{"id":{"repo_id":"tdl","oai_identifier":"oai:tdl-ir.tdl.org:2152/28083"},"canonical_url":"https://search.dev.ndltd.org/etd/tdl/oai:tdl-ir.tdl.org:2152/28083","repository":{"repo_id":"tdl","name":"Texas Digital Library","base_url":"https://tdl-ir.tdl.org/server/oai/request"},"display":{"title":"The nature of hallucinatory experience","abstract":"This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the nature of hallucinatory experience. It defines and contrasts the two major current theories about the nature of perceptual experience: representationalism and naïve realism. I then argue that most (if not all) current versions of these theories do not offer a satisfactory account of hallucination. Finally, I propose and defend a schematic version of a Kaplanian theory for perceptual experience that can arguably give a satisfactory account of the distinctive nature of hallucination. I compare my proposal with similar candidates and argue that it offers a more promising way of accounting for the relevant desiderata in a harmonious way. In short, I propose that hallucinatory experiences are failed experiences of a special sort. By having a hallucination, the subject fails to be in contact with worldly objects, and this special kind of failure can be accounted for in terms of a failed reference to putative objects. On my proposal, a hallucinatory state purports to represent a specific state-of-the-world, but it fails to do so. This renders hallucinatory states incapable of being (properly speaking) either veridical or falsidical. This peculiar aspect of hallucination, I claim, is not properly captured by most (if not all) theories to date.","abstract_html":"This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the nature of hallucinatory experience. It defines and contrasts the two major current theories about the nature of perceptual experience: representationalism and naïve realism. I then argue that most (if not all) current versions of these theories do not offer a satisfactory account of hallucination. Finally, I propose and defend a schematic version of a Kaplanian theory for perceptual experience that can arguably give a satisfactory account of the distinctive nature of hallucination. I compare my proposal with similar candidates and argue that it offers a more promising way of accounting for the relevant desiderata in a harmonious way. In short, I propose that hallucinatory experiences are failed experiences of a special sort. By having a hallucination, the subject fails to be in contact with worldly objects, and this special kind of failure can be accounted for in terms of a failed reference to putative objects. On my proposal, a hallucinatory state purports to represent a specific state-of-the-world, but it fails to do so. This renders hallucinatory states incapable of being (properly speaking) either veridical or falsidical. This peculiar aspect of hallucination, I claim, is not properly captured by most (if not all) theories to date.","abstract_has_math":false,"creators":["Alves, Marco Aurelio Sousa"],"institution":null,"degree_name":null,"degree_level":null,"degree_discipline":null,"degree_department":null,"school":null,"contributors":["Tye, Michael"],"advisors":[],"committee_chairs":[],"committee_members":[],"year":2014,"date_issued":"2014-12","date_published":"2014-12","updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:19:21Z","subjects":["Hallucination","Perceptual content"],"languages":["en"],"rights":[],"rights_urls":[],"identifier_entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2152/28083"],"render_values":[{"text":"http://hdl.handle.net/2152/28083","href":"http://hdl.handle.net/2152/28083","code":true}]}]},"links":{"outbound_url":"https://hdl.handle.net/2152/28083","outbound_label":"Handle","outbound_source":"dc:identifier.uri"},"metadata_groups":[{"id":"people","label":"People","entries":[{"key":"dc:contributor","label":"Contributor","values":["Tye, Michael"]},{"key":"dc:creator","label":"Author","values":["Alves, Marco Aurelio Sousa"]}]},{"id":"academic_context","label":"Academic Context","entries":[{"key":"dc:date.accessioned","label":"Dc Date Accessioned","values":["2026-03-24T19:07:15Z"]},{"key":"dc:date.issued","label":"Date","values":["2014-12"]},{"key":"dc:type","label":"Dc Type","values":["Thesis"]}]},{"id":"subjects_keywords","label":"Subjects and Keywords","entries":[{"key":"dc:subject","label":"Dc Subject","values":["Hallucination","Perceptual content"]}]},{"id":"language_rights","label":"Language and Rights","entries":[{"key":"dc:language","label":"Dc Language","values":["en"]}]},{"id":"identifiers","label":"Identifiers","entries":[{"key":"dc:identifier","label":"Identifier","values":["http://hdl.handle.net/2152/28083"]},{"key":"dc:identifier.uri","label":"Identifier URI","values":["https://hdl.handle.net/2152/28083"]}]},{"id":"additional","label":"Additional Metadata","entries":[{"key":"dc:description.abstract","label":"Abstract","values":["This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the nature of hallucinatory experience. It defines and contrasts the two major current theories about the nature of perceptual experience: representationalism and naïve realism. I then argue that most (if not all) current versions of these theories do not offer a satisfactory account of hallucination. Finally, I propose and defend a schematic version of a Kaplanian theory for perceptual experience that can arguably give a satisfactory account of the distinctive nature of hallucination. I compare my proposal with similar candidates and argue that it offers a more promising way of accounting for the relevant desiderata in a harmonious way. In short, I propose that hallucinatory experiences are failed experiences of a special sort. By having a hallucination, the subject fails to be in contact with worldly objects, and this special kind of failure can be accounted for in terms of a failed reference to putative objects. On my proposal, a hallucinatory state purports to represent a specific state-of-the-world, but it fails to do so. This renders hallucinatory states incapable of being (properly speaking) either veridical or falsidical. This peculiar aspect of hallucination, I claim, is not properly captured by most (if not all) theories to date."]},{"key":"dc:title","label":"Title","values":["The nature of hallucinatory experience"]}]}],"canonical_facts":{"dc:contributor":["Tye, Michael"],"dc:creator":["Alves, Marco Aurelio Sousa"],"dc:date.accessioned":["2026-03-24T19:07:15Z"],"dc:date.issued":["2014-12"],"dc:description.abstract":["This dissertation seeks to advance our understanding of the nature of hallucinatory experience. It defines and contrasts the two major current theories about the nature of perceptual experience: representationalism and naïve realism. I then argue that most (if not all) current versions of these theories do not offer a satisfactory account of hallucination. Finally, I propose and defend a schematic version of a Kaplanian theory for perceptual experience that can arguably give a satisfactory account of the distinctive nature of hallucination. I compare my proposal with similar candidates and argue that it offers a more promising way of accounting for the relevant desiderata in a harmonious way. In short, I propose that hallucinatory experiences are failed experiences of a special sort. By having a hallucination, the subject fails to be in contact with worldly objects, and this special kind of failure can be accounted for in terms of a failed reference to putative objects. On my proposal, a hallucinatory state purports to represent a specific state-of-the-world, but it fails to do so. This renders hallucinatory states incapable of being (properly speaking) either veridical or falsidical. This peculiar aspect of hallucination, I claim, is not properly captured by most (if not all) theories to date."],"dc:identifier":["http://hdl.handle.net/2152/28083"],"dc:identifier.uri":["https://hdl.handle.net/2152/28083"],"dc:language":["en"],"dc:subject":["Hallucination","Perceptual content"],"dc:title":["The nature of hallucinatory experience"],"dc:type":["Thesis"]},"updated_at":"2026-07-27T21:19:21Z"}