less in production; that is, results that counter what is found in the symmetric model."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["Ph.D."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["Non-Parasitic Warlords and Geographical Distance"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Diamantaras, Dimitrios"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Ritter, Moritz B.","Zusai, Dai","Rosenthal, Edward C., 1959-"],"dc:creator":["Hionis, Jerry Jr."],"dc:date.accessioned":["2020-10-26T19:19:23Z"],"dc:date.available":["2020-10-26T19:19:23Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2013"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation presents an extension of the warlord competition models found in Skaperdas (2002) and Konrad and Skaperdas (2012). I consider two non-parasitic warlords located on a line. Each warlord allocates resources for the extraction of natural resources, the production of goods and services, and conflict with the opposing warlord. Within the symmetric rates of seizure model, I use three different forms of the contest success function, a primary tool in the conflict theory literature, in my analysis. I show that the warlord closer to the point of conflict will invest less into the hiring of warriors and more into the production of goods and services, yet wins a larger proportion of total goods and services produced within the economy. Under certain conditions, the placement of the point of conflict at the midpoint between the two warlords maximizes the total resources toward war and minimizes total production. Under the asymmetric rates of seizure model, I find that the warlord closer to the point of conflict invests more in warfare and less in production; that is, results that counter what is found in the symmetric model."],"dc:description.degree":["Ph.D."],"dc:identifier.other":["864885813"],"dc:identifier.uri":["http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.12613/1442"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Temple University. Libraries"],"dc:rights":["IN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Economics","Economic Theory","Conflict Theory","Contest Theory","Development Economics","Game Theory","Microeconomic Theory","Warlord Competition"],"dc:title":["Non-Parasitic Warlords and Geographical Distance"],"dc:type":["Text"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:21:38Z"}