{"id":{"repo_id":"temple","oai_identifier":"oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/12196"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/temple/oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/12196","repository":{"repo_id":"temple","name":"Temple University","base_url":"https://scholarshare.temple.edu/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The intersection of geopolitics and strategic procurement: an exploration of sourcing in the defense industry from a six sigma perspective","abstract":"Advanced semiconductors are foundational to the operational effectiveness of modern U.S. defense systems. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) remains structurally dependent on geographically concentrated foreign fabrication—particularly advanced-node production in Taiwan—and upstream material inputs subject to geopolitical constraint. This dependency creates systemic vulnerability within defense acquisition governance rather than isolated procurement inefficiency. This dissertation examined the strategic implications of concentrated and outsourced semiconductor supply chains within U.S. defense acquisition. It addressed three research questions: (1) To what extent does U.S. semiconductor dependency pose national security risk? (2) How do policymakers and defense industry leaders perceive geopolitical uncertainty within semiconductor markets and (3) What governance and procurement strategies can enhance resilience? Using a two-study qualitative design, the research integrated Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Six Sigma DMAIC framework to evaluate governance constraints and operational control gaps. Study 1 analyzed the F-35 program as a critical case using semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis of GAO, CRS, and DoD reports. Study 2 extended the analysis across missile defense and related acquisition systems to assess ecosystem-level generalizability. Data were coded using NVivo through a hybrid theoretical and inductive approach. Findings indicate that semiconductor vulnerability is systemic within defense acquisition architecture. High asset specificity, supplier concentration, institutional rigidity, and geopolitical uncertainty interact to produce structural inertia, limiting adaptive capacity. Strengthening defense semiconductor resilience therefore requires coordinated reform across procurement governance, industrial policy, and supply chain transparency.","abstract_html":"Advanced semiconductors are foundational to the operational effectiveness of modern U.S. defense systems. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) remains structurally dependent on geographically concentrated foreign fabrication—particularly advanced-node production in Taiwan—and upstream material inputs subject to geopolitical constraint. This dependency creates systemic vulnerability within defense acquisition governance rather than isolated procurement inefficiency. This dissertation examined the strategic implications of concentrated and outsourced semiconductor supply chains within U.S. defense acquisition. It addressed three research questions: (1) To what extent does U.S. semiconductor dependency pose national security risk? (2) How do policymakers and defense industry leaders perceive geopolitical uncertainty within semiconductor markets and (3) What governance and procurement strategies can enhance resilience? Using a two-study qualitative design, the research integrated Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Six Sigma DMAIC framework to evaluate governance constraints and operational control gaps. Study 1 analyzed the F-35 program as a critical case using semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis of GAO, CRS, and DoD reports. Study 2 extended the analysis across missile defense and related acquisition systems to assess ecosystem-level generalizability. Data were coded using NVivo through a hybrid theoretical and inductive approach. Findings indicate that semiconductor vulnerability is systemic within defense acquisition architecture. High asset specificity, supplier concentration, institutional rigidity, and geopolitical uncertainty interact to produce structural inertia, limiting adaptive capacity. Strengthening defense semiconductor resilience therefore requires coordinated reform across procurement governance, industrial policy, and supply chain transparency.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Sarfo, John"],"institution":"Temple University. Libraries","degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":[],"advisors":["Guillotin, Bertrand"],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":["Moreira, Solon","Di Benedetto, C. Anthony","Wattal, Sunil"],"year":2026,"date_issued":"2026-05","date_published":"2026-05","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:22:02Z","subjects":["Business administration","Business administration and international business administration"],"languages":["eng"],"rights":["IN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available."],"rights_urls":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"identifier_entries":[]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://scholarshare.temple.edu/handle/20.500.12613/12196","outbound_label":"Repository record","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor.advisor","label":"Advisor","values":["Guillotin, Bertrand"]},{"key":"dc:contributor.committeemember","label":"Committee Member","values":["Moreira, Solon","Di Benedetto, C. 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Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available."]},{"key":"dc:rights.uri","label":"Rights URI","values":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://scholarshare.temple.edu/handle/20.500.12613/12196"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["Advanced semiconductors are foundational to the operational effectiveness of modern U.S. defense systems. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) remains structurally dependent on geographically concentrated foreign fabrication—particularly advanced-node production in Taiwan—and upstream material inputs subject to geopolitical constraint. This dependency creates systemic vulnerability within defense acquisition governance rather than isolated procurement inefficiency. This dissertation examined the strategic implications of concentrated and outsourced semiconductor supply chains within U.S. defense acquisition. It addressed three research questions: (1) To what extent does U.S. semiconductor dependency pose national security risk? (2) How do policymakers and defense industry leaders perceive geopolitical uncertainty within semiconductor markets and (3) What governance and procurement strategies can enhance resilience? Using a two-study qualitative design, the research integrated Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Six Sigma DMAIC framework to evaluate governance constraints and operational control gaps. Study 1 analyzed the F-35 program as a critical case using semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis of GAO, CRS, and DoD reports. Study 2 extended the analysis across missile defense and related acquisition systems to assess ecosystem-level generalizability. Data were coded using NVivo through a hybrid theoretical and inductive approach. Findings indicate that semiconductor vulnerability is systemic within defense acquisition architecture. High asset specificity, supplier concentration, institutional rigidity, and geopolitical uncertainty interact to produce structural inertia, limiting adaptive capacity. Strengthening defense semiconductor resilience therefore requires coordinated reform across procurement governance, industrial policy, and supply chain transparency."]},{"key":"dc:description.degree","label":"Dc Description Degree","values":["D.B.A."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The intersection of geopolitics and strategic procurement: an exploration of sourcing in the defense industry from a six sigma perspective"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor.advisor":["Guillotin, Bertrand"],"dc:contributor.committeemember":["Moreira, Solon","Di Benedetto, C. Anthony","Wattal, Sunil"],"dc:creator":["Sarfo, John"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-06-10T13:45:25Z"],"dc:date.available":["2026-06-10T13:45:25Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2026-05"],"dc:description.abstract":["Advanced semiconductors are foundational to the operational effectiveness of modern U.S. defense systems. However, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) remains structurally dependent on geographically concentrated foreign fabrication—particularly advanced-node production in Taiwan—and upstream material inputs subject to geopolitical constraint. This dependency creates systemic vulnerability within defense acquisition governance rather than isolated procurement inefficiency. This dissertation examined the strategic implications of concentrated and outsourced semiconductor supply chains within U.S. defense acquisition. It addressed three research questions: (1) To what extent does U.S. semiconductor dependency pose national security risk? (2) How do policymakers and defense industry leaders perceive geopolitical uncertainty within semiconductor markets and (3) What governance and procurement strategies can enhance resilience? Using a two-study qualitative design, the research integrated Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) and the Six Sigma DMAIC framework to evaluate governance constraints and operational control gaps. Study 1 analyzed the F-35 program as a critical case using semi-structured interviews and documentary analysis of GAO, CRS, and DoD reports. Study 2 extended the analysis across missile defense and related acquisition systems to assess ecosystem-level generalizability. Data were coded using NVivo through a hybrid theoretical and inductive approach. Findings indicate that semiconductor vulnerability is systemic within defense acquisition architecture. High asset specificity, supplier concentration, institutional rigidity, and geopolitical uncertainty interact to produce structural inertia, limiting adaptive capacity. Strengthening defense semiconductor resilience therefore requires coordinated reform across procurement governance, industrial policy, and supply chain transparency."],"dc:description.degree":["D.B.A."],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://scholarshare.temple.edu/handle/20.500.12613/12196"],"dc:language.iso":["eng"],"dc:publisher":["Temple University. Libraries"],"dc:rights":["IN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available."],"dc:rights.uri":["http://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/"],"dc:subject":["Business administration","Business administration and international business administration"],"dc:title":["The intersection of geopolitics and strategic procurement: an exploration of sourcing in the defense industry from a six sigma perspective"],"dc:type":["Text"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:22:02Z"}