Powers and the Metaphysics of Fundamentality

<p>In this dissertation, I address the question of whether ground, the relation that obtains between entities e1...en and a further entity e when e ontologically depends on, and is metaphysically explained by, e1...en, should be understood causally and, if so, whether this has any substantive implications. I answer both in the affirmative. I argue that ground and causation are similar enough to motivate characterizing ground as a special kind of causation, and that this can be done if we adopt a powers-theoretic account of causation. Moreover, I argue that the resultant view of ground, what I call “powerful, existential causation,” has important consequences for the debate between foundationalists, according to whom there must exist something fundamental that grounds all else, and infinitists, according to whom being might descend infinitely with nothing fundamental. Drawing on arguments and insights of medieval philosophers such as Ibn- Sīnā, Thomas Aquinas, and John Duns Scotus, I argue that if ground is understood as powerful, existential causation a strong argument can be formulated for foundationalism over infinitism. Thus, there must exist something fundamental whose existence is ungrounded, but which grounds the existence of everything else.

Name thesis:degree_name

Doctor of Philosophy (PhD)

Level thesis:degree_level

Dissertation

Discipline thesis:degree_discipline

Philosophy

Year

2022

Author dc:creator

• Cook, Benjamin

Contributors dc:contributor

• McDaniel, Kris

• Aquinas
• causation
• Grounding
• Ontological dependence
• Scotus
• Metaphysics
• Philosophy

Repository record dc:identifier

https://surface.syr.edu/etd/1593

OAI identifier oai:identifier

oai:surface.syr.edu:etd-2594