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LOBBYING FOR ACCOUNTING LEGISLATION

Abstract

dc:description.abstract

I provide the first large-scale evidence on the lobbying forces seeking to deregulate accounting and their consequences using the U.S. congressional archive and lobbying disclosure data. I focus on congressional bills aimed at changing accounting rules (“accounting bills”), which attracted over a billion dollars in lobbying from industries and firms between 1999 and 2022. Notably, 72 percent of the lobbying expenditures are for accounting bills that seek to deregulate (“deregulating bills”). Deregulating bills, when lobbied more, are not more likely to become legislated but are more likely to result in downstream deregulatory actions. When chairs of the congressional committees overseeing accounting regulation receive more campaign financing from lobbying organizations, they are more likely to hear a deregulating bill, and politicians are more likely to vote in favor of it. Furthermore, after lobbying for accounting bills, firms are less likely to face accounting-related regulatory scrutiny from the SEC. These findings are consistent with the special interest theory of regulation.

Degree

thesis:*
Grantor dc:publisher
Temple University. Libraries
Year dc:date.issued
2025

Author and committee

dc:creator, dc:contributor.*
Author dc:creator
  • Lee, You-Kyung
Advisor dc:contributor.advisor
  • Basu, Sudipta, 1965-
Committee members dc:contributor.committeemember
  • Byzalov, Dmitri
  • Gomez, Enrique
  • Wang, Wei
  • Naveen, Lalitha

Subjects

dc:subject × 2

Rights

dc:rights
Statement dc:rights
  • IN COPYRIGHT- This Rights Statement can be used for an Item that is in copyright. Using this statement implies that the organization making this Item available has determined that the Item is in copyright and either is the rights-holder, has obtained permission from the rights-holder(s) to make their Work(s) available, or makes the Item available under an exception or limitation to copyright (including Fair Use) that entitles it to make the Item available.
Language dc:language.iso
eng

Identifiers

dc:identifier.*
Repository record dc:identifier.uri
https://scholarshare.temple.edu/handle/20.500.12613/11253
OAI identifier oai:identifier
oai:scholarshare.temple.edu:20.500.12613/11253

Chain of custody

source
Harvested from
Temple University
Base URL
scholarshare.temple.edu/server/oai/request
Last updated
2026-07-27
Source record
OAI-PMH GetRecord
citation

Lee, You-Kyung. LOBBYING FOR ACCOUNTING LEGISLATION. Temple University. Libraries, 2025. https://scholarshare.temple.edu/handle/20.500.12613/11253